Transnational Repression: International Cooperation in Silencing Dissent

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Abstract

Why do some states assist other countries to reach across national borders and repress their diaspora, while others do not? Transnational repression involves host countries (many of whom are established democracies) working closely with origin states (typically autocracies) to transfer their citizens living abroad into their custody and silence dissent. We expect international cooperation on transnational repression to rely on a host country's economic ties with the origin country and domestic rule of law. To measure international cooperation on transnational repression, we present new data containing 608 direct physical cases of transnational repression from 2014-2020 involving 160 unique country-dyads (79 host countries and 31 origin countries). We test our hypotheses using a dataset of 33,615 directed dyad-years that accounts for refugee flows between pairs of countries and find empirical support for our theoretical argument. Autocracies are better able to elicit cooperation on human rights violations from states that have shared economic interests and a weak rule of law. Our findings provide a first account of foreign complicity in extra-territorial repression and have policy implications for civil society activists that seek to prevent governments from committing future human rights abuses on foreign nationals living abroad.

Introduction

In July 2016, Enoch Ruhigira, the former head of presidential staff for the Rwandan government, was arrested in Frankfurt, Germany following a Red Notice submitted to Interpol by the current Rwandan government accusing him of genocide and crimes against humanity. Over the next eight months, he was held in German detention as Rwanda prepared for his extradition—but was later released following exculpatory evidence and concerns that his prosecution was politically influenced (Guichaoua 2016). In October 2019, Osman Karaca, a teacher from Turkey who worked at a school linked to the Gülen religious movement, was seized in Phnom Penh, Cambodia by unidentified men believed to be Cambodian counter-terror police following accusations from Turkey that he led a coup attempt in 2016, despite having left the country in 2002. He was held in secret detention in Cambodia and rendered to Turkey on a small government jet where he continues to be held in incommunicado detention amid concerns that he faces the risk of torture (Kijewski 2019). In October 2020, Habib Asyud, the former president of an Iranian exiled Arab separatist group, was arrested and kidnapped in Istanbul, Turkey following accusations from Iran that he was involved in a deadly attack on a military parade in 2018. He was driven to the border and rendered to Iran where he faces the death penalty and has been detained for over a year (Ahmed 2020).

These three cases are examples of transnational repression. However, they are not isolated incidences. For example, Turkey has been referred to the ICC for persecuting numerous political opponents around the world; committing acts of torture, enforced disappearances, and wrongful imprisonment and Iran and Rwanda have been accused of being among the worst perpetrators of transnational repression in the United States of America (U.S.); stalking, harassing and threatening exiles there (Borger 2022; 2023). Other well-known examples of transnational repression include the murder of Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents in Turkey, Russia's poisoning of former

intelligence officers Alexander Litvinenko and Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom (UK), Rwanda's arrest of Paul Rusesabagina, a prominent dissident and former Kigali hotel manager whose story is told in the film Hotel Rwanda, Iran's abduction and execution of dissident journalist Rouhollah Zam who had been granted asylum in France, and China's persecution of Uighurs and Tibetans in many overseas territories (Abramowitz and Schenkkan 2021; Amnesty International 2020; Borger 2022).

Since 2014, Freedom House has documented 608 physical cases of transnational repression involving 79 host countries and 31 origin countries: representing 160 unique country dyads (Freedom House 2021). This increasingly "normal phenomenon" involves host countries (many of whom are established democracies) often working closely with origin countries (typically autocracies) to transfer their citizens living abroad into their custody and silence dissent (Freedom House 2021, p. 2). Origin countries target their diaspora using assassinations, assault, detention, rendition, unlawful deportation, and unexplained disappearances. The most frequent targets of transnational repression include national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities, political activists, journalists, former insiders/government elites, and human rights advocates (Freedom House 2021).

Most instances of transnational repression would not be possible without international cooperation. To reach their diaspora abroad, origin countries often depend upon host countries to arrest, detain, and transfer their citizens back to their country of origin. However, very little is known as to why states become involved in this deeply sensitive area of international politics. This raises the question, "Why do some states assist other countries to reach across national borders and repress their diaspora, while others do not?" This global pattern is especially puzzling given

the political costs of foreign complicity in abusing human rights and the political and economic diversity of host countries – ranging from Italy and Poland to South Africa and Japan.

While recent research has examined why autocratic governments use transnational repression to silence dissent, research has been yet to explore the theoretical mechanisms that explain why foreign governments decide to cooperate. We argue that international cooperation on transnational repression relies on a host country's economic ties to the origin countries and domestic rule of law. The most desirable transnational repression partners should be those countries that are more willing to trade off economic cooperation for civil liberties. Countries that are less concerned about the domestic and international consequences of breaking commitments to the rule of law should be easier to co-opt and should require less persuasion to cooperate, especially when they have greater financial dependence on the origin country.

We test our hypotheses using a dataset of 33,615 directed dyad-years that accounts for refugee flows between pairs of countries and find empirical support for our theoretical argument. Origin countries are better able to elicit cooperation on human rights violations from host countries that have shared economic interests and a weak rule of law. This article provides the first systematic account of foreign complicity in transnational repression and contributes to debates in international relations on how globalization can hinder as well as promote human rights (Brysk 2002). Our results suggest that while domestic institutions upholding the rule of law can be an effective tool for deterring international cooperation on silencing dissent, economic interconnectedness can have the negative unintended consequence of incentivizing states to trade-off human rights for material gains. Together, these findings have policy implications for civil society activists that seek to prevent governments from committing future human rights abuses on foreign nationals living abroad.

International Cooperation on Transnational Repression

Transnational Repression

Prior research on the global scale and scope of transnational repression has predominantly focused on why *origin countries* aim to silence dissent among their citizens living outside of their national borders. Like intra-state repression, transnational repression is more common among autocracies than democracies. Authoritarian regimes use repression to exert political control over their citizens, weaken the opposition, and ensure that the ruling elite survive (Davenport 2007; Hassan, Mattingly, and Nugent 2022). The benefits of authoritarian regimes using repression to deter and punish dissent (at home and abroad) outweighs the costs of public backlash as the institutions that enable citizens living in democracies to hold their government to account for violating human rights are typically absent (Olar 2019). Individuals that engage in political activism abroad are particularly threatening to authoritarian regimes as the origin country does not have direct control over the foreign institutions that allow diaspora to publicly criticize the regime (i.e., the internet) (Moss 2016). This alternative flow of information is harmful to origin countries as it provides a different account of events that can be used to mobilize dissent internally and apply international pressure on the regime to change its domestic policies (Dukalskis 2021). Dukalskis (2021) frames transnational repression as an "obstructive form" of external authoritarian image management designed to eliminate negative narratives from the public sphere that undermine the legitimacy of the regime back home and prevent domestic and international dissidents from communicating with one another (Dukalskis 2021, p. 40).

Tsourapas (2021) argues that transnational repression emerges because of migration, and the need for authoritarian regimes to maintain open borders for economic purposes while at the same time control citizen's political activities once abroad. Additionally, advances in internet

communication technologies provide opportunities for individuals to mobilize and share anti-government information with others on a global scale while simultaneously improving the ability of origin countries to surveil the political behavior of their diaspora and identify the location of their targets (Dukalskis 2021; Tsourapas 2021). While transnational repression has wide appeal across authoritarian regimes for its ability to silence dissenting voices abroad and avoid internal challenges back home, patterns of transnational repression tend to reflect the domestic politics of each country involved. For example, China's targeting of Uighur diaspora mirrors its post-2014 domestic security crackdown in the Xingjiang province and Turkey's targeting of diaspora following the 2016 coup reflects its domestic campaign against individuals that it suspected of being involved (Dukalskis 2021). Because of globalization, domestic politics and repression continue to extend beyond a country's national borders as a diaspora's "physical exit no longer necessarily implies exit from the national public sphere" (Glasius 2018, p. 81).

Cooley and Heathershaw (2017) outline three stages of transnational repression whereby origin states warn and intimidate targets in the first stage, arrest and seize property in the second stage, and pursue renditions, disappearances, attacks, and assassinations in the third stage. The multifaceted nature of transnational repression therefore requires origin countries to have a strong state security services capacity that can conduct extraterritorial violence towards a targeted diaspora and repress/coerce their associates back home (Furstenburg, Lemon and Heathershaw 2021; Shain 2010). Shain (2010) suggests that we are more likely to observe a country pursuing transnational repression when they have less tolerance of the domestic opposition, a "greater ideological component", fear external threats to their lives (e.g., in personalized regimes), and are less dependent on international support (Shain 2010, p. 162).

International Cooperation

While existing research has advanced our understanding of this topic, we still do not know what drives host countries to assist origin countries in repressing their diaspora. Transnational repression would not be possible without international cooperation (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017). Many instances of transnational repression involve origin countries "co-opting" host governments to silence dissent among their diaspora (Freedom House 2021, p. 2). Most cooperation on transnational repression is bilateral between the origin country that seeks to target their citizens living abroad and the host country where the target is apprehended. The most common form of physical repression identified by Freedom House (2021) in their Transnational Repression Database is i) detention, where an individual is held by the host country for over 12 hours at the request of the origin country, followed by ii) renditions, where the host country holds an individual incommunicado, without access to a lawyer, and forcibly returns them to the origin country without protection, and iii) unlawful deportations, where the host country forcibly deports an individual to the origin country where they are at risk of persecution with some violations of due process (Freedom House 2021).[1] The least common forms of physical repression include assassinations or assassination attempts, assaults, unexplained disappearances, and intimidation. These are cases where the origin country engages in direct attacks against individuals that have fled their territories with little or no involvement from the host country (Freedom House 2021).

The most frequent targets of transnational repression in the database include national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities, followed by political activists, journalists, former insiders/government elites, and human rights advocates (Freedom House 2021). In many instances, origin countries apply the label of terrorism or extremism to diaspora that they pursue or accuse targets of anti-state actions or corruption to justify their repressive actions and persuade host

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[1] Renditions also include abductions by the origin country overseas with reduced or no involvement by the host country government.

countries to cooperate. In some instances, the origin country files a Red Notice, Diffusion Request, or Extradition Request through Interpol that results in the host country detaining the individual or rendering/unlawfully deporting them to the origin country where they face the risk of persecution (Freedom House 2021).[2] While Interpol abuse by origin countries accounts for less than 7% of all cases of transnational repression in the database, Interpol Red Notices (requests to law enforcement in other countries to arrest a person pending extradition, surrender, or similar legal action) and other notifications provide a "cheap and easy means of reaching exiles" by legitimizing attacks on diaspora and increasing pressure on host countries to transfer individuals into their custody (Coyne 2022; Freedom House 2021, p. 6). The political manipulation of Interpol is likely to be a particularly effective tool for securing cooperation on transnational repression from democracies where host countries may be more reluctant to transfer individuals into the custody of origin countries without evidence that the individual is guilty of the crime that they are accused of committing (even if the allegations are later discovered as false). For example, Interpol notices and request on behalf of origin countries such as Azerbaijan, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, India, Iran, Rwanda, Turkey have all successfully led to the detention of individuals by democratic host countries including Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the U.S..

Figure 1 displays those 31 origin countries in the database that have targeted their citizens living abroad through transnational repression between 2014-2020. Unsurprisingly, most origin countries are autocracies where human rights violations are widespread (Coppedge et al. 2021;

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[2] Interpol is an international criminal police institution formed in 1923 with 195 member countries dedicated to transnational cooperation on counterterrorism, organized and emerging crime, and cybercrime (Coyne 2022; Interpol 2023).

Figure 1: Origin Countries, Frequency of Transnational Repression

Note: Origin countries (that have targeted a citizen living abroad) who have engaged in transnational repression (assassination or assassination attempt, assault, detention, rendition, unlawful deportation or unexplained disappearance) according to Freedom House (2021).

Figure 2: Host Countries, Frequency of Transnational Repression

Note: Host countries (where the target was apprehened) that have been involved in transnational repression (assassination or assassination attempt, assault, detention, rendition, unlawful deportation or unexplained disappearance) according to Freedom House (2021).

Gibney et al. 2022). The top ten origin countries that have engaged in the most instances of transnational repression in the database are China (213 cases), Turkey (111 cases), Egypt (42 cases), Tajikistan (38 cases), Russia (32 cases), Uzbekistan (29 cases), Thailand (15 cases), Iran (12 cases), Azerbaijan (10 cases) and Rwanda (10 cases).

Figure 2 displays 79 host countries where the origin country's target has been apprehended on behalf of an origin country or by the origin country themselves. The political and economic diversity of host countries makes international cooperation in transnational repression particularly intriguing. While the top 10 host countries that have engaged in the highest number of recorded cases of transnational repression include many autocracies and semi-democracies (e.g., Thailand, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Turkey, Kuwait, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, and India) there are many democracies that have been involved in multiple instances of transnational repression where foreign complicity in human rights violations carries greater political costs (e.g., Kenya, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Spain, France, and Austria) (Coppedge et al. 2021; Gibney et al. 2022).

Existing Explanations

Why do some states assist other countries to reach across national borders and repress their diaspora, while others do not? Very little is known as to why states become involved in this "growing pattern" of transnational repression (Abramowitz and Schenkkan 2021). International cooperation in this deeply sensitive area of international politics is especially puzzling when we consider how core international relations theories fail to fully explain why host countries would agree to participate.

For example, prior research suggests that we should be more likely to observe international cooperation between allies since defense pact members are obliged to come to the aid of their

alliance partners in times of need (Henry 2020). Additionally, countries that collaborate with allies on political and economic issues reduce security externalities and increase the strength of the whole alliance (Long and Leeds 2006). However, this argument fails to fully account for participation in transnational repression as many host countries do not have formal alliances with the origin country. For example, only 22% of host countries that assisted China with carrying out transnational repression were allies, with most participating countries not having a formal military alliance with China (e.g., the U.S., Brazil, and the Czech Republic).

Alternatively, previous studies suggest that democracies are less likely to violate human rights because of the domestic costs that would result if detected (Davenport 2007). Host countries with liberal democratic institutions should be less likely to engage in repression as their behavior is constrained by domestic and international legal commitments (Conrad and Moore 2010). However, this also fails to explain cooperation in transnational repression, since as many as 80% of host countries that assisted Russia with targeting their diaspora overseas were democracies, including established democracies such as Germany, France, and the UK.

Similarly, scholars would predict that host countries with strong human rights protections should be less likely to participate in transnational repression as doing so puts the human rights of targeted individuals at risk (Cordell 2019). A country's decision to assist a country with violating human rights is driven by the anticipated consequences of being caught, with public backlash being more likely in countries with core human rights norms (Efrat and Newman 2020). However, 50% of the host countries that have helped Iran engage in transnational repression have high levels of human rights protections, with participating states such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy having some of the best human rights records of all countries in the world.

Additionally, past research on the importance of domestic politics suggests that we might expect to observe more cooperation from host countries with right-wing governments as parties of this orientation are more likely to implement policies that strongly prioritize political and economic interests over civil liberties (Cordell 2020). Country leaders play a major role in determining the foreign policies of their country and are motivated by the preferences of their supporter base, with right-wing voters being less likely to punish their government for trading off human rights for national security than right-wing voters (Nanes 2017). However, we find quite the opposite, as there were three times as many host countries that aided Saudi Arabia in transnational repression with left-wing governments than right-wing governments (including France and the Philippines).

Economic Interconnectedness and the Rule of Law

Given these largely null findings, what drives host countries to assist origin countries in repressing their diaspora? We propose that a host country's decision to engage in transnational repression with an origin country is based on a cost-benefit calculation. On the one hand, foreign complicity in transnational repression carries significant domestic political costs as it can lead to public backlash and political resistance in the host country (Cordell 2020; Efrat and Newman 2020). All forms of transnational repression are prohibited under international law (e.g., assassinations/assassination attempts, assaults, detentions, renditions, unlawful deportations and unexplained disappearances) with countries that aid or assist an origin country in the commission of an internationally wrongful act considered internationally responsible if they have knowledge of the circumstances and does not take reasonable steps to prevent it (United Nations 2010). On the other hand, participation in transnational repression can be beneficial for the host country in maintaining or improving their bilateral relations with the origin country (Cordell 2020). Issue

linkages in international relations enable countries to exchange favors on different issue areas and incentivizes states to take great risks to uphold their international reputations and advance their national interests (Levy 1997; Long and Leeds 2006).

In order to maintain secrecy and successfully carry out transnational repression, it is crucial that origin countries only approach those host countries that are likely to agree to cooperate in the first place. Approaching a country that refuses to cooperate increases the risk that the host country will expose the origin country's plans to target their diaspora and draw attention to their repressive behavior which is counter-productive to the goal of transnational repression (i.e., silencing dissent rather than amplifying it). This selection mechanism can be conceptualized as a screening process that identifies those host countries that are most likely to perceive the payoffs of cooperation in transnational repression as positive and eliminates those countries most likely to perceive the payoffs of cooperation as negative. We propose that a host country's willingness to trade-off international cooperation for civil liberties depends on two factors.

First, we argue that international cooperation on transnational repression relies on a host country's economic ties to the origin country. Most research on the link between economic interconnectedness and human rights has focused on the positive effect of trade on human rights whereby human rights respecting states can use their financial linkages to pressure abusive states into improving their human rights practices (Cao, Greenhill and Prakash 2012; Hafner-Burton 2005; Peterson, Murdie and Asal 2016). However, few studies have focused on the way in which abusive states can leverage their position to induce cooperation from their trade partners on human rights violations. Countries with financial linkages are more likely to cooperate with one another on different issue areas as refusing to cooperate could place valuable economic transactions in jeopardy (Nooruddin and Payton 2010). Recent survey experiments on public opinion, foreign aid

and human rights show that public attitudes towards international cooperation with repressive governments is conditional on the benefits of cooperation for the donor country in other areas of international politics (Heinrich and Kobayashi 2020; Heinrich, Kobayashi and Long 2018). Countries that are dependent on one another are more likely continue to cooperate in the future to avoid sanctions, ensure that their cooperation continues in other domains, and prevent domestic backlash for any losses that would result from refusal to cooperate. Together, these factors increase the likelihood that host countries with existing ties to origin countries will perceive cooperation in transnational repression as beneficial and find rewards in helping them for their own sake (Levy 1997; Long and Leeds 2006).

Additionally, host countries that are financially dependent on the origin country should be easier to co-opt by origin countries as they can use their relative power to elicit cooperation in transnational repression through the threat or use of sanctions (e.g., a reduction in trade) (Nooruddin and Payton 2010). Previous studies suggest that powerful states can better use sanctions to secure desired policy outcomes and persuade other countries to do something they would otherwise not do when the balance of power is unequal between the sender and the target (Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Theile 2008). Host countries with economic ties to the origin country should also make more trustworthy transnational repression partners as states are more likely to exchange favors with friends as they know that they will be dealing with each other repeatedly in the future; reducing the incentives to exploit a situation and weaken the bilateral linkage (Levy 1997; Kydd 2017). This theoretical argument can help us understand why Thailand and Egypt (countries that are more dependent on trade with China) provided China with support to target their diaspora via detentions and renditions but why Laos and Tunisia (countries that are relatively

less dependent on trade with China) did not (Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini 2021; Freedom House 2021). In sum, we hypothesize that:

H1: Countries with greater economic ties to origin countries are more likely to participate in transnational repression as host countries than countries with less economic ties to origin countries.

Second, we argue that international cooperation on transnational repression relies on a host country's domestic rule of law. Countries with a strong rule of law are more likely to honor their commitments to laws protecting human rights as disregarding the rule of law can have negative domestic consequences (Kelley 2007). Experimental research shows that citizens value the rule of law and are willing to punish states for violating international legal commitments (Lupu and Wallace 2019; Wallace 2013). The risk of public backlash incentivizes states to obey their legal commitments as violating the rule of law can undermine their domestic legitimacy and threaten their survival in office, especially in countries where the normative value of the rule of law is high (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Prior research predicts that violating human rights should be more politically costly for governments that typically respect them as it reveals a greater deviation between their public and private type that can lead voters to question their honesty and credibility as a government (Cordell 2020). Whereas countries with a weak rule of law have less to lose in terms of their domestic reputation for upholding the rule of law as the public is less likely to expect them to honor their international commitments and are more likely to be accustomed to the government disrespecting the domestic rule of law on a regular basis (Simmons 2009). Due to the interconnectedness of the rule of law and the quality of democracy, it is also unlikely that citizens in countries with weak rule of law will have the ability to effectively constrain the government's behavior and punish them for violating commitments to the rule of law; therefore, reducing the

likelihood that the public's reaction to abuses will threaten the government's survival in office (O'Donnell 2004).

In addition to being less likely to perceive transnational repression as politically costly, countries with a weak rule of law should be easier to co-opt by origin countries as they are more likely to have similar preferences on handling dissent and engaging in repression (Kelley 2007). Prior research indicates that countries with similar preferences make more reliable cooperation partners as they are more likely to perceive cooperation as mutually beneficial and are less likely to disclose sensitive information that is detrimental to the group (Cordell 2019). From a logistical standpoint, origin countries should be better able to exploit the institutions of host countries with a weak rule of law and target their diaspora as detentions, unlawful deportations and renditions depend on the host country's ability to forgo due process and act without constraints to abuses of civil liberties and state power (Freedom House 2021; O'Donnell 2004). This theoretical argument can help us understand why Kosovo and Moldova (countries with a weak rule of law) provided Turkey with support to target their diaspora via arrests and renditions but why Montenegro and Estonia (countries with a relatively stronger rule of law) did not (Coppedge et al. 2021; Freedom House 2021). In sum, we hypothesize that:

> *H2: Countries with a weaker rule of law are more likely to participate in transnational repression as host countries than countries with a stronger rule of law.*

Research Design

We test our hypotheses using data on international cooperation in transnational repression, trade flows, and the rule of law for all countries in the world from 2014-2020. Our unit of analysis is directed dyad-year. While the occurrence of transnational repression has become increasingly common in recent years, it is still a relatively rare event, resulting in many zeros on our dependent

variable (a count of cooperation in transnational repression). We employ two methods for dealing with this research design issue.

First, we reduce our global sample of directed dyad-years (210,714 observations) to a sample of host countries that have admitted refugees or asylum seekers from the origin country that year according to annual refugee flow data from the UNHCR (2022). This case selection produces a sample of 33,615 directed dyad-years and ensures that only eligible cooperation partners are included in our data since the presence of a foreign citizen (from the origin country) in the host country is a necessary condition of cooperation in this issue area (with many transnational repression targets seeking asylum in the host country to avoid being returned to their country of origin).[3] This pre-processing step removes pairs of countries from our data where there is no possibility for cooperation such as Belize and Russia (no Russian refugees or asylum seekers in Belize) but guarantees that Poland (a country hosting many Russian refugees and asylum seekers) remains in our dataset. Table A.1 displays the results using the original global sample of 210,714 directed dyad-years and the study's main findings still hold.

Second, we use a zero-inflated negative binomial model to account for excess zeros in the data where there is never cooperation in transnational repression (i.e., structural zeros) and true zeros in the data where there could be cooperation in transnational repression (i.e., random zeros). The first stage of the regression uses a binary model to determine whether an observation in the data is in the "excess zero" or "true zero" category. The second stage of the regression then uses the probabilities from the first stage to model the count of cooperation in transnational repression. A Vuong test confirms that estimating a zero-inflated component is more appropriate than using a

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[3] While refugee flows are not a perfect measure of transnational cooperation eligibility (e.g., some individuals are targeted while transiting through a third country to their country of asylum), we believe it is a useful way to eliminate implausible cooperation partners from our data and reduce the possibility that our results are being driven by the prediction of non-events.

single equation count model. We use a negative binomial distribution rather than a Poisson distribution as we find significant overdispersion in the data.[4] Table A.2 shows the findings from a standard negative binomial model instead of a zero-inflated model and the paper's main results remain the same.

Dependent variable (Cooperation in Transnational Repression)

The dependent variable is a count of the number of instances of transnational repression between a pair of countries each year. To measure participation in transnational repression, we use the Transnational Repression Database from Freedom House (2021) which records 608, direct, physical cases of transnational repression from January 2014 through November 2020. In each case, states assassinated, rendered, assaulted, physically intimidated, or had detained individuals who had left those states and resided abroad. The dataset includes 31 origin countries that had conducted physical translational repression in 79 host countries and has a unique pairing between 160 host and origin countries. Freedom House uses information from UN communications, court rulings, news articles, and other official documents and reported sources to identify episodes of transnational repression and codes cases according to their certainty on whether the incident was state-driven and direct.[5]

When creating our dependent variable, we exclude assassinations/assassination attempts, assaults, unexplained disappearances, and intimidations from our count of transnational repression incidences (62 incidents) as they represent cases where host countries had little to no involvement (and are presumed not to be complicit in the action). This ensures that our measure only includes

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[4] However, the results are similar using a Poisson regression and logistic regression (where we use a dummy variable to measure transnational repression for the latter model).

[5] For a discussion of alternative datasets measuring transnational repression see Dukalskis et al. (2022). We prefer to use the Freedom House database for our analysis due to its expansive geographical coverage and narrow conceptual focus on direct physical instances of transnational repression.

those instances of transnational repression where host countries directly cooperated with origin countries on detentions, renditions, and unlawful deportations. This count variable ranges from 0 (e.g., the U.S. and China in 2014) to 121 (e.g., Thailand and China in 2015), with a mean value of 0.013.

Independent Variable (Total Trade (log))

To test the article's first hypothesis that countries with greater economic ties to origin countries should be more likely to cooperate in transnational repression, we use dyadic data from the Direction of Trade Statistics (International Monetary Fund 2023). This data presents the value of merchandise imports and exports which have been disaggregated to a country's primary trading partners. We extract the variables, *Goods, Value of Exports, Free on board (FOB), US Dollars* and *Goods, Value of Imports, Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF), US Dollars* which indicates the exports and imports value between countries. We then add the export and import values together for each country dyad-year and take the natural logarithm. A higher value on this continuous variable (e.g., Turkey and the Iran in 2019) indicates more trade and stronger economic ties between two countries, and a lower value (e.g., Israel and Iran in 2019) indicates that the two countries have less trade and weaker economic ties.

Independent Variable (Rule of law)

To test the article's second hypothesis that countries with a weaker rule of law should be more likely to cooperate in transnational repression, we use the *Rule of Law* index from Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi (2010)'s Worldwide Governance Indicators data. This index captures "perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence" (Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi 2010, p. 4). A higher value

(e.g., the UK in 2015) indicates that the state has a greater presence of the rule of law, and a lower value (e.g., Cambodia in 2015) indicates that the state has a lower presence of the rule of law.

Control Variables

To reduce the possibility that other factors affecting the likelihood of international cooperation in transnational repression may be correlated with the rule of law and trade variables, we control for several confounders.

Democracy

We control for a country's regime type using the non-democracy variable from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014)'s Autocratic Regimes dataset, updated by the Colpus dataset from Chin, Wright and Carter (2021), that codes country's as democratic when elections were fair and free with multiple parties. We create a dummy variable that codes democratic countries as 1 (e.g., France in 2016), and 0 otherwise (e.g., Saudi Arabia in 2016). This is the case for 79 percent of the observations, but not for the remaining 21 percent. Prior research shows that democracies should be less likely to engage in transnational repression as democratic institutions increase the risk that governments will be held accountable and punished by voters (Conrad and Moore 2010).

GDPPC (log)

We control for a country's GDP per capita by extracting the variable *GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$)* from the World Development Indicators dataset (World Bank 2023). We then take the natural logarithm. A higher value on this continuous variable (e.g., Germany in 2017) represents a greater economic output of a country per person that year, and a lower value (e.g., Burundi in 2017) represents a lower economic output. Past studies suggest that countries with lower levels of GDP per capita should be more likely to participate in transnational repression as they are more

likely to perceive the potential economic payoffs of cooperating as consequential and are less likely to respect human rights in general (Davenport 2007).

Alliance

We create an alliance control variable using Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long's (2002)'s Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions data. We extract all military alliance agreements from the data excluding non-aggression and neutrality pacts, as recommended by Mattes and Vonnahme (2010). We create a dummy variable that is coded 1 when there is a formal military alliance between a dyad in a specific year (e.g., Spain and Turkey in 2018), and 0 otherwise (e.g., Sweden and Turkey in 2018). This is the case for 18 percent of the observations, but not for the remaining 82 percent. Research indicates that allied countries should be more likely to engage in transnational repression to preserve their international relationships and maintain future cooperation with states in other security issue areas (Long and Leeds 2006).

Right orientation

We create a right-wing control variable using Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini (2021)'s Database of Political Institutions *EXECRLC* variable that codes the party orientation of a government as left, center, or right each year. We construct a dummy variable for this measure where states are coded as 1 if they are categorized as right-wing in a specific year (e.g., Guatemala in 2020), and 0 otherwise (e.g., Mexico in 2020). This is the case for 31 percent of the observations, but not for the remaining 69 percent. It is anticipated that right-wing governments may be more likely to participate in transnational repression as studies show that such parties are more likely to trade off human rights for cooperation in other areas of international politics, especially security (Cordell 2020).

Population (log)

We control for a country's population using the World Development Indicators dataset (World Bank 2023). We then take the natural logarithm. A higher value (e.g., India in 2019) means there are a greater number of residents living in a country regardless of their legal status or citizenship that year, and a lower value (e.g., Iceland in 2019) indicates that the country has a smaller sized population. While prior findings suggest that countries with smaller populations may be more likely to experience an imbalance of power with origin countries and participate in transnational repression, it is also possible that they may be less likely to cooperate as smaller countries tend to have greater respect for human rights in general (Davenport 2007).

Refugees (log)

We control for a country's refugee population size by country of origin using annual refugee flow data from the UNHCR (2022). We then take the natural logarithm. A higher value on this continuous variable (e.g., Turkey and Syria in 2014) means there is a greater portion of refugees and asylum seekers from a potential origin country living in a potential host country at the end of that year, and a lower value (e.g., the U.S. and South Sudan in 2014) means that there is a smaller refugee population. It is expected that countries with high refugee populations from an origin country may be more likely to participate in transnational repression as most targets of transnational repression are diaspora, exiles, refugees, and asylum seekers; therefore, increasing the likelihood that an origin country seeks cooperation from a host country in the first place (Efrat and Newman 2020).

Civil Liberties

We control for a country's level of respect for civil liberties using the *v2x_civlib* variable from Coppedge et al. (2021)'s Varieties of Democracy data. This measure conceptualizes civil liberty as a lack of physical violence and constraints on private and political liberties by the government

and its agents. A higher value on this continuous measure (e.g., Denmark in 2017) implies better civil liberties protections in a country that year, and a lower value (e.g., Egypt in 2017) implies worse civil liberties protections. It is predicted that countries with a greater respect for civil liberties in general should be less likely to trade off civil liberties for cooperation with origin countries because of a stronger normative and legal commitment to this right (Cordell 2019).

Origin Country

We control for whether a country has engaged in transnational repression as an origin country themselves using the Freedom House (2021) database. We construct a dummy variable for this measure where states are coded as 1 if they have targeted their diaspora living abroad in the past (e.g., Rwanda in 2020), and 0 otherwise (e.g., South Africa in 2020). This is the case for 5 percent of the observations, but not for the remaining 95 percent. It is anticipated that countries with similar preferences and experience of transnational repression may make more reliable cooperation partners as they less likely object to cooperation in this issue area (in principle and in practice) and are more likely to agree to cooperate to secure reciprocal cooperation in the future when it comes to targeting their own diaspora.

Press Freedom

We control for a country's level of press freedom using the *World Press Freedom Index* from Reporters Without Borders (2022). This index defines press freedom as "the ability of journalists as individuals and collectives to select, produce, and disseminate news in the public interest independent of political, economic, legal, and social interference and in the absence of threats to their physical and mental safety" (Reporters Without Borders 2022). A higher value on this continuous measure (e.g., Canada in 2015) implies greater press freedom in a country that year, and a lower value (e.g., Pakistan in 2015) implies worse freedom of the press. It is expected that

countries with greater press freedom are more likely to be observed as cooperating in transnational repression, especially since the Freedom House (2021) database uses news articles as a source for identifying countries that participated. Table A.3 displays descriptive statistics of the article's independent and control variables; including the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values.

Results

The theoretical framework in our paper predicts that countries with a weaker rule of law and higher volume of total trade (exports and imports) with origin countries and are more likely to participate in transnational repression. We estimate the effect of the rule of law and bilateral trade flows on the count of transnational repression using zero-inflated negative binomial regression models and a sample of 33,615 directed dyad-years. The results of our analyses are reported in Table 1. Model 1 is the baseline model that includes the independent variables only and model 2 is the full model that includes the independent variables and control variables.

The results provide empirical support towards the article's two hypotheses. Origin countries are better able to elicit cooperation on transnational repression from host countries that have shared economic interests and a weak rule of law. As expected, countries with a higher volume of trade with origin countries are more likely to participate in transnational repression than countries with a lower volume of total trade. This positive relationship holds in all models and is statistically significant at above the 99% confidence level. This finding suggests that origin countries can use their economic leverage over host states to secure cooperation in this deeply sensitive area of international politics, regardless of the political costs of participating if caught.

Table 1: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression, count of transnational repression incidences

Variables	Model 1 Baseline model Independent variables	Model 2 Full model Independent and control variables
Total trade (log)	0.644***	0.671***
	(0.050)	(0.058)
Rule of Law	-1.315***	-0.621**
	(0.134)	(0.291)
Democracy		-0.559*
		(0.307)
GDPPC (log)		-0.098
		(0.170)
Alliances		0.581**
		(0.250)
Right orientation		0.165
		(0.313)
Population (log)		-0.371***
		(0.099)
Refugees (log)		0.149***
		(0.048)
Civil Liberties		-4.562***
		(1.056)
Origin Country		-0.343
		(0.392)
Press Freedom		0.019
		(0.020)
Intercept	-17.770***	-9.761***
	(1.064)	(2.675)
Observations	33,615	30,455
ln (α)	-4.646***	-4.155***
Log Likelihood	-927.258	-847.506
Chi squared	298.16***	352.33***

Note: Significant Codes ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$ with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Whereas countries with a higher rule of law are less likely to engage in transnational repression with origin countries as anticipated. This negative relationship holds in all models and is statistically significant at above the 95% confidence level. This result indicates that origin countries experience greater difficulty in co-opting the institutions of countries with strong commitments to the rule of law as they are less willing to trade off legal protections for their foreign citizens for international cooperation.

Beyond the article's two hypotheses, the Alliance variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on international cooperation on transnational repression at above the 95% confidence level. States that are allied partners are more likely to participate in transnational repression than states that are not allied. This finding provides further support for the article's underlying theoretical mechanism on economic linkages, namely that interdependence between states in other areas of international politics (e.g., trade and security) increases the likelihood that states will continue to cooperate with one another on other issues to maintain their existing relationships. The findings for the Population (log) variable and Civil Liberties variable also yield some interesting patterns as both variables have a negative and statistically significant effect at above the 99% confidence level. This result indicates that larger countries and countries with greater respect for civil liberties are less likely to cooperate in transnational repression. The mechanism behind the finding on the relationship between a country's civil liberties protections and cooperation in transnational repression adds weight to the article's main results on the influence of the rule of law. Countries with stronger normative and legal commitments on the principles that transnational repression threaten (e.g., human rights and due process) are less likely to be willing to trade-off these values in exchange for cooperation. Finally, the Refugees (log) variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on international cooperation in

transnational repression at the 99% confidence level, indicating that countries with a greater number of refugees from the origin country are more likely to participate. This finding is in line with the expectation that cooperation on transnational repression is conditional on the host country having an origin country target in their territory in the first place.

To examine the substantive effects of bilateral trade flows and the rule of law on the frequency of cooperation on transnational repression, we present the predicted count of observing transnational repression from the full model (model 2) in Figure 3 with 95% confidence intervals. The predicted count of transnational repression is computed while holding all control variables at their mean. The panel on the left-hand side shows the predicted count of transnational repression incidences conditional on bilateral trade flows and the panel on the right-hand side shows the predicted count conditional on a country's domestic rule of law. The x axis displays the range of values for the Total trade (log) variable and the Rule of law variable (from lower levels of trade between two countries and a weak rule of law to higher levels of trade and a strong rule of law). The y axis displays the predicted count of cooperation in transnational repression between a country and an origin country each year ranging from no instances of transnational repression to a greater number of instances of transnational repression.

The results show that the predicted count of transnational repression increases as dyadic trade flows increases (left panel) but decreases as the strength of the rule of law increases (right panel). Shifting the volume of dyadic trade from the minimum value in our data from 0 to the maximum value of 30 greatly increases the predicted count of transnational repression from no occurrences (0) to almost two occurrences (1.69). For the rule of law, the predicted count of transnational repression decreases from 0.01 (countries with a weak rule of law) to 0 (countries with a strong rule of law). These empirical findings support *H1* and *H2* but demonstrate that the

Figure 3: Predicted Count of Transnational Repression

Note: Predicted count of transnational repression calculated holding all control variables at their mean.

influence of economic ties has a much greater impact on the frequency of international cooperation on transnational repression than a country's rule of law. Host countries that are financially dependent on an origin country should be easier to co-opt by origin countries and more willing to trade-off civil liberties for economic benefits as refusal to cooperate could place valuable economic transactions in jeopardy.

Robustness

We systematically test the robustness of our results using a variety of different model specifications displayed in the Appendix. First, Table A.4 excludes instances of transnational repression where it was less clear that attacks on individuals were state-driven or political (as determined by Freedom House). While most observations in the Freedom House (2021) data are

political in nature (e.g., 85% of transnational repression targets are political activists, former insiders/government elites, journalists, human rights advocates, and national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities), this robustness check increases our confidence that the results are not being driven by non-political cases where host countries may have thought they were simply cooperating with origin countries on international crime rather than political dissent (e.g., where the individuals being targeted would also be classified as criminals within their domestic jurisdiction)—and the study's main findings hold.

Second, Table A.5 excludes instances where the targeted individuals are accused of terrorism and/or extremism. While many of these state accusations are not supported by evidence (Freedom House 2021), this test allows us to rule out that the results are being driven by more extreme cases of transnational repression where host countries may have thought they were simply assisting the origin country in combating terrorism rather than political dissent. Again, our results remain the same, providing further empirical support for our hypotheses.

Third, we test an alternative explanation that focuses on the role of Interpol red notices and requests on international cooperation in transnational repression as Interpol notices legitimize extradition requests from origin countries and reduce the perception among host governments that the request is political in nature (i.e., that the transfer of an individual to the origin country would be a potential human rights violation). Table A.6 includes an Interpol dummy variable where directed dyad-years are coded 1 if an Interpol red notice, diffusion request, or extradition request contributed to the transnational repression incident (detention, rendition, or unlawful deportation), and 0 otherwise. As expected, the results show that Interpol notices and requests increase the likelihood that countries will participate in transnational repression. Importantly, the inclusion of

this new variable does not affect the study's main finding on the influence of bilateral trade flows and the rule of law on cooperation in transnational repression.

Finally, to ensure that the link between trade and transnational repression is not being driven by an outlier, namely cooperation between Thailand and China (the dyad with the largest volume of transnational repression incidences), we test our hypotheses using a sample that excludes Thailand as a Host Country and China as an Origin Country in Table A.7—and the results still hold.

Conclusion

While transnational repression is not a new phenomenon, the rate at which states target their citizens living abroad using repressive measures has increased in recent years due to the globalization of activism, technological advances in government surveillance, and international cooperation on migration (Freedom House 2021). Information and communication technologies have provided diaspora with new opportunities to engage in activism against their country of origin as well as increased the capacity of states to monitor, locate and silence extraterritorial threats (Dukalskis et al. 2022; Rød and Weidmann 2019). Additionally, an increase in human movement, hardening of international borders, and perception of migration as a security issue has enabled abusive governments to expand their reach outside of their territory and target diaspora by coopting international and regional institutions and secure assistance from foreign governments by framing cooperation as an effort to fight crime and terrorism (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017; Simmons 2019). Studying the causes and dynamics of international cooperation on transnational repression has implications for research on whether globalization, the internet, migration, and institutions

help or hinder the promotion of human rights (Brysk 2002; Simmons 2019; Vreedland 2008; Weidmann and Rød 2019).

Although recent research has improved our understanding of this topic, most studies have only focused on why origin countries engage in this repressive tactic rather than why host countries agree to cooperate (Cooley Heathershaw 2017; Dukalskis 2021; Furstenburg, Lemon and Heathershaw 2021; Glasius 2018; Shain 2010; Tsourapas 2021). This is important since most instances of transnational repression would not be possible without international cooperation. To fill this gap, our article provides the first systematic account of the political and economic factors that drive foreign complicity in transnational repression. Why do some states assist other countries to reach across national borders and repress their diaspora, while others do not? As expected, we find evidence that international cooperation on transnational repression relies on a country's economic ties to the origin country and the quality of the rule of law. On the one hand, origin countries are better able to elicit cooperation on human rights violations from states with shared economic interests that cooperate with one another in other areas of international politics. On the other hand, countries with a stronger rule of law are more difficult to co-opt and influence because of their unwillingness to trade-off normative and legal commitments to due process and human rights.

These finding contribute to existing debates in international relations in several ways. First, the results suggest that domestic institutions and commitments to upholding the rule of law can be an effective tool for deterring international cooperation on silencing dissent. This finding complements existing research on the importance of liberal democratic institutions, norms, and public opinion in constraining the government's behavior on human rights (Davenport 2007; Kelley 2007; Lupu and Wallace 2017). Second, the results show that rather than improving human

rights, economic interconnectedness can incentivize states to trade-off human rights for material gains. This indicates that although the outcome is starkly different, illiberal states can use their financial linkages to pressure cooperation on human rights violations in the same manner that liberal governments can leverage their economic position to induce state compliance with human rights (Cao, Greenhill and Prakash 2012; Hafner-Burton 2005; Peterson, Murdie, and Asal 2016). Finally, although many studies suggest that violating human rights is politically costly for states (especially democracies), this study re-confirms that governments likely anticipate less public backlash for complicity in extra-territorial violations of foreign nationals than direct abuses of their own citizens within their jurisdiction. This finding speaks to research on the limitations of extraterritorial human rights obligations, the dynamics of refugee rights violations, and the potential challenges of attributing "derivative responsibility" to foreign governments for assisting another state in the commission of an internally wrongful act (Abdelaaty 2019; Cerone 2008; Heupel 2018).

The results also have important implications for policy makers and civil society activists that seek to prevent autocratic governments from reaching across national borders to repress their diaspora. If countries are more willing to assist trade partners with violating human rights, law makers should pay closer attention to renditions and unlawful deportations of diaspora to states with strong economic ties–especially when they concern minority groups, political activists, journalists, former insiders/government elites, or human rights advocates (the most common targets of transnational repression). Additionally, efforts to strengthen the domestic rule of law in all countries (not just the most repressive states) appears to be a robust way to ensure that foreign governments comply with international human rights norms, due process, and refugee protection principles. This study highlights the interconnectedness of state practices on human rights and

implies that helping other countries to achieve the rule of law is essential to advancing human rights worldwide.

However, it is important to keep in mind some potential limitations of this study. First, any dataset measuring transnational repression is only able to capture the "tip of the iceberg" of this global phenomenon as many instances are likely to go unobserved due to the secret nature of human rights violations and government attempts cover up, censor, and deny abuses (Dukalskis et al. 2022; Freedom House 2021, p. 2). For example, Freedom House explain that there were many other cases of transnational repression that did not make it into their database because they lacked sufficient documentation. Additionally, it is likely that there is an under-reporting bias in the data that fails to accurately capture the involvement of countries with lower levels of press freedoms and access to information since the database is based on public information. However, we prefer to use a conservative estimate of transnational repression to avoid including false positives in our data and do not find a country's media freedom to be a statistically significant predictor of participation in our empirical models. Future research on this topic could use quantitative measurement models (e.g., latent variables) and qualitative methods (e.g., case studies and interviews) to corroborate and examine the dynamics of international cooperation in transnational repression in countries where it is least likely to be observed, as recommended by Dukalskis et al. (2022).

Second, we have only considered the theoretical mechanisms that explain why foreign governments decide to cooperate in physical instances of transnational repression in this study including detentions, renditions, and unlawful deportations (excluding assassinations/assassination attempts, assaults, unexplained disappearances, and intimidation where it is less likely that host countries were involved). While outside the remit of this article,

future studies may wish to examine the factors that drive origin countries to engage in *non-physical* instances of transnational repression (e.g., harassment, intimidation, and threats) in some host countries but not others. It may be the case that certain host country characteristics or relations between the host country and origin country make it more logistically difficult or politically costly for origin countries to engage in the harassment of their diaspora in another country's territory, even if the host country themselves is not directly involved. More generally, future research on this topic may seek to disaggregate participation in transnational repression into the type of activities that a host country is involved in as international cooperation in some repressive activities may be more politically costly than others (e.g., detentions vs. renditions vs. unlawful deportations).

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Appendix

Table A.1: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression, count of transnational repression incidences, full sample

Variables	Model 1 Baseline model Independent variables	Model 2 Full model Independent and control variables
Total trade (log)	0.534***	0.615***
	(0.033)	(0.045)
Rule of Law	-0.802***	-0.593***
	(0.113)	(0.224)
Democracy		-0.737***
		(0.251)
GDPPC (log)		-0.025
		(0.139)
Alliances		0.669***
		(0.208)
Right orientation		-0.078
		(0.290)
Population (log)		-0.427***
		(0.082)
Refugees (log)		0.444***
		(0.041)
Civil Liberties		-2.201***
		(0.781)
Origin Country		0.348
		(0.294)
Press Freedom		0.001
		(0.014)
Intercept	-16.627***	-10.293***
	(0.742)	(2.215)
Observations	210,714	164,177
ln (α)	-5.871***	-4.908***
Log Likelihood	-1,591.488	-1,314.659
Chi squared	298.16***	352.33***

Note: Significant Codes ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$ with Standard Errors in parentheses

Table A.2: Negative binomial regression, count of transnational repression incidences

Variables	Model 1 Baseline model Independent variables	Model 2 Full model Independent and control variables
Total trade (log)	0.447***	0.500***
	(0.034)	(0.043)
Rule of Law	-0.868***	-0.516***
	(0.09)	(0.204)
Democracy		0.138**
		(0.266)
GDPPC (log)		-0.008
		(0.136)
Alliances		0.576***
		(0.194)
Right orientation		0.111
		(0.248)
Population (log)		-0.325***
		(0.083)
Refugees (log)		0.089***
		(0.029)
Civil Liberties		-3.316***
		(0.795)
Origin Country		0.391
		(0.288)
Press Freedom		0.016
		(0.014)
Intercept	-13.153***	-8.111***
	(0.751)	(2.103)
Observations	33,615	30,455
Log Likelihood	-949.43	-866.99
Chi squared	253.81***	313.37***

Note: Significant Codes ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$ with Standard Errors in parentheses

Table A.3: Descriptive statistics of independent and control variables

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Total trade (log)	33615	17.86	4.69	0	27.89
Rule of Law	33615	0.58	1.1	-2.35	2.13
Democracy	32411	0.81	0.39	0	1
GDPPC (log)	33379	9.53	1.4	5.57	11.59
Alliances	33615	0.18	0.39	0	1
Right orientation	31863	0.33	0.47	0	1
Population (log)	33615	16.79	1.52	12.54	21.07
Refugees (log)	33615	4.05	2.36	1.61	15.11
Civil Liberties	33560	0.81	0.21	0.05	0.98
Origin Country	33615	0.05	0.23	0	1
Press Freedom	33586	73.45	14.3	14.56	93.6

Table A.4: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression, count of transnational repression incidences, excluding instances where it is less clear that cases are state-driven and political

Variables	Model 1 Baseline model Independent variables	Model 2 Full model Independent and control variables
Total trade (log)	0.624***	0.652***
	(0.046)	(0.054)
Rule of Law	-1.210***	-0.598**
	(0.121)	(0.278)
Democracy		-0.432
		(0.292)
GDPPC (log)		-0.093
		(0.162)
Alliances		0.495**
		(0.238)
Right orientation		0.173
		(0.288)
Population (log)		-0.400***
		(0.093)
Refugees (log)		0.200***
		(0.046)
Civil Liberties		-4.630***
		(0.998)
Origin Country		-0.437
		(0.381)
Press Freedom		0.019
		(0.018)
Intercept	-17.231***	-8.980***
	(0.981)	(2.511)
Observations	33,615	30,455
ln (α)	-4.448***	-4.066***
Log Likelihood	-1,018.978	-932.770
Chi squared	320.11***	385.77***

Note: Significant Codes ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$ with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Table A.5: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression, count of transnational repression incidences, excluding instances where individuals are accused of terrorism and/or extremism

Variables	Model 1 Baseline model Independent variables	Model 2 Full model Independent and control variables
Total trade (log)	0.539***	0.559***
	(0.059)	(0.070)
Rule of Law	-1.175***	-0.943**
	(0.166)	(0.424)
Democracy		-0.755*
		(0.415)
GDPPC (log)		0.135
		(0.248)
Alliances		0.140
		(0.365)
Right orientation		0.392
		(0.408)
Population (log)		-0.449***
		(0.130)
Refugees (log)		0.194**
		(0.076)
Civil Liberties		-5.377***
		(1.491)
Origin Country		-0.657
		(0.559)
Press Freedom		0.036
		(0.027)
Intercept	-15.879***	-8.888**
	(1.270)	(3.638)
Observations	33,615	30,455
ln (α)	-5.359***	-5.079***
Log Likelihood	-626.542	-573.037
Chi squared	144.12***	176.94***

Note: Significant Codes ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$ with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Table A.6: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression, count of transnational repression incidences, including Interpol abuse variable

Variables	Model 1 Baseline model Independent variables	Model 2 Full model Independent and control variables
Interpol	7.675***	7.507***
	(1.952)	(1.704)
Total trade (log)	0.667***	0.691***
	(0.050)	(0.058)
Rule of Law	-1.491***	-0.634**
	(0.140)	(0.284)
Democracy		-0.639**
		(0.300)
GDPPC (log)		-0.115
		(0.166)
Alliances		0.649***
		(0.250)
Right orientation		-0.166
		(0.329)
Population (log)		-0.374***
		(0.099)
Refugees (log)		0.139***
		(0.048)
Civil Liberties		-4.902***
		(1.020)
Origin Country		-0.337
		(0.370)
Press Freedom		0.018
		(0.019)
Intercept	-18.420***	-9.767***
	(1.070)	(2.643)
Observations	33,615	30,455
ln (α)	-4.324***	-3.901***
Log Likelihood	-900.625	-815.230
Chi squared	351.43***	416.88***

Note: Significant Codes ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$ with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Table A.7: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression, count of transnational repression incidences, excluding Thailand (host country) and China (origin country)

Variables	Model 1 Baseline model Independent variables	Model 2 Full model Independent and control variables
Total trade (log)	0.563***	0.598***
	(0.057)	(0.066)
Rule of Law	-1.189***	-0.663**
	(0.136)	(0.298)
Democracy		-0.679**
		(0.331)
GDPPC (log)		-0.016
		(0.177)
Alliances		0.668**
		(0.264)
Right orientation		0.181
		(0.321)
Population (log)		-0.350***
		(0.101)
Refugees (log)		0.141***
		(0.049)
Civil Liberties		-3.316**
		(1.328)
Origin Country		-0.209
		(0.434)
Press Freedom		0.012
		(0.021)
Intercept	-16.146***	-9.729***
	(1.185)	(2.722)
Observations	33,034	29,903
ln (α)	-4.646***	-4.266***
Log Likelihood	-811.603	-738.233
Chi squared	193.37***	238.71***

Note: Significant Codes ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$ with Standard Errors in parentheses.