Public Attitudes Toward Human Rights: Violation Characteristics, Framing and Elite Cues[1]

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Abstract

What drives public opinion on human rights? Although recent research has improved our knowledge on this topic, there is little consensus on the factors that drive this relationship. This is partly due to the traditional design of survey experiments which combine multiple factors into a single manipulation or vary only a small number of components; confounding results. I advance this research by conducting a conjoint survey experiment that evaluates the causal effects of multiple factors associated with public attitudes on human rights simultaneously–for the first time. I find that key attributes of a violation (target, perpetrator, type, and scope) have the greatest impact on shaping public reactions to human rights. Public disapproval and willingness to act is strongest for violations targeting non-violent actors, violations perpetrated by non-state actors, abuses of non-derogable rights, and abuses affecting a greater number of people. Surprisingly, group identity and elite cues have little effect.

Keywords: Human rights, repression, elite cues, public opinion, survey experiment

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Introduction

What drives public reactions to human rights violations?[2] Although recent research has improved our knowledge on this topic, there is little consensus on the factors that drive this relationship (Dill and Schubiger 2021; Edwards and Arnon 2021; Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Long 2018; Lupu and Wallace 2019; McEntire, Leiby, and Krain 2015; Kearns and Young 2020).[3] For example, while some studies have found that in-group identity influences public opinion on human rights, other studies find less consistent support for this key theoretical claim (Edwards and Arnon 2021; Kearns and Young 2020). Such inconsistencies are partly due to limitations in the design of most existing survey experiments. First, several key findings from the literature are based on experiments which combine multiple factors (e.g., target identity and violation type) into a single manipulation; possibly confounding results. Second, the majority of existing studies vary only a small number of factors at any one time and fail to control for other relevant features (e.g., framing strategies and elite cues). This has prevented the field from determining which dimensions of a violation shape public attitudes toward human rights abuses as it is unclear whether prior results for certain attributes are obscuring the effect of others.

This letter provides a solution to this problem by conducting a conjoint survey experiment that evaluates the causal effects of multiple factors associated with public opinion on human rights simultaneously – for the first time. Using a nationally representative sample of 3,200 respondents in the U.S., the conjoint analysis varies key attributes of a violation (target, perpetrator, type, and scope) and external factors (framing and elite cues) to determine which features shape public disapproval and willingness to participate in a human rights campaign. The conjoint design advances research on this topic by isolating and comparing the effect of multiple treatment components that have been conflated or omitted from past survey experiments (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). By holding fixed a range of attributes that would otherwise confound the observed effects, the study's findings inform the research community which causal hypotheses we

[2]This study was preregistered before data collection and received approval from an Institutional Review Board (IRB). See Appendix 1 for a blinded version of the study's registration.

[3]I provide a comprehensive review of literature on public opinion and human rights in Appendix 2.

should continue to endorse and which theoretical claims fail to hold up when we test a more complete portfolio of relevant factors.

I illustrate that violation characteristics (target identity, perpetrator identity, violation type, and violation scope) have the greatest impact on shaping public attitudes and behavior. Public disapproval and willingness to act is strongest for violations targeting non-violent actors, violations perpetrated by non-state actors, abuses of non-derogable rights, and abuses affecting a greater number of people. Interestingly, group identity and elite cues have little effect. This research contributes to literature on public opinion and human rights abuses by testing a greater number of theories concurrently and examining whether factors which shape public attitudes also influence an individual's willingness to act. While the study cannot tell us whether the findings are generalizable outside of the U.S. context, this letter produces insights into the causal mechanisms that influence public reactions to human rights and provides a stepping stone for future research to test these explanations in a comparative setting.

Public Attitudes Toward Human Rights

Violation Characteristics

First, the identity of the target can influence how the public responds to reports of human rights violations by shifting perceptions of the victim as vulnerable and innocent (Keck and Sikkink 1999). *H1:* I expect human rights abuses targeting in-groups to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than those targeting out-groups as in-group bias and adverse perceptions of out-group members can change how individuals humanize and empathize with victims (Edwards and Arnon 2021). *H2:* I expect human rights abuses targeting non-violent actors to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than human rights abuses targeting violent actors because threat perceptions and support for a reciprocal response can alter perceptions of whether victims are deserving of repression (Lupu and Wallace 2019).

Second, the identity of the perpetrator can effect public attitudes toward abusing

human rights by adjusting perceptions of the perpetrator as blameworthy (Keck and Sikkink 1999). *H3:* I expect human rights abuses ordered by a principal (chief executive of the government) from an out-group (that an individual does not favor) to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than those ordered by a principal from an in-group (that an individual favors) as confirmation bias and negative perceptions of out-groups can shape how individuals process responsibility and justify abuses (Kao and Revkin 2022). *H4:* I expect human rights abuses carried out by a security agent that is a state actor to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than those carried out by an agent that is a non-state actor because of the perception that the state has a duty to protect the public, with some governments delegating abuses to pro-government militias for plausible deniability. Alternatively, the revelation that the government has cooperated with a non-state actor on human rights abuses may generate significant public backlash as it represents a violation of the rule of law and loss of state legitimacy (Carey and Mitchell 2017).

Third, the type and scope of the abuse can shape public reactions to abusing human rights by influencing the perceived severity of abuse (Keck and Sikkink 1999). *H5:* I expect violations of non-derogable rights (e.g., torture and extrajudicial killings) to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than violations of derogable rights (e.g., arbitrary arrest) as categories of abuse which involve bodily harm can be perceived as more painful and extreme (Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Long 2018). *H6:* I expect human rights violations that affect a greater number of people to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act those that affect a smaller number of people because they can be interpreted as systematic and indiscriminate (Dill and Schubiger 2021).

Framing

Fourth, framing strategies can influence how people respond to human rights by emphasizing certain aspects of a violation that change how an individual conceptualizes and assigns meaning to a particular issue/incident (McEntire, Leiby, and Krain 2015). *H7:* I

expect violations that use personal frames emphasizing the narrative of the victim to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than violations that do not use personal frames as humanizing descriptions can increase the perceived innocence of a victim and generate empathy among audiences (McEntire, Leiby, and Krain 2015). *H8:* I expect violations that use graphically violent frames emphasizing the pain and suffering of the victim to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than violations that do not use graphically violent frames as graphic descriptions can increase the perceived severity of a violation and elicit anger among audiences (Fahmy, Bock, and Wanta 2014).

Elite Cues

Finally, elite actors can shape individual opinions on human rights by altering how a person thinks about the content and importance of a violation, as long as the cue giver is perceived as credible (Kearns and Young 2020). *H9:* I expect elite cues from an in-group politician (that an individual favors) to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than elite cues from an out-group politician (that an individual does not favor) because in-group favoritism can make reports of allegations appear more credible and abhorrent (Kao and Revkin 2022). *H10:* I expect elite cues from an international HRO to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than elite cues from a domestic HRO as international organizations can make reports of allegations appear more credible and escalatory (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). Appendix 3 summarizes the letter's theoretical expectations and discusses how individual-level characteristics such as political orientation and education may affect public attitudes toward abusing human rights.

Research Design

This study examines variation in public responses to human rights violations using a conjoint survey experiment in the U.S. via YouGov using a nationally representative

Table 1: Conjoint attributes and levels

Conjoint Treatments	Levels
(A) Perpetrator (Principal)	The Republican president | The Democrat president | A Republican governor | A Democrat governor ...ordered...
(B) Perpetrator (Agent)	the military | the police | the national guard | a civilian militia group | a private militia group ...to carry out the armed raid.
(C) Violation Type	The armed raid resulted in the... extrajudicial killing | torture | disappearance | arbitrary arrest
(D) Violation Scope	...of... two | six | twelve | twenty ...people.
(E) Target (Tactic)	Most of the victims were... civilians | journalists | protesters | criminals | suspected terrorists
(F) Target (Race/Ethnicity)	...including... white | black | asian | hispanic | middle eastern ...
(G) Target (Religion)	christian | jewish | muslim | buddhist | hindu ...
(H) Target (Immigration)	American citizens. | naturalized American citizens. | immigrants with legal status. | immigrants without legal status.
(I) Framing	The victims suffered multiple injuries to the head, limbs and torso. | Family and friends describe the victims as kind, loving and caring people. | ...
(J) Elite Cue	The American Civil Liberties Union, an American nonprofit organization, | Amnesty International, an international nonprofit organization, | A Democrat member of Congress | A Republican member of Congress ...condemned the abuse.

sample of 3,200 participants based on age, gender, race, and education.[4] I present survey participants with five pairs of condensed news articles describing a human rights violation composed of randomly generated features and ask them to rank and rate the two profiles according to their disapproval and willingness to support a human rights campaign.

Table 1 shows the full range of randomized attribute levels that were shown to respondents. The conjoint treatments appearing in the same box were displayed together in order for the vignettes to remain understandable to respondents. While some of the human rights profiles are quite abstract for the U.S. context, prior research suggests that situational hypotheticality does not affect the results experimenters obtain (see Appendix 6.1). Nevertheless, I included randomization constraints for some of the attribute levels to exclude problematic combinations, as recommended by Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014).

[4]See Appendix 4 for the sample statistics, Appendix 5 for the power analysis, and Appendix 6 for details of the experimental design.

Results

Figure 1 displays the Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals for each individual treatment component while accounting for the values of the other attributes included in the model. The estimates represent the difference in respondents' disapproval and willingness to support a human rights campaign for each attribute category compared to the baseline level for each attribute (the point without horizontal bars at x =0). Model 1 shows the forced-choice measure results where respondents are asked to choose which incident they most oppose. Model 2 and 3 display the seven-point Likert-type scale results of disapproval and willingness to participate in a human rights campaign, re-scaled from 0 to 1. Model 4 shows the behavioral based measure results where respondents are asked to click on a URL if they would like to sign a human rights petition for the violation.

The findings in Figure 1 show that theories on the effect of target tactics, delegating abuses to non-state actors, and the severity of violations are some of the most robust from public opinion research on human rights. For the *Target Identity (Tactic)* attribute, the results support H2. Respondents were 11-12% more likely to oppose violations targeting non-violent actors (protesters, journalists, civilians) than violations targeting a violent actor (suspected terrorists) (model 1).

Interestingly, the results for the *Perpetrator Identity (Agent)* attribute show that respondents were more likely to disapprove of and willing to participate in a human rights campaign for violations perpetrated by non-state actors (a civilian militia group) rather than state actors (the national guard and police). While these findings are contrary to H4, they confirm that *getting caught* delegating abuses to pro-government militias comes with great political costs. In the US context, this finding is not surprising given strong norms on the rule of law and a monopoly by state agents over the legitimate use of force.

For the *Violation Type* and *Violation Scope* attributes, the results support H5 and H6. Respondents were 13-20% more likely to oppose violations of non-derogable rights (disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killings) than violations of derogable rights (arbitrary arrests) (model 1). Participants were also 8-9% more likely to oppose violations

Figure 1: Main Effects of Attributes



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals.

affecting a larger number of people (twelve and twenty people) than violations affecting a smaller number of people (two people) (model 1).

For the *Framing* attribute, the results provide mixed support for H7 and H8. Personal and graphically violent frames had a positive and statistically significant effect on some disapproval and participation measures but not others. This puzzling finding calls for a deeper investigation into how different aspects of a frame effect public attitudes on human rights violations (e.g., frame length, word choice, and images).

Figure 2 displays the conditional AMCEs for the *Perpetrator (Principal)* and *Elite Cue (MOC)* attributes based on respondents' party identification. For the *Perpetrator*

Figure 2: Effect of the Perpetrator (Principal) and Elite Cue (MOC) Attributes Conditional on Respondents' Party Identification



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals.

(Principal) attribute, the results provide mixed support for H3. As anticipated, respondents were more likely to disapprove of violations ordered by an out-group principal than an in-group principal (model 1-2). However, this factor did not influence people's willingness to participate in a human rights campaign (model 3-4). Future research should explore this fascinating finding further to see whether the effect of this attribute depends on the value of others (e.g., target identity or violation type/scope).

Surprisingly, the remaining findings show that theories on group identity and elite cues do not hold up when we control for a greater number of factors related to public attitudes on human rights. Figure 3 displays the conditional AMCEs for the *Target (Race/Ethnicity)* attribute based on respondents' race/ethnicity. The results fail to provide support for H1 and suggest that the targeting of in-groups (where the identity of the respondent and target are the same) does not influence public disapproval or willingness to participate in a human rights campaign. The results are similar for the *Target (Religion)* and *Target (Immigration)* attributes conditional on respondents' religion and immigration status (see Appendix 7). Additional inquiries into how unique combinations of in-group membership and out-group identity influence individual responses to violations will be essential to understanding this nuanced relationship.

For the *Elite Cue* attribute, the results contradict H9 and H10 and indicate that elite

Figure 3: Effect of Target (Race/Ethnicity) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Race/Ethnicity



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals.

cues from international HROs and in-group politicians do not matter much (see Figure 1 and 2). This unexpected finding invites future studies to examine how the use of emotive language and alternative reasons for condemning a violation by cue givers effect public reactions to human rights.

The results from the analyses are robust to a series of different model specifications presented in the Appendices. In particular, the results are robust to different measures of respondent attentiveness (Appendix 8) and models which use Bonferroni corrections to account for the issue of multiple hypothesis testing (Appendix 9). In Appendix 10, I show that the overall treatment effects are robust across different individual-level characteristics such as political orientation, education, gender, and age.

Conclusion

In this letter, I conduct a novel conjoint survey experiment in the U.S. that evaluates the causal effects of multiple factors associated with public opinion on human rights simultaneously–for the first time. I illustrate that violation characteristics (target, perpetrator, type, and scope) have the greatest impact on shaping public attitudes and behavior. Public disapproval and willingness to act is strongest for violations targeting non-violent actors, violations perpetrated by non-state actors, abuses of non-derogable rights, and abuses affecting a greater number of people. Surprisingly, group identity and elite cues have little effect. These findings contribute to literature on the sources of public support for human rights by unobscuring previously conflated and excluded factors, testing a greater number of hypotheses at the same time, and identifying which theories are most robust in shaping public attitudes *and* action on abuses.

Future research should test the external generalizability of these results to see whether public reactions to human rights violations vary based on different political, economic, and social contexts. Individuals may be less likely to disapprove of violations carried out by non-state actors in countries with a weaker rule of law where pro-government militias play more of a central role in political activities. Similarly, the effect of target in-group membership might be stronger in countries that have experienced civil conflict due to violent interactions between different social groups and heightened perceptions of threat. Additionally, individuals living in democratic countries may be more likely to disapprove of violations in general due to the prevalence of norms on tolerance and deliberation.

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Appendices

Public Attitudes Toward Human Rights: Violation Characteristics, Framing and Elite Cues

Contents

1 Preregistration of Study

1.1 Original Registration

This study was first preregistered with the EGAP registry on the Open Science Framework (OSF) before the collection of data for a **pre-test** version of the survey experiment in April 2021. The goal of pre-testing the survey instrument was to identify any problems with the wording of the survey questions and improve the readability of the conjoint profiles by securing feedback from a small sample of respondents, before conducting the full-scale survey experiment via YouGov.

General Information About the Study

Title of Study

Who Did What to Whom: A Survey Experiment on Public Attitudes Toward Abusing Human Rights

EGAP Registration ID

[*Redacted for anonymous peer review*]

Timestamp of original registration

2021-04-25 17:09:00 -0400

Acknowledgements

[*Redacted for anonymous peer review*]

Is one of the study authors a university faculty member?

Yes

Other author affiliation

No response

Is this Registration Prospective or Retrospective?

Registration prior to any research activities

Other description of registration timing

No response

Is this an experimental study?

With "experimental" defined as random assignment of units to treatment and control conditions.

Yes

Date of start of study

Understood as first date of treatment assignment or equivalent for observational study

04/26/2021

Was this design presented at an EGAP meeting?

No

Is there a pre-analysis plan associated with this registration?

Yes

Registration Data

Background and explanation of rationale.

This study examines the factors that drive public opinion on human rights. How individuals respond to reports of human rights abuses can have major implications for domestic and international politics. Prior theory and evidence indicate that human rights violations can be costly for governments when they are met with protests, conflict, a decline in electoral support, or sanctions from the international community. However, not all cases of human rights violations result in widespread disapproval or action. What explains differences in public reactions to human rights violations? To answer this question, I conduct a survey experiment in the U.S. that varies key attributes of a human rights violation (target, perpetrator, type, and severity) and external factors such as framing, elite cues, and individual-level differences. Using a forced-choice and ratings-based conjoint design, I present survey participants with five pairs of profiles describing a human rights violation composed of randomly generated features. After seeing each pair of human rights violation profiles, respondents are asked to rank and rate the two profiles according to their disapproval and willingness to support a human rights campaign on a seven-point scale, and click on a URL if they would like to sign a human rights petition for each profile.

What are the hypotheses to be tested/quantities of interest to be estimated?

This study includes a series of theoretical expectations on the hypothesized effect of i) target identity ii) perpetrator identity iii) type and severity of abuse iv) framing v) elite cues vi) individual-level characteristics on an individual's disapproval and willingness to support a human rights campaign. For further information, see H1a- H12b in the pre-analysis plan.

How will these hypotheses be tested?

This study examines variation in public responses to human rights violations using a conjoint survey experiment conducted in the U.S. of 3,200 respondents. To test my hypotheses, I manipulate ten attributes of a human rights violation (target identity,

perpetrator identity, type of abuse, severity of abuse, framing, elite cues). To test the hypotheses on individual-level characteristics, I include two pre-treatment questions that measure the political attitudes and educational attainment of respondents. The survey experiment uses a forced-choice and ratings based conjoint design. Participants are presented with five pairs of profiles describing a human rights violation composed of randomly generated features. After seeing each pair of human rights violation profiles, respondents are asked a series of questions related to the primary outcomes of the analysis; disapproval of the abuse and willingness to participate in a human rights campaign. The survey is 10 minutes long.

First, I run a local pre-test version of the survey at [*Redacted for anonymous peer review*] via Qualtrics using a sample of 1,000 student participants. Second, I run the full survey experiment via YouGov using a nationally representative sample of 3,200 participants in the U.S. based on age, gender, race, and education. The results will be analyzed using average marginal component effect tests (AMCE) to evaluate the overall effect of each individual treatment component and average marginal component interaction effect tests (AMCIE) to evaluate the conditional effects between each individual treatment component. For further information, see the research design section in the pre-analysis plan.

Country

United States

Sample Size (# of Units)

3,200 respondents

Was a power analysis conducted prior to data collection?

Yes

Other power analysis information

No response

Has this research received Institutional Review Board (IRB) or ethics committee approval?

Yes

Other IRB information

No response

IRB Number

[*Redacted for anonymous peer review*]

Date of IRB Approval

04/21/2021

Will the intervention be implemented by the researcher or a third party? If a third party, please provide the name.

Third party (describe in text box below)

Third party implementer information

The full survey experiment will be implemented by a third party – YouGov.

Did any of the research team receive remuneration from the implementing agency for taking part in this research?

No

Other renumeration information

No response

If relevant, is there an advance agreement with the implementation group that all results can be published?

No

Other publication agreement information

No response

JEL classification(s)

No response

Keywords and Data

Keywords for Methodology

Experimental Design
Survey Methodology

Keywords for Policy

Conflict and Violence

Certification

Agree

Confirmation

Agree

Additional documentation

20210425AA_PAP.pdf

DeclareDesign

No files selected

1.2 Updated Registration

An addendum to the study's original registration was preregistered with the Open Science Framework (OSF) before the collection of data for the **full-scale** survey experiment conducted via YouGov in June 2021. This updated registration records any changes made to the study's original research design following feedback from a small sample of respondents during the pretest version of the survey experiment.

Title of Study

Who Did What to Whom: A Survey Experiment on Public Attitudes Toward Abusing Human Rights - Addendum 06.16.21

Description

[*Redacted for anonymous peer review*]

Registration type

Open-Ended Registration

Date registered

June 16, 2021

Date created

June 16, 2021

Registered from

[*Redacted for anonymous peer review*]

Internet Archive link

[*Redacted for anonymous peer review*]

Category

Uncategorized

Registration DOI

[*Redacted for anonymous peer review*]

Subjects

Social and Behavioral Sciences International Relations Political Science

Summary

Provide a narrative summary of what is contained in this registration or how it differs from prior registrations. If this project contains documents for a preregistration, please note that here.

This addendum contains updates to the study's original pre-analysis plan. The updated pre-analysis plan has been modified in order to improve the study's research design following feedback from respondents that took the pre-test version of the survey. Any changes to the pre-analysis plan are explained in red footnotes and have been made prior to data collection for the full-scale survey experiment via YouGov using a nationally representative sample of 3,200 participants in the U.S. based on age, gender, race, and education.

Add supplemental files or additional information

20210425AA_Updated_PAP.pdf

1.3 Pre-Analysis Plan

This pre-analysis plan was filed publicly via the Open Science Framework (OSF) with the study's updated registration before the collection of data for the full-scale survey experiment conducted by YouGov in June 2021. This pre-analysis plan explains any changes made to the study's original research design in red footnotes following feedback from a small sample of respondents during the pretest version of the survey experiment.

Who Did What to Whom: A Survey Experiment on Public Attitudes Toward Abusing Human Rights[1]

Pre-Analysis Plan

[*Redacted for anonymous peer review*]

June 11 2021[2]

Introduction

This study examines the factors that drive public opinion on human rights. How individuals respond to reports of human rights abuses can have major implications for domestic and international politics. Prior theory and evidence indicate that human rights violations can be costly for governments when they are met with protests, conflict, a decline in electoral support, or sanctions from the international community. However, not all cases of human rights violations result in widespread disapproval or action. What explains differences in public reactions to human rights violations? To answer this question, I conduct a survey experiment in the U.S. that varies key attributes of a human rights violation (target, perpetrator, type, and severity) and external factors such as framing, elite cues, and individual-level differences. Using a forced-choice and ratings-based conjoint design, I present survey participants with five pairs of profiles describing a human rights violation composed of randomly generated features. After seeing each pair of human rights violation profiles, respondents are asked to rank and rate the two profiles according to their disapproval and willingness to support a human rights campaign on a seven-point scale, and click on a URL if they would like to sign a human rights petition for each profile.

Hypotheses

Target Identity

One factor that might influence how the public responds to reports of human rights violations is the identity of the target. First, I expect human rights abuses targeting in-groups to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than those targeting out-groups. Previous studies on public opinion and conflict have shown that individuals are more likely to hold negative beliefs and discriminate against members of an out-group than an in-group (Horowitz 2001; Huff and Kertzer 2018; D'Orazio and Salehyan 2018; Edwards and Arnon 2021). These findings are in line with social

[1] [*Redacted for anonymous peer review*]

[2] This is an updated version of the pre-analysis plan. The original pre-analysis plan was submitted to EGAP on April 25 2021 before data was collected for the pre-test version of the survey. Any changes made to the study's research design are explained in red footnotes and apply to the full-scale survey experiment conducted after June 11 2021.

identity theory which posits that individuals tend to perceive members of an out-group as more homogeneous than members of an in-group; leading to a process of generalization that can facilitate discrimination against individuals, particularly when the out-group is perceived as threatening and inferior (Brewer and Campbell 1976; Linville, Salovey, and Fischer 1986; Maoz and McCauley 2008). Consequently, prior psychology studies have found that individuals have less empathy for members of a group that are "socially distant" and are less likely to detect/respond to the pain and suffering of another person that they perceive as different to them (Batson and Ahmad 2009; Cikara, Bruneau, and Saxe 2011, p. 149). Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H1a: *Individuals should be more likely to disapprove of human rights violations targeting an 'in-group' than an 'out-group'*

H1b: *Individuals should be more likely to participate in a human rights campaign on human rights violations targeting an 'in-group' than an 'out-group'*

Second, I expect human rights abuses targeting non-violent actors to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than human rights abuses targeting violent actors. Previous studies that assess public opinion on repression and dissent find that individuals are more likely to oppose human rights violations that target non-violent actors than those that target violent actors (Lupu and Wallace 2019; Edwards and Arnon 2021). These results suggest that the public evaluates the violent conduct of governments by taking into account the behavior of the targets of human rights violations and the threatening nature of the events that the government is responding too. Accordingly, violence towards non-violent groups is more likely to elicit sympathy and disapproval whereas violence directed toward violent groups is more likely to be perceived as justified and necessary (Merolla and Zechmeister, 2009; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, p. 45; Stanton, 2013). Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H2a: *Individuals should be more likely to disapprove of human rights violations targeting non-violent actors than violent actors*

H2b: *Individuals should be more likely to participate in a human rights campaign on human rights violations targeting non-violent actors than violent actors*

Perpetrator Identity

Another attribute that may affect public attitudes toward abusing human rights is the identity of the perpetrator. First, I expect human rights abuses ordered by a principal that an individual does not favor to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than those ordered by a principal that an individual does favor. Previous studies that evaluate public opinion on democracy and human rights show that individuals are more likely to punish politicians for violating key democratic principles and human rights when they belong to an opposition party than when they belong to their own political party (Esarey and Bryant 2019; Graham and Svolik 2020). These findings are in line with existing studies on confirmation bias which suggest that individuals are selective in the new (and potentially harmful) information that they pay attention to and endorse, with a tendency to accept information that supports their current beliefs and dismiss information that challenges them (Kruglanski and Bjork 1996; Taber and Lodge 2006). Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H3a: *Individuals should be more likely to disapprove of human rights violations perpetrated by an actor that they do not favor than an actor that they do favor*

H3b: *Individuals should be more likely to participate in a human rights campaign on human rights violations perpetrated by an actor that they do not favor than an actor that they do favor*

Second, I expect human rights abuses carried out by an agent that is a state actor to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than those carried out by an agent that is a non-state actor. Previous studies suggest that ordering non-state actors to implement human rights violations on behalf of the government should be less politically costly than using state actors as they provide the government with plausible deniability; allowing them to deny knowledge of and evade responsibility for the human rights abuses committed (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013; Carey and Mitchell 2017). These findings are consistent with the design of international human rights regimes which are primarily used to punish governments for violating human rights; placing legally binding responsibilities on governments (rather than non-state actors) to protect and fulfill the human rights of their citizens (Hafner-Burton 2012). Consequently, human rights organizations and foreign governments have been selective in the human rights violations that they condemn with a historical bias towards shaming state actors for violating human rights and paying less attention to the human rights violations perpetrated by non-state actors (Roth 2011; Tayler 2011). Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H4a: *Individuals should be more likely to disapprove of human rights violations perpetrated by state actors than non-state actors*

H4b: *Individuals should be more likely to participate in a human rights campaign on human rights violations perpetrated by state actors than non-state actors*

Type and Severity of Abuse

An additional factor that may affect public attitudes toward abusing human rights is the type of abuse. I expect violations of "non-derogable" human rights (i.e., those that cannot be violated under any circumstances) to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than violations of "derogable" human rights (i.e., those that can be restricted or suspended during a state of emergency).[3] Previous studies suggest that violating non-derogable human rights (e.g., the right to life and freedom from torture) is more politically costly than violating derogable rights as they are so "pejorative, stigmatic, and universally condemned"; representing the "irreducible core" of human rights and protecting the most basic human needs required for survival (e.g., physiological and safety needs) (Maslow, 1970; Cohen, 1996, p. 526; Koji, 2001, p. 921; Quintavalla and Heine, 2019). Previous studies on public opinion, economic sanctions and foreign aid find that the public supports punishing foreign countries for abusing human rights when they violate the most "severe" categories of human rights such as the right to life and freedom from torture than when they violate less severe categories of human rights such as worker rights and freedom of speech, assembly and the press (Putnam and Shapiro, 2017, p. 251; Heinrich and Kobayashi, 2018). Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H5a: *Individuals should be more likely to disapprove of violations of non-derogable rights than violations of derogable rights*

H5b: *Individuals should be more likely to participate in a human rights campaign on human rights violations of non-derogable rights than violations of derogable rights*

Another attribute that may affect public attitudes toward abusing human rights is the severity of the abuse – conceptualized as the total number of people affected by a violation. I expect human rights violations that affect a greater number of people to be more likely to generate disapproval and a willingness to act than those that affect a smaller number of people. Violating the human rights of many people should be more politically costly than violating the human rights of a few people as they can be

[3]See Article 4.2 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights for a list of the non-derogable rights.

perceived as systematic and part of a larger pattern of behavior. Accordingly, when governments are accused of violating the human rights of many people, they often attempt to downplay the number of people affected by re-framing the violation as an exceptional and isolated incident in order to avoid condemnation from the international community (Cohen 1996). Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H6a: *Individuals should be more likely to disapprove of human rights violations affecting a larger number of people than violations affecting a smaller number of people*

H6b: *Individuals should be more likely to participate in a human rights campaign on human rights violations affecting a larger number of people than violations affecting a smaller number of people*

Framing

An additional factor that may affect public attitudes toward abusing human rights is the framing of the human rights violation. Previous research on social mobilization, human rights, elections and protests find that frames which evoke emotional responses are more likely to mobilize individuals and shape public opinion on an issue or event (Gamson 1995; Valentino et al. 2011; Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic 2007; McEntire, Leiby, and Krain 2015). On the one hand, personal frames are an effective way to garner public support for human rights naming and shaming campaigns as the development of a victim's personal narrative humanizes the violation and allows readers to empathize and connect with the victim; eliciting feelings of sadness and anger (McEntire, Leiby, and Krain 2015; Haines et al. 2020). On the other hand, violent graphic frames may be more likely to elicit public disapproval of human rights violations as the use of violent/graphic descriptions and images can elicit emotions of anger and disgust; increasing an individual's willingness to engage in a particular activity (Fahmy, Bock, and Wanta 2014; Grizzard et al. 2017). Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H7a: *Individuals should be more likely to disapprove of human rights violations that use personal frames than violations that do not use personal frames*

H7b: *Individuals should be more likely to participate in a human rights campaign on human rights violations that use personal frames than violations that do not use personal frames*

H8a: *Individuals should be more likely to disapprove of human rights violations that use violent graphic frames than violations that do not use violent graphic frames*

H8b: *Individuals should be more likely to participate in a human rights campaign on human rights violations that use violent graphic frames than violations that do not use violent graphic frames*

Elite Cues

Another attribute that may affect public attitudes toward abusing human rights is whether the public receives an elite cue from a public figure on the human rights violation. Previous research suggests that an individual's decision-making process is strongly influenced by the statements made by public figures on a range of issues, particularly when the figure is perceived as credible with an appropriate amount of knowledge and expertise on the issue (Gilens and Murakawa 2002). On the one hand, elite cues from politicians who have the same political affiliation as an individual are more likely to influence a person's opinions than those that come from a politician of a rivaling political party due to partisan and confirmation bias (Bartels 2002; Gelpi 2010; Kearns and Young 2020). On the other hand, elite cues from international human rights organizations may be more likely to shape public opinion and behavior than domestic human

rights organizations due to the perception that they are more impartial, trustworthy and are less likely to possess political motives for condemning or supporting a particular issue (Gourevitch, Lake, and Stein 2012; Kelley and Simmons 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). Therefore, I hypothesize:

H9a: *Individuals should be more likely to disapprove of human rights violations condemned by a politician of a party that they support than violations condemned by a politician of a party that they do not support*

H9b: *Individuals should be more likely to participate in a human rights campaign on human rights violations condemned by a politician of a party that they support than violations condemned by a politician of a party that they do not support*

H10a: *Individuals should be more likely to disapprove of human rights violations condemned by an international human rights organization than violations condemned by a domestic human rights organization*

H10b: *Individuals should be more likely to participate in a human rights campaign on human rights violations condemned by an international human rights organization than violations condemned by a domestic human rights organization*

Individual-Level Characteristics

An additional set of factors that may affect public attitudes toward abusing human rights are individual-level characteristics such as political attitudes and educational attainment. Prior research on public opinion and human rights has identified several individual-level characteristics that influence whether or not a respondent approves or disapproves of a human rights violation. On the one hand, liberal voters are more likely to oppose human rights violations than conservative voters as liberal ideologies tend to prioritize global values (e.g., human rights) over national self-interests while conservative ideologies tend to prioritize national self-interests (e.g., national security) over global values (McFarland and Mathews 2005; Moeckli 2008; Pew Research Center 2009; Anderson and Richards 2018). On the other hand, individuals with a higher educational status may be more likely to oppose human rights violations than individuals with a lower educational status as the educational process itself encourages individuals to develop an open mindset and tolerance for different views and cultures (including the belief that all individuals are entitled to human rights) (Hyman and Wright 1979; McFarland and Mathews 2005). Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H11a: *Individuals that identify with a liberal political orientation should be more likely to disapprove of human rights violations than individuals with a conservative political orientation*

H11b: *Individuals that identify with a liberal political orientation should be more likely to participate in a human rights campaign than individuals with a conservative political orientation*

H12a: *Individuals that are more educated should be more likely to disapprove of human rights violations than individuals that are less educated*

H12b: *Individuals that are more educated should be more likely to participate in a human rights campaign than individuals that are less educated*

Table 1 summarizes the article's theoretical expectations, displaying the hypothesized effects of perpetrator identity, target identity, violation type, severity of abuse, framing, elite cues, and individual-level characteristics on disapproval and participation in a human rights campaign.

Conditional Effects

Theoretically, I expect conditional effects to exist for all combinations of the treatments

Table 1: Hypothesized effects of conjoint treatments

Variable	Value	Effect on Disapproval and Participation in a Human Rights Campaign
Target Identity	In-group	+
	Out-group	-
	Non-violent	+
	Violent	-
Perpetrator Identity	Support for principal	-
	No support for principal	+
	State agent	+
	Non-state agent	-
Violation Type	Non-derogable rights	+
	Derogable rights	-
Violation Severity	More people affected	+
	Less people affected	-
Framing	Personal frame	+
	No personal frame	-
	Violent graphic frame	+
	No violent graphic frame	-
Elite Cues	Political party supported	+
	Political party not supported	-
	International HRO	+
	Domestic HRO	-
Individual-level Characteristics	Liberal	+
	Conservative	-
	More educated	+
	Less educated	-

included in my survey. For example, I expect an individual's level of disapproval and willingness to act for human rights violations targeting in-groups and out-groups to increase when the human rights violation i) targets a non-violent actor ii) is perpetrated by an actor that the respondent does not favor iii) is perpetrated by a state actor iv) violates a non-derogable right ii) affects a greater number of people v) is framed using a personal or violent graphic frame vi) is condemned by a politician of a party that the respondent supports or an international human rights organization vii) the respondent has a liberal political orientation or has a higher educational status. An important implication of these conditional effects is that the interaction of these treatments should decrease the difference in an individual's level of disapproval and willingness to act for violations targeting in-groups and violations targeting out-groups.

Research Design

Survey Experiment

This study examines variation in public responses to human rights violations using a 10 minute long conjoint survey experiment conducted in the U.S. of 3,200 respondents that varies key attributes of a human rights violation (target, perpetrator, type, and severity) and external factors such as framing, elite cues, and individual-level differences. Using a forced-choice and ratings based conjoint design, I present survey participants with five pairs of profiles describing a human rights violation composed of randomly generated features. After seeing each pair of human rights violation profiles, respondents are asked

to rank and rate the two profiles according to their disapproval and willingness to support a human rights campaign on a seven-point Likert-type scale, and click on a URL if they would like to sign a human rights petition for each profile. The ordering of the questions are randomized in order to avoid order effects on the outcome measures.

First, I run a local pre-test version of the survey at [*Redacted for anonymous peer review*] via Qualtrics using a sample of 1,000 student participants. This process will enable me to evaluate which vignettes and questions to select for the experimental study and how-to best phrase each question. The data is to be collected in April 2021, following the pre-registration of the study. Second, I run the full survey experiment via YouGov using a nationally representative sample of 3,200 participants in the U.S. based on age, gender, race, and education. The YouGov panel is a proprietary opt-in survey panel, comprised of 1.8 million U.S. residents who have agreed to participate in YouGov's web surveys. Participants are paid for their participation via YouGov's incentive program. The data is to be collected shortly after the pre-test version of the survey in June 2021.

Main Variables of Interest

To test my hypotheses, I manipulate ten attributes of a human rights violation.[4] First, I manipulate the perpetrator's identity according to the political party of the principal that orders the violation (H3a and H3b). Second, I manipulate the perpetrator's identity according to the agent that carries out the human rights violation (H4a and H4b). Third, I manipulate the type of abuse by including violations of non-derogable rights and derogable rights (H5a and H5b). Fourth, I manipulate the severity of the abuse by specifying the number of people affected by it, ranging from high (twenty individuals) to low (two individuals) (H6a and H6b). Fifth, I manipulate the target's identity according to the level of violence associated with their tactics (H2a and H2b). For the sixth-eighth treatments, I manipulate the target's identity according to their race/ethnicity, nationality, and religion (H1a and H1b). Ninth, I manipulate the framing of the human rights violation according to whether a personal frame (H7a and H7b) or a violent graphic frame (H8a and H8b) is used to describe the violation. Tenth, for the elite cue from a politician, I manipulate the political party that they belong to (H9a and H9b). For the elite cue from a human rights organization, I manipulate the geographical level that they operate at (domestic or international) (H10a and H10b). The ordering of the attributes are randomized across participants in order to avoid attribute order affects but are fixed for each participant in order to enhance readability of the profiles.

To test the hypotheses on individual-level characteristics, I include two pre-treatment questions that measure each respondents political attitudes and educational attainment. First, to test H11a and H11b, respondents are asked how they would describe their political ideology from a choice of Very liberal, Liberal, Moderate, Conservative, Very conservative, Not sure. Second, to test H12a and H12b, respondents are asked what their highest level of education is from a choice of Did not graduate from high school, High school graduate, Some college, but no degree (yet), 2-year college degree, 4-year college degree, Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.).

Outcome Measures

After seeing each pair of human rights violation profiles, respondents are asked a series of

[4] Jenke et al. (2021) find that conjoint survey analyses can include up to eleven attributes without compromising how respondents process the information provided to them. The randomization of attributes for each human rights violation profile will be constrained to exclude implausible and problematic combinations as recommended by Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014). While some of the human rights profiles are quite abstract for the U.S. context, prior research suggests that situational hypotheticality does not affect the results experimenters obtain (**brutger_etal_2020**).

questions related to the primary outcomes of the analysis; *disapproval of the abuse* and *willingness to participate in a human rights campaign*. To measure *disapproval of the abuse*, participants are asked the following two questions: First, respondents are forced to pick which human rights abuse they are more likely to oppose (binary variable). Second, respondents are asked how much they approve or disapprove of each human rights abuse from 1 (strongly approve) to 7 (strongly disapprove) (seven-point Likert-type scale).

To measure *willingness to participate in a human rights campaign*, participants are asked the following two questions: First, respondents are asked how much they are willing to participate in a human rights campaign for each human rights abuse from 1 (strongly unwilling) to 7 (strongly willing) (seven-point Likert-type scale). Second, respondents are asked to click on a URL if they would like to sign a petition for either of the human rights abuses to be sent to the United States Attorney General and the United Nations Rapporteur for Human Rights (binary variable).

Other Variables [5]

To control for individual level factors, respondents will also be asked questions on their age, gender, race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, employment, income, marital status, location, political affiliation, voting history, interest in human rights, engagement with world news, history of participation in the Black Lives Matter movement, and how much influence they think they have on public policy (see appendix).

To measure the attentiveness of respondents, I include two pre-treatment screener questions that aim to detect whether respondents are reading the survey questions carefully (Berinsky et al. 2021). I also include a captcha verification that respondents must complete at the very beginning of the survey in order to prevent bots from submitting responses (see appendix).

Survey Instrument

Introductory Prompt (shown to all respondents)

Every year, governments in various countries around the world abuse human rights. The following questions are about fictional human rights abuses in the United States. The situation is hypothetical and is not about a specific story in the news today. We will describe two human rights abuses at a time, and ask you to rank and rate each abuse according to whether you oppose, disapprove and are willing to participate in a corresponding human rights campaign. Some parts of the description may seem more important to you than others. You will repeat this exercise five times.

Do you agree to read the details very carefully, and then give your most thoughtful answers?

- Yes
- No

Conjoint Treatments [6]

[5] Update: The wording for many of the socio-demographic questions has been replaced with the language used by YouGov for their overlapping core socio and political profile items. In addition, one of the attention checker questions has been replaced as it was not WCAG accessible and may have tested more for cognitive/learning ability than attention.

[6] Update: The visualization of the conjoint choices has been changed from a table format to a vignette format as a number of respondents that took the pre-test version of the survey stated that the tables were difficult to read and understand. This new format has resulted in the following changes:

Figure 1 shows a sample scenario. Table 2 shows the full range of randomized attribute levels that will be shown to respondents.

Figure 1: Sample conjoint choice

Story 3 of 5

Incident A	Incident B
REUTERS United States May 27, 2021 **U.S. Faces Allegations of Human Rights Abuses** 11:48AM CDT *By Mike Stone and Julia Harte*	REUTERS United States May 27, 2021 **U.S. Faces Allegations of Human Rights Abuses** 11:48AM CDT *By Mike Stone and Julia Harte*
• The U.S. is accused of committing human rights abuses during an armed raid. • A Democrat governor ordered a civilian militia group to carry out the armed raid. • The armed raid resulted in the torture of twelve people. • Family and friends describe the victims as kind, loving and caring people. • Amnesty International, an international nonprofit organization, condemned the abuse. • Most of the victims were journalists including middle eastern jewish naturalized American citizens.	• The U.S. is accused of committing human rights abuses during an armed raid. • A Republican governor ordered the national guard to carry out the armed raid. • The armed raid resulted in the arbitrary arrest of twenty people. • Amnesty International, an international nonprofit organization, condemned the abuse. • Most of the victims were protesters including hispanic christian American citizens.

First, some of the wording that precedes and follows the treatment attributes has been modified in order to form independent sentences and improve the narrativity of the vignettes. Second, while the ordering of the attributes are still randomized across respondents, the conjoint treatments in Table 2 appearing in the same box will be displayed together in order for the vignettes to remain understandable to respondents. Third, each profile will be presented as a condensed version of a news article in order to enhance the readability and realism of the profiles (with the same header and introductory bullet point for each profile). Reuters has been chosen as the news organization for the vignettes as it has a strong reputation for impartial and reliable reporting.

Table 2: Conjoint attributes and levels

Conjoint Treatments	Levels
(A) Perpetrator (Principal)	1. The Republican president
	2. The Democrat president
	3. A Republican governor
	4. A Democrat governor
	...ordered...
(B) Perpetrator (Agent)	1. the military
	2. the police
	3. the national guard
	4. a civilian militia group
	5. a private militia group
	...to carry out the armed raid.
(C) Violation Type	The armed raid resulted in the...
	1. extrajudicial killing
	2. torture
	3. disappearance
	4. arbitrary arrest
(D) Violation Severity	...of...
	1. two
	2. six
	3. twelve
	4. twenty
	...people.
(E) Target (Tactic)	Most of the victims were...
	1. civilians
	2. journalists
	3. protesters
	4. criminals
	5. suspected terrorists
(F) Target (Race/Ethnicity)	...including...
	1. white
	2. black
	3. asian
	4. hispanic
	5. middle eastern
	...
(G) Target (Religion)	1. christian
	2. jewish
	3. muslim
	4. buddhist
	5. hindu
	...
(H) Target (Nationality)	1. American citizens.
	2. naturalized American citizens.
	3. immigrants with legal status.
	4. immigrants without legal status.
(I) Framing	1. The victims suffered multiple injuries to the head, limbs and torso.
	2. Family and friends describe the victims as kind, loving and caring people.
	3. ...
(J) Elite Cue	1. The American Civil Liberties Union, an American nonprofit organization,
	2. Amnesty International, an international nonprofit organization,
	3. A Democrat member of Congress
	4. A Republican member of Congress
	...condemned the abuse.

Survey Instrument Questions[7]

1. If you had to choose between them, which incident are you more likely to oppose?
   - Incident A
   - Incident B
2. On a scale of 1 to 7, do you approve, disapprove or neither approve nor disapprove of the incident?

	Strongly Approve	Approve	Somewhat Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Somewhat Disapprove	Disapprove	Strongly Disapprove
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Incident A	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
Incident B	o	o	o	o	o	o	o

3. On a scale of 1 to 7, would you be willing to participate in a human rights campaign on the incident?

	Strongly Unwilling	Unwilling	Somewhat Unwilling	Neither Willing nor Unwilling	Somewhat Willing	Willing	Strongly Willing
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Incident A	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
Incident B	o	o	o	o	o	o	o

4. If you would like sign a petition for these incidents to be sent to the United States Attorney General and the United Nations Rapporteur for Human Rights, please click below and then click the forward arrow to continue.

Incident A	**Incident B**
Sign the petition	Sign the petition

Estimation Strategy

The results will be analyzed using two methods. First, I will use average marginal component effects (AMCEs) tests to evaluate the overall effect of each individual treatment component while accounting for the values of the other attributes included in the model. Second, I will use average marginal component interaction effects (AMCIEs) models to

[7] Update: The wording of the survey instrument questions has been slightly modified, with the term "incident(s)" replacing the term "human rights abuse(s)" as a number of respondents that took the pre-test version of the survey stated that it was confusing to be asked to rank and rate the "human rights abuse(s)" when the profiles are titled "Incident A/B".

evaluate the conditional effects between each individual treatment component.

Sample Size and Power Analysis

To determine the minimum required sample size for the survey and ensure that the experiment is well powered, I run two power analyses that take into account the number of individually assessed profiles per task (2), the total number of tasks (5), and the maximum number of attribute levels (5). The first power analysis calculates the minimum required sample size for detecting the overall effect of the individual treatment components (AMCEs) for a five level attribute, with a power of 0.8, an AMCE of 0.01-0.05, and an α of 0.05 (see table 3). The second power analysis calculates the minimum required sample size for detecting the conditional effects between the individual treatment components (AMCIEs) for an interaction between a two level attribute and a five level attribute, with a power of 0.8, an AMCIE of 0.01-0.05, and an α of 0.05 (see table 4). I select the minimum required sample size for detecting an AMCIE of 0.05 in table 4 as AMCIEs require larger sample sizes than ACMEs (Schuessler and Freitag 2020; Stefanelli and Lukac 2020). The results from the power analysis suggest that the survey experiment will require approximately 3,200 respondents in order to have a well powered design. Since each participant will assess 2 profiles per task and repeat this task 5 times, the sample size will include 32,000 observations (3,200 participants x 10).

Table 3: Power analysis for AMCEs

Respondents	Observations	AMCE	Power	α	Levels
19618	196183	0.01	0.8	0.05	5
4902	49016	0.02	0.8	0.05	5
2176	21763	0.03	0.8	0.05	5
781	7810	0.05	0.8	0.05	5

Table 4: Power analysis for AMCIEs

Respondents	Observations	AMCIE	Power	α	Levels1	Levels2
78481	784809	0.01	0.8	0.05	2	5
19614	196144	0.02	0.8	0.05	2	5
8713	87131	0.03	0.8	0.05	2	5
3132	31317	0.05	0.8	0.05	2	5

Appendix

Captcha Verification (pre-treatment)

Before you proceed, please complete the captcha below:

- I am not a robot

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Socio-demographic Questions (pre-treatment)

In what year were you born?

Are you. . . ?

- Male
- Female

Please indicate the racial or ethnic groups that best describe you? (select all that apply)

- White
- Black or African-American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Asian or Asian-American
- Native American
- Middle Eastern
- Don't know

What is your present religion, if any?

- Protestant
- Roman Catholic
- Mormon
- Eastern or Greek Orthodox
- Jewish
- Muslim
- Buddhist
- Hindu
- Atheist
- Agnostic

- Nothing in particular
- Something else (please specify) ☐

Which of these statements best describes you?

- I am an immigrant to the USA and a naturalized citizen
- I am an immigrant to the USA but not a citizen
- I was born in the USA but at least one of my parents is an immigrant
- My parents and I were born in the USA but at least one of my grandparents was an immigrant
- My parents, grandparents and I were all born in the USA

Which of the following best describes your current employment status?

- Working full time now
- Working part time now
- Temporarily laid off
- Unemployed
- Retired
- Permanently disabled
- Taking care of home or family
- Student
- Other (please specify) ☐

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- Did not graduate from high school
- High school graduate
- Some college, but no degree (yet)
- 2-year college degree
- 4-year college degree
- Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.)

Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

- Less than $10,000
- $10,000 - $19,999
- $20,000 - $29,999
- $30,000 - $39,999
- $40,000 - $49,999

- $50,000 - $59,999
- $60,000 - $69,999
- $70,000 - $79,999
- $80,000 - $99,999
- $100,000 - $119,999
- $120,000 - $149,999
- $150,000 - $199,999
- $200,000 - $249,999
- $250,000 - $349,999
- $350,000 - $499,999
- $500,000 or more
- Prefer not to say

What is your marital status?

- Married
- Separated
- Divorced
- Widowed
- Never married
- Domestic / civil partnership

In which state do you live?

Drop down

In what sort of place do you currently live?

- Big city
- Smaller city
- Suburban area
- Small town
- Rural area

In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?

- Very liberal
- Liberal
- Moderate
- Conservative

- Very conservative
- Not sure

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a. . . ?

- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent
- Other (please specify) ☐
- Not sure

*If Democrat selected, ask the follow-up: Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?

- Strong Democrat
- Not very strong Democrat

*If Republican selected, ask the follow-up: Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?

- Strong Republican
- Not very strong Republican

*If Independent, Other, or Not sure selected, ask the follow-up: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party?

- The Democratic Party
- The Republican party
- Neither
- Not sure

Did you vote in the November 2020 general election?

- Yes
- No

*If Yes selected, ask the follow-up: Who did you vote for in the election for President in 2020?

- Donald Trump
- Joe Biden
- Jo Jorgensen
- Howie Hawkins
- Other (please specify) ☐
- Did not vote for President

How would you describe your interest in human rights?

- Strongly interested
- Somewhat interested
- Neither interested or disinterested
- Somewhat disinterested
- Strongly disinterested

How often do you follow world news?

- Daily
- Weekly
- Several times a month
- Rarely
- Never

Have you ever participated in the Black Lives Matter movement? E.g. Signed a petition, donated money, participated in a demonstration.

- Yes
- No

How much influence do you think you can have in shaping public policy?

- A lot
- Some
- Little
- None

Attention Checkers (pre-treatment)

Before we proceed, we have a question about how you're feeling.

Recent research on decision making shows that choices are affected by context. Differences in how people feel, their previous knowledge and experience, and their environment can affect choices. To help us understand how people make decisions, we are interested in information about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, some results may not tell us very much about decision making in the real world. To show that you have read the instructions, please ignore the question below about how you are feeling and instead check only the "none of the above" option as you answer. Thank you very much.

Please check all words that describe how you are currently feeling.

- Interested
- Hostile
- Nervous

- Distressed
- Enthusiastic
- Determined
- Excited
- Proud
- Attentive
- Upset
- Irritable
- Jittery
- Strong
- Alert
- Active
- Guilty
- Ashamed
- Afraid
- Scared
- Inspired
- None of the above

We would like to get a sense of your general preferences.

Most modern theories of decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables can greatly impact the decision process. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both red and green among the alternatives below, no matter what your favorite color is. Yes, ignore the question below and select both of those options.

What is your favorite color?

- White
- Pink
- Black
- Green
- Red
- Blue

1.4 Deviations from Preregistration

This article deviates from the study's preregistration in two minor ways:

First, the hypotheses in the study's pre-analysis plan are presented separately for each outcome variable (e.g., H1a is for the disapproval measure and H1b is for the participation measure). In the interest of space, I have condensed each set of hypotheses into a single hypothesis for each theoretical expectation in the main article (e.g., H1 mentions the disapproval and participation measure at the same time). Most importantly, the predictions remain the same. Additionally, due to space constraints I have moved the individual-level characteristics hypotheses and results to the appendix. I provide clear signage in the article as to where readers can find these items and briefly touch upon the results in the main body of the paper.

Second, the estimation strategy in the study's pre-analysis plan states that the results from the survey experiment will be analyzed using two methods: 1) Average marginal component effects (AMCEs) tests to evaluate the overall effect of each individual treatment component 2) Average marginal component interaction effects (AMCIEs) models to evaluate the conditional effects between each individual treatment component.

The article analyses some of the results using conditional AMCEs. While the pre-analysis plan fails to mention this method, it does outline hypotheses for the conditional AMCEs tests and discusses which respondent characteristics the attributes are expected to be conditional on–ahead of data collection. While this oversight is unfortunate, most existing survey experiments use conditional AMCEs to test hypotheses like this–as recommended by Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014).

This article only analyses the results using AMCEs (not AMCIEs). This estimation strategy was overly ambitious as it is not possible to present this many analyses in a single paper, especially since the article already includes a large number of hypotheses. In addition, the pre-analysis plan only specifies hypotheses that can be evaluated using AMCEs (not AMCIEs). Thus, it would be inappropriate to interpret the results using AMCIEs without concrete predictions ahead of data collection.

2 Literature Review

Public Opinion and Human Rights

Observational Challenges

Previous empirical work on the relationship between state repression and dissent indicate that public opinion is crucial to understanding whether the impact of repression on dissent is positive or negative (or both/neither). On the one hand, human rights violations can deter individuals from engaging in anti-government behavior (Davenport 2007; Lichbach 1987). On the other hand, they can backfire and generate grievances that mobilize members of the public to join opposition movements (Aytaç, Schiumerini, and Stokes 2018; Opp and Roehl. 1990). While the public can engage in activities that attempt to punish and deter the government from engaging in future abuse (e.g., protests and voting), there are many instances where violations have been met with public ambivalence or an increase in support for the perpetrator (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Cordell 2021; Kao and Revkin 2022). Identifying the causal mechanisms underlying an individual's response to human rights violations is crucial to predicting which violations will result in public backlash as well as improving our general understanding of repression's "punishment puzzle" (Davenport, 2007, p. 8).

Despite scholarly agreement that human rights violations effect public attitudes and behavior, there is little consensus on the factors that drive this relationship; moreover, many real-world examples undermine key theoretical claims in the literature. This contradiction is partly due to the endogeneity of public opinion and human rights violations: Expectations for how the public will react to human rights abuses influences the government's decision of whether or not to publicly violate human rights in the first place–and shapes the behavior of other key domestic and international political actors. Governments that anticipate public backlash may decide not to abuse the human rights of certain groups–or violate them in secret in order to avoid the public finding out (Cordell 2021). Some targets of human rights violations provoke governments to carry out abuses that they suspect will generate support for their cause: Violations of this sort are very different to those that are unprovoked (Kydd and Walter 2006). Additionally, HROs and news agencies only report on violations in which they expect the public to be interested, with many observable human rights abuses occurring without the public knowing (Ramos, Ron, and Thoms 2007; Roth 2004).

This "strategic censoring process" distorts our understanding of the relationship between public opinion and human rights. This is because the kinds of violations to which we observe the public responding negatively are systematically different to the everyday human rights abuses about which the public is never informed (Ritter and Conrad, 2016, p. 85). This selection issue has left observational studies ill-equipped to analyze research on this topic and has likely led to numerous inaccurate conclusions within the literature.

Conventional surveys attempt to deal with this empirical problem by asking a sample of respondents questions relating to their attitudes on human rights. Many of these studies reveal that the public has diverse views on whether governments should or should not violate human rights based on certain individual-level characteristics. For example, several surveys indicate that individuals with a liberal political orientation and higher education are more likely to oppose human rights violations than individuals with a conservative political orientation and lower education (Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson and Richards 2018; Davis and Silver 2004; McFarland and Mathews 2005). While conventional surveys have provided an important foundation for our understanding of public opinion and human rights, they often produce misleading findings due to selection bias and do not allow us to infer causal relationships given the absence of a counterfactual

(i.e., a control group) (Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk 2007).

Previous Experimental Work

Survey experiments including vignette and factorial designs provide researchers with a solution to overcoming these methodological issues by randomly assigning respondents to groups with different experimental conditions (e.g., a treatment and control group) (Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk 2007). Many of these experiments have focused on the role of group identity and find that individuals are more likely to support human rights abuses of an out-group than an in-group as individuals are more likely to perceive socially distant groups as threatening and consider violations as justified (Conrad et al., 2018; Edwards and Arnon, 2021; Piazza, 2015). Similarly, prior research has found that the public is less supportive of human rights violations targeting non-violent actors than those targeting violent actors as the public is less likely to perceive non-violent actors as threatening and deserving of a violent government response (Conrad et al. 2018; Edwards and Arnon 2021; Lupu and Wallace 2019). Whereas, other scholars pay attention to the framing strategies used by HROs to describe abuses and find that frames which evoke emotional responses (e.g., personal frames which develop the personal narrative of a victim) are more likely to mobilize individuals to act than those that do not (Haines et al. 2020; McEntire, Leiby, and Krain 2015).[8]

Although these survey experiments have improved our knowledge of the factors that influence public disapproval of human rights violations, the empirical findings from existing research is mixed and have failed to resolve debates on the sources of public support for human rights. For example, while some of the above studies have found that group identity influences public opinion on human rights, other studies find less consistent support for this key theoretical claim (Morrison 2021; Kearns and Young 2020). This inconsistency is primarily due to limitations in the research design of vignette and factorial survey experiments. Namely, most experimental studies that examine public attitudes toward human rights have varied only a small number of attributes at any one time. This is problematic because prior findings for particular attributes could be concealing the effects of others and confounding results (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). Consequently, the field may have endorsed some theoretical claims that fail to hold up when we control for previously omitted variables.

Conjoint experiments offer the most promising solution to overcoming these empirical challenges by randomly varying multiple characteristics of a human rights violation and asking respondents to rank and/or rate several pairs of profiles according to their disapproval of the abuse (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). For example, Heinrich and Kobayashi (2018) use a conjoint design to examine the relationship between public opinion, foreign aid and human rights by randomizing multiple components of a foreign aid package and find that the public is more likely to oppose providing aid to foreign countries that engage in severe types of violations (e.g., torture) than less severe categories (e.g., media crackdowns). While informative, this study does not control for other factors known to influence public opinion and human rights (e.g., identity of the target and perpetrator) and does not tell us about the conditions under which citizens are more or less likely to attempt to constrain their own government's abusive behavior (the focus of this study).

Another conjoint experiment on this topic is conducted by Kearns and Young (2020). They examine public opinion on torture in the U.S. by varying the suspect's identity, elite cues, and the efficacy of torture and find that an individual's decision-making

[8] Esarey and Bryant (2019) also conduct a factorial survey experiment in the U.S. on whether Democrat and Republican voters care about human rights abuses and find that neither group is willing to trade-off partisan loyalty for human rights.

process is strongly influenced by the statements made by elite actors and experts (e.g., military interrogators).[9] Although this study tests several theoretical arguments, we still do not know how the public reacts to different types or intensities of human rights violations. This is important as repressive governments violate different human rights in tandem and are likely to receive different reactions from the public based on their perceived severity (Cordell et al. 2021; Conrad, Haglund, and Moore 2013; Davenport 2007). To move this body of research forward, I develop a more complete portfolio of human rights abuse that allows for multiple theories on this topic to be tested rigorously and simultaneously.

[9]Morrison (2021) also conducts a conjoint survey experiment in the U.S. on group identity and public reactions to the repression of Black Lives Matter and white nationalists protesters and finds mixed support for this relationship.

3 Therotical Expectations

3.1 Individual-Level Characteristics

In addition to violation characteristics (target, perpetrator, type, and scope) and external factors (framing and elite cues), it is possible that individual-level characteristics affect public attitudes toward abusing human rights. *H11:* I expect individuals with a liberal political orientation to be more likely to disapprove of and be willing to act for violations than individuals with a conservative political orientation due to different social and political priorities (Davis and Silver 2004). *H12:* I expect high educated individuals to be more likely to disapprove of and be willing to act for violations than low educated individuals because of exposure to alternative point of views (McFarland and Mathews 2005).

3.2 Hypothesized Effects of Conjoint Treatments

Table A.3.2 summarizes the articles theoretical expectations.

Table A.3.2: Hypothesized effects of conjoint treatments

Variable	Value	Hypothesis	Disapproval/Participation
Target Identity	In-group	H1	+
	Out-group		-
	Non-violent	H2	+
	Violent		-
Perpetrator Identity	Principal favored	H3	-
	Principal not favored		+
	State agent	H4	+
	Non-state agent		-
Violation Type	Non-derogable rights	H5	+
	Derogable rights		-
Violation Scope	More people affected	H6	+
	Less people affected		-
Framing	Personal frame	H7	+
	No personal frame		-
	Violent frame	H8	+
	No violent frame		-
Elite Cues	MOC favored	H9	+
	MOC not favored		-
	International HRO	H10	+
	Domestic HRO		-
Individual Characteristics	Liberal	H11	+
	Conservative		-
	More educated	H12	+
	Less educated		-

4 Sample Statistics

In June 2021, I conducted a conjoint survey experiment in the U.S. via YouGov using a nationally representative sample of 3,200 participants based on age, gender, race, and education. Table A.4 shows the distribution of respondents in the sample according to a range of demographic characteristics.

Table A.4: Summary of Respondents

Variable	Mean	Min	Max	SD
Age	48.07	18	96	17.757
Gender				
Female	0.55	0	1	0.498
Male	0.45	0	1	0.498
Race/ethnicity				
White	0.711	0	1	0.453
Black	0.126	0	1	0.331
Hispanic	0.165	0	1	0.371
Asian	0.04	0	1	0.197
Native American	0.03	0	1	0.17
Middle Eastern	0.008	0	1	0.088
Religion				
Christian	0.471	0	1	0.499
Jewish	0.027	0	1	0.163
Muslim	0.01	0	1	0.101
Buddhist	0.01	0	1	0.1
Hindu	0.004	0	1	0.064
Atheist/Agnostic	0.155	0	1	0.362
Immigration				
First generation immigrant	0.124	0	1	0.33
Second generation immigrant	0.199	0	1	0.4
Third generation immigrant	0.574	0	1	0.495
Immigrant Citizen	0.073	0	1	0.26
Immigrant Non-citizen	0.03	0	1	0.17
Education				
No high school	0.04	0	1	0.195
High school graduate	0.322	0	1	0.467
College	0.521	0	1	0.5
Postgraduate	0.117	0	1	0.321
Family income				
Less than $20,000	0.17	0	1	0.376
$20,000-$49,999	0.275	0	1	0.447
$50,000-$99,999	0.271	0	1	0.444
More than $100,000	0.161	0	1	0.367
Political ideology				
Very liberal	0.158	0	1	0.365
Liberal	0.171	0	1	0.376
Moderate	0.311	0	1	0.463
Conservative	0.164	0	1	0.37
Very conservative	0.11	0	1	0.313
Political party				
Democrat	0.384	0	1	0.486
Independent	0.285	0	1	0.452
Republican	0.221	0	1	0.415

5 Power Analysis

Prior to data collection, I ran two power analyses using the cjpowR package to determine the minimum required sample size for the study and ensure that the experiment was well powered (Schuessler and Freitag 2020). The power analyses take into account the number of individually assessed profiles per task (2), the total number of tasks (5), and the maximum number of attribute levels (5). Table A.5.1 displays the minimum required sample size for detecting the overall effect of the individual treatment components (AMCEs) for a five level attribute, with a power of 0.8, an AMCE of 0.01-0.05, and an α of 0.05. Table A.5.2 calculates the minimum required sample size for detecting the conditional effects between the individual treatment components (ACIEs) for an interaction between a two level attribute and a five level attribute, with a power of 0.8, an ACIE of 0.01-0.05, and an α of 0.05.

I select the minimum required sample size for detecting an ACIE of 0.05 in Table A.5.2 as ACIEs require larger sample sizes than ACMEs. The results from this power analysis suggest that the survey experiment requires approximately 3,200 respondents in order to have a well powered design. Since each participant will assess 2 profiles per task and repeat this task 5 times, the sample size includes 32,000 observations (3,200 participants x 10). This power analysis was also used to determine the minimum required sample size for conducting the conditional AMCEs in this study (e.g., an interaction between a two-level variable for whether the respondent is a member of the target race/ethnicity in-group and the five-level target race/ethnicity attribute).

Table A.5.1: Power Analysis for Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs)

Respondents	Observations	AMCE	Power	α	Levels
19618	196183	0.01	0.8	0.05	5
4902	49016	0.02	0.8	0.05	5
2176	21763	0.03	0.8	0.05	5
781	7810	0.05	0.8	0.05	5

Note: The number of respondents is calculated by dividing the number of observations by 10 as each participant will assess 2 profiles per task and repeat this task 5 times.

Table A.5.2: Power Analysis for Average Component Interaction Effects (ACIEs)

Respondents	Observations	ACIE	Power	α	Levels1	Levels2
78481	784809	0.01	0.8	0.05	2	5
19614	196144	0.02	0.8	0.05	2	5
8713	87131	0.03	0.8	0.05	2	5
3132	31317	0.05	0.8	0.05	2	5

Note: The number of respondents is calculated by dividing the number of observations by 10 as each participant will assess 2 profiles per task and repeat this task 5 times.

6 Experimental Design

6.1 Survey Instrument

In June 2021, I conducted a conjoint survey experiment in the U.S. via YouGov using a nationally representative sample of 3,200 participants based on age, gender, race, and education (see Appendix 2 for the sample statistics). This study was preregistered via EGAP and the Open Science Framework (OSF) ahead of data collection and received institutional review board (IRB) approval (see Appendix 1 for the study's registration). A power analysis with a power of 0.8 and an α of 0.05 determined that this sample size is large enough to detect significant effects at the .05 level across all models (see Appendix 5 for the power analysis). The conjoint survey varied key attributes of a human rights violation (target, perpetrator, type, and scope) and external factors (framing and elite cues). The survey began by asking respondents a series of demographic and attitudinal questions (see Appendix 6.2 for the survey text). Using a forced-choice and ratings based conjoint design, respondents were then asked to rank and rate pairs of randomly generated human rights violations according to their disapproval and willingness to support a human rights campaign, and click on a URL to sign a fictitious petition for each profile. The conjoint choices were presented as a condensed version of a Reuters news article, an organization with a strong reputation for impartial and reliable reporting, in order to enhance the readability and realism of the profiles (Ad Fontes Media 2021).

Conjoint survey experiments have become increasingly common in political science; enabling researchers to examine multidimensional preferences while holding fixed a range of attributes that would otherwise confound the results (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). Prior theory and evidence indicates that public reactions to human rights abuses are subjective in nature and involve making trade-offs between certain features of a violation (e.g., "who" did "what" to "whom"). Conjoint survey designs provide a unique opportunity to isolate the effects of each of these components simultaneously and determine which factors shape public attitudes and willingness to act on human rights. Conjoint experiments can also be used to overcome social desirability bias as respondents are less likely to be concerned about their choices being linked to a particular attribute when they are required to consider several attributes at the same time (Bansak et al. 2019). This is especially important for analyzing sensitive issues like public attitudes and behavior on human rights violations.

To test my hypotheses, I manipulated ten attributes of a human rights violation.[10] These attributes and their corresponding levels were chosen as they represent the typical characteristics of violations contained in human rights reports and allegation datasets frequently used by political scientists to measure human rights (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014; Conrad, Haglund, and Moore 2013; Cordell et al. 2021; Gibney et al. 2021). The ordering of the attributes were randomized across participants in order to avoid attribute order affects but were fixed for each participant in order to enhance readability of the profiles, as recommended by Bansak et al. (2019). Figure A.6.1 shows a sample scenario.

While some of the human rights profiles are quite abstract for the U.S. context, recent research suggests that situational hypotheticality does not affect the results experimenters obtain. For example, Brutger et al. (2022) replicate three survey experiments that vary in terms of abstraction and find that the degree to which an experimental scenario is realistic (i.e., explicitly or implicitly hypothetical) does not alter any of the studies treatment effects. Many existing experiments in international relations use hypothetical and abstract scenarios to test their hypotheses which includes telling respondents

[10] Jenke et al. (2021) find that conjoint surveys can include up to eleven attributes without compromising how respondents process the information provided to them.

Figure A.6.1 Sample conjoint choice



that the situation is hypothetical, set in the future, or implicitly based on fictional situations that the respondent is unlikely to believe are real (Boettcher III 2004; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Mattes and Weeks 2019). In addition to being driven by logistical constraints, avoiding deception and being transparent about the hypothetical nature of experimental scenarios is especially important in order for researchers to adhere and promote human subjects research that is in line with ethical guidelines from Institutional Review Boards (Brutger et al. 2022).

For the *Perpetrator (Principal)* attribute, I distinguish between Democrat and Republican with alternate levels for a president and governor given the different powers and authority that they have to order those actors included in the agent attribute. For the *Perpetrator (Agent)* attribute, I include those agents that most frequently carry out human rights violations on behalf of governments around the world; the military, police and national guard (state actors) and civilian and private militas (non-state actors) (Carey and Mitchell 2017; Conrad, Haglund, and Moore 2013).

For the *Violation Type* attribute, I include violations that are the focal point of popular human rights measures; torture, extrajudicial killings and disappearances (non-derogable rights) and arbitrary arrests (derogable rights) (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014; Gibney et al. 2021). Similarly, for the *Violation Scope* attribute, I select quantities for the number of people affected by a violation that capture variation across the scales produced by these human rights measures ranging from high (twenty individuals) to low (two individuals) in order to reflect real-world distributions (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014).

For the *Target (Tactic)* attribute, I include those groups that governments around the world frequently target with human rights violations but vary in terms of their association with violence; suspected terrorists and criminals (violent actors) and protesters, journalists and civilians (non-violent actors) (Conrad, Haglund, and Moore 2013). For the other *Target* attributes, I include levels that reflect the composition of race/ethnicity, religion and immigration status in the U.S. while ensuring sufficient variation across groups.

For the *Framing* attribute, I include language for personal and violent graphic frames that typically appear in newspaper reports describing the victims of human rights vi-

olation. I also include an empty level where no frame is shown to respondents so that violations with frames can be compared to violations without frames. For the *Elite Cue* attribute, I distinguish between a Democrat and Republican Member of Congress (MOC) and include well-known HROs; the American Civil Liberties Union (domestic HRO) and Amnesty International (international HRO).[11] Appendix 11 demonstrates that the randomization of the majority of conjoint attributes are well balanced across respondent characteristics.

After seeing each pair of human rights violation profiles, respondents were asked four questions related to the primary outcomes of the analysis. To measure disapproval of the abuse, respondents were asked "If you had to choose between them, which incident are you more likely to oppose?" and "On a scale of 1 to 7, do you approve, disapprove or neither approve nor disapprove of the incident?" To measure willingness to participate in a human rights campaign, respondents were asked "On a scale of 1 to 7, would you be willing to participate in a human rights campaign on the incident?" and "If you would like sign a petition for these incidents to be sent to the United States Attorney General and the United Nations Rapporteur for Human Rights, please click below and then click the forward arrow to continue".[12]

The design of these outcomes has several advantages. First, forced-choice questions are the best way to assess the trade-offs individuals make in responding to human rights violations. Second ratings-based questions provide finer grained responses without constraints (Bansak et al. 2019). Third, by presenting respondents with a fictitious human rights petition, I am able to directly assess how the conjoint attributes influence public behavior using a popular method of human rights activism.

To avoid any order effects on the outcome measures, the ordering of these questions were randomized, as recommended by Bansak et al. (2019). Participants assessed two profiles per task and repeated this task five times (10 profiles in total); producing 32,000 different randomly generated scenarios.[13] To test my hypotheses, I estimate the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) and conditional AMCEs using linear regressions.[14] I cluster standard errors by respondent in order to account for the potential non-independence of outcomes for the same participant.

6.2 Survey Text (Pre-treatment Questions)

6.2.1 Captcha Verification

Before you proceed, please complete the captcha below:

- I am not a robot

Randomly generate number

[11] While some of the human rights profile combinations might be considered quite abstract for the U.S. context, **brutger_etal_2020** find that situational hypotheticality does not affect the results experimenters obtain.

[12] For the human rights petition question, I use wording similar to that developed by McEntire, Leiby, and Krain (2015).

[13] Bansak et al. (2018) find that conjoint designs can include up to 30 conjoint tasks without compromising response quality. To assess respondents attentiveness, I include several attention questions including two screeners developed by Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances (2014). Appendix 8 demonstrates that the results are robust across different measures of attentiveness except the findings for the *Perpetrator (Principal)* and *Frame (Violent) attributes*.

[14] To account for the issue of multiple comparisons, I present bonferroni corrections in Appendix 9. The results show that the results are robust except the findings for the *Perpetrator (Principal)* and *Frame (Violent) attributes*.

6.2.2 Socio-demographic Questions

In what year were you born?

[ ]

Are you. . . ?

- Male
- Female

Please indicate the racial or ethnic groups that best describe you? (select all that apply)

- White
- Black or African-American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Asian or Asian-American
- Native American
- Middle Eastern
- Don't know

What is your present religion, if any?

- Protestant
- Roman Catholic
- Mormon
- Eastern or Greek Orthodox
- Jewish
- Muslim
- Buddhist
- Hindu
- Atheist
- Agnostic
- Nothing in particular
- Something else (please specify) [ ]

Which of these statements best describes you?

- I am an immigrant to the USA and a naturalized citizen
- I am an immigrant to the USA but not a citizen
- I was born in the USA but at least one of my parents is an immigrant

- My parents and I were born in the USA but at least one of my grandparents was an immigrant
- My parents, grandparents and I were all born in the USA

Which of the following best describes your current employment status?

- Working full time now
- Working part time now
- Temporarily laid off
- Unemployed
- Retired
- Permanently disabled
- Taking care of home or family
- Student
- Other (please specify) ☐

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- Did not graduate from high school
- High school graduate
- Some college, but no degree (yet)
- 2-year college degree
- 4-year college degree
- Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.)

Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

- Less than $10,000
- $10,000 - $19,999
- $20,000 - $29,999
- $30,000 - $39,999
- $40,000 - $49,999
- $50,000 - $59,999
- $60,000 - $69,999
- $70,000 - $79,999
- $80,000 - $99,999
- $100,000 - $119,999
- $120,000 - $149,999

- $150,000 - $199,999
- $200,000 - $249,999
- $250,000 - $349,999
- $350,000 - $499,999
- $500,000 or more
- Prefer not to say

What is your marital status?

- Married
- Separated
- Divorced
- Widowed
- Never married
- Domestic / civil partnership

In which state do you live?

Drop down

In what sort of place do you currently live?

- Big city
- Smaller city
- Suburban area
- Small town
- Rural area

In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?

- Very liberal
- Liberal
- Moderate
- Conservative
- Very conservative
- Not sure

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a. . . ?

- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent

- Other (please specify) ☐
- Not sure

*If Democrat selected, ask the follow-up: Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?

- Strong Democrat
- Not very strong Democrat

*If Republican selected, ask the follow-up: Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?

- Strong Republican
- Not very strong Republican

*If Independent, Other, or Not sure selected, ask the follow-up: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party?

- The Democratic Party
- The Republican party
- Neither
- Not sure

Did you vote in the November 2020 general election?

- Yes
- No

*If Yes selected, ask the follow-up: Who did you vote for in the election for President in 2020?

- Donald Trump
- Joe Biden
- Jo Jorgensen
- Howie Hawkins
- Other (please specify) ☐
- Did not vote for President

How would you describe your interest in human rights?

- Strongly interested
- Somewhat interested
- Neither interested or disinterested
- Somewhat disinterested
- Strongly disinterested

How often do you follow world news?

- Daily
- Weekly
- Several times a month
- Rarely
- Never

Have you ever participated in the Black Lives Matter movement? E.g. Signed a petition, donated money, participated in a demonstration.

- Yes
- No

How much influence do you think you can have in shaping public policy?

- A lot
- Some
- Little
- None

6.2.3 Attention Check Questions

Before we proceed, we have a question about how you're feeling.
Recent research on decision making shows that choices are affected by context. Differences in how people feel, their previous knowledge and experience, and their environment can affect choices. To help us understand how people make decisions, we are interested in information about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, some results may not tell us very much about decision making in the real world. To show that you have read the instructions, please ignore the question below about how you are feeling and instead check only the "none of the above" option as you answer. Thank you very much.
Please check all words that describe how you are currently feeling.

- Interested
- Hostile
- Nervous
- Distressed
- Enthusiastic
- Determined
- Excited
- Proud
- Attentive

- Upset
- Irritable
- Jittery
- Strong
- Alert
- Active
- Guilty
- Ashamed
- Afraid
- Scared
- Inspired
- None of the above

We would like to get a sense of your general preferences.
Most modern theories of decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables can greatly impact the decision process. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both red and green among the alternatives below, no matter what your favorite color is. Yes, ignore the question below and select both of those options.
What is your favorite color?

- White
- Pink
- Black
- Green
- Red
- Blue

6.2.4 Introductory Prompt

Every year, governments in various countries around the world abuse human rights. The following questions are about fictional human rights abuses in the United States. The situation is hypothetical and is not about a specific story in the news today. We will describe two human rights abuses at a time, and ask you to rank and rate each abuse according to whether you oppose, disapprove and are willing to participate in a corresponding human rights campaign. Some parts of the description may seem more important to you than others. You will repeat this exercise five times.

Do you agree to read the details very carefully, and then give your most thoughtful answers?

- Yes
- No

6.3 Survey Text (Outcome Questions)

- If you had to choose between them, which incident are you more likely to oppose?
  - Incident A
  - Incident B
- On a scale of 1 to 7, do you approve, disapprove or neither approve nor disapprove of the incident?

	Strongly Approve	Approve	Somewhat Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Somewhat Disapprove	Disapprove	Strongly Disapprove
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Incident A	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
Incident B	o	o	o	o	o	o	o

- On a scale of 1 to 7, would you be willing to participate in a human rights campaign on the incident?

	Strongly Unwilling	Unwilling	Somewhat Unwilling	Neither Willing nor Unwilling	Somewhat Willing	Willing	Strongly Willing
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Incident A	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
Incident B	o	o	o	o	o	o	o

- If you would like sign a petition for these incidents to be sent to the United States Attorney General and the United Nations Rapporteur for Human Rights, please click below and then click the forward arrow to continue.

Incident A	**Incident B**
Sign the petition	Sign the petition

7 Conditional Effect of Target Religion and Immigration Attributes

Figure A.7.1 Effect of Target (Religion) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Religion



Average Marginal Component Effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.7.2 Effect of Target (Immigration) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Immigration Status



Average Marginal Component Effects with 95% confidence intervals.

8 Attention Checks

Inattentive respondents can undermine a study's findings by introducing noise into datasets. To assess respondents attentiveness and ensure that this factor does not bias the results, I included several attention questions in the survey including two screeners developed by Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances (2013). Figures A.8.1.1-A.8.1.8 display the study's results excluding respondents with low attention scores. The attention scores are created using an Item Response Theory (IRT) Model that aggregates respondents pass rate for the two attention check questions, as recommended by Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances (2013).

As an alternative measure of attentiveness, I consider respondents' survey completion time. Figures A.8.2.1-A.8.2.8 display the study's results excluding respondents with high and low survey completion times. Respondents that completed the survey too quickly (in less than 9 minutes) may have rushed through the profiles and questions while respondents that took to long to complete the survey (more than 22 minutes) may have gotten distracted during parts of the survey. Together, these attention checks show that the study's main findings are robust across different measures of attentiveness except the findings for the Perpetrator (Principal) and Frame (Violent) attributes. The findings are similar when the results are stratified by levels of attentiveness.

8.1 Attention Scores

Figure A.8.1.1 Main Effects of Attributes, Excluding Respondents with Low Attention Scores



Average Marginal Component Effects with 95% confidence intervals. Attention scores are created using an Item Response Theory (IRT) Model that aggregates respondents pass rate for the two attention check questions.

Figure A.8.1.2 Effect of Target (Race/Ethnicity) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Race/Ethnicity, Excluding Respondents with Low Attention Scores



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. Attention scores are created using an Item Response Theory (IRT) Model that aggregates respondents pass rate for the two attention check questions.

Figure A.8.1.3 Effect of the Target (Religion) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Religion, Excluding Respondents with Low Attention Scores



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. Attention scores are created using an Item Response Theory (IRT) Model that aggregates respondents pass rate for the two attention check questions.

Figure A.8.1.4 Effect of the Target (Immigration) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Immigration Status, Excluding Respondents with Low Attention Scores



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. Attention scores are created using an Item Response Theory (IRT) Model that aggregates respondents pass rate for the two attention check questions.

Figure A.8.1.5 Effect of the Perpetrator (Principal) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Party Identification, Excluding Respondents with Low Attention Scores



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. Attention scores are created using an Item Response Theory (IRT) Model that aggregates respondents pass rate for the two attention check questions.

Figure A.8.1.6 Effect of the Elite Cue (MOC) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Party Identification, Excluding Respondents with Low Attention Scores



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. Attention scores are created using an Item Response Theory (IRT) Model that aggregates respondents pass rate for the two attention check questions.

Figure A.8.1.7 Effects of Attributes Conditional on Respondents' Political Orientation, Excluding Respondents with Low Attention Scores



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. Black estimates are for liberal respondents and grey estimates are for conservative respondents. Attention scores are created using an Item Response Theory (IRT) Model that aggregates respondents pass rate for the two attention check questions.

Figure A.8.1.8 Effects of Attributes Conditional on Respondents' Education, Excluding Respondents with Low Attention Scores



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. Black estimates are for high educated respondents and grey estimates are for low educated respondents. Attention scores are created using an Item Response Theory (IRT) Model that aggregates respondents pass rate for the two attention check questions.

8.2 Survey Completion Time

Figure A.8.2.1 Main Effects of Attributes, Excluding Respondents with Low and High Survey Completion Times



Average Marginal Component Effects with 95% confidence intervals. Respondents with a low and high survey completion completed the survey in less than 9 minutes or more than 22 minutes.

Figure A.8.2.2 Effect of Target (Race/Ethnicity) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Race/Ethnicity, Excluding Respondents with Low and High Survey Completion Times



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. Respondents with a low and high survey completion completed the survey in less than 9 minutes or more than 22 minutes.

Figure A.8.2.3 Effect of the Target (Religion) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Religion, Excluding Respondents with Low and High Survey Completion Times



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. Respondents with a low and high survey completion completed the survey in less than 9 minutes or more than 22 minutes.

Figure A.8.2.4 Effect of the Target (Immigration) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Immigration Status, Excluding Respondents with Low and High Survey Completion Times



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. Respondents with a low and high survey completion completed the survey in less than 9 minutes or more than 22 minutes.

Figure A.8.2.5 Effect of the Perpetrator (Principal) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Party Identification, Excluding Respondents with Low and High Survey Completion Times



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. Respondents with a low and high survey completion completed the survey in less than 9 minutes or more than 22 minutes.

Figure A.8.2.6 Effect of the Elite Cue (MOC) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Party Identification, Excluding Respondents with Low and High Survey Completion Times



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. Respondents with a low and high survey completion completed the survey in less than 9 minutes or more than 22 minutes.

Figure A.8.2.7 Effects of Attributes Conditional on Respondents' Political Orientation, Excluding Respondents with Low and High Survey Completion Times



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. Black estimates are for liberal respondents and grey estimates are for conservative respondents. Respondents with a low and high survey completion completed the survey in less than 9 minutes or more than 22 minutes.

Figure A.8.2.8 Effects of Attributes Conditional on Respondents' Education, Excluding Respondents with Low and High Survey Completion Times



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with 95% confidence intervals. Black estimates are for high educated respondents and grey estimates are for low educated respondents. Respondents with a low and high survey completion completed the survey in less than 9 minutes or more than 22 minutes.

9 Bonferroni Corrections

Figure A.9.1 Main Effects of Attributes, Bonferroni Corrections



Average Marginal Component Effects with Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{34} = 0.9985294$). The number of hypothesis tests includes baseline comparisons to each attribute level and the number of outcome variables per hypothesis.

Figure A.9.2 Effect of Target (Race/Ethnicity) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Race/Ethnicity, Bonferroni Corrections



Average Marginal Component Effects of the Target (Race/Ethnicity) attribute with Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{40} = 0.99875$). The number of hypothesis tests includes baseline comparisons to each attribute level, the number of outcome variables per hypothesis, and the number of subgroups.

Figure A.9.3 Effect of the Target (Religion) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Religion, Bonferroni Corrections



Average Marginal Component Effects of the Target (Religion) attribute with Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{40} = 0.99875$). The number of hypothesis tests includes baseline comparisons to each attribute level, the number of outcome variables per hypothesis, and the number of subgroups.

Figure A.9.4 Effect of the Target (Immigration) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Immigration Status, Bonferroni Corrections



Average Marginal Component Effects of the Target (Immigration) attribute with Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{30} = 0.0983333$). The number of hypothesis tests includes baseline comparisons to each attribute level, the number of outcome variables per hypothesis, and the number of subgroups.

Figure A.9.5 Effect of the Perpetrator (Principal) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Party Identification, Bonferroni Corrections



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of the Principal (Perpetrator) and Elite Cue attributes with Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence interval ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{24} = 0.9979167$). The number of hypothesis tests includes baseline comparisons to each attribute level, the number of outcome variables per hypothesis, and the number of subgroups.

Figure A.9.6 Effect of the Elite Cue (MOC) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Party Identification, Bonferroni Corrections



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{4} = 0.9875$). The number of hypothesis tests includes baseline comparisons to each attribute level, the number of outcome variables per hypothesis, and the number of subgroups.

Figure A.9.7 Effects of Attributes Conditional on Respondents' Political Orientation, Bonferroni Corrections



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{132} = 0.9992424$). Black estimates are for liberal respondents and grey estimates are for conservative respondents. The number of hypothesis tests includes baseline comparisons to each attribute level, the number of outcome variables per hypothesis, and the number of subgroups.

Figure A.9.8 Effects of Attributes Conditional on Respondents' Education, Bonferroni Corrections



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) with Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervals ($\alpha = \frac{0.05}{132} = 0.9996212$). Black estimates are for high educated respondents and grey estimates are for low educated respondents. The number of hypothesis tests includes baseline comparisons to each attribute level, the number of outcome variables per hypothesis, and the number of subgroups.

10 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

10.1 Political Orientation

Figure A.10.1 Effect of Attributes Conditional on Respondents' Political Orientation



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) conditional on respondents' political orientation with 95% confidence intervals. Black estimates are for liberal respondents and grey estimates are for conservative respondents.

10.2 Education

Figure A.10.2 Effect of Attributes Conditional on Respondents' Education



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) conditional on respondents' education with 95% confidence intervals. Black estimates are for high educated respondents and grey estimates are for low educated respondents.

10.3 Gender

Figure A.10.3 Effect of Attributes Conditional on Respondents' Gender



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) conditional on respondents' gender with 95% confidence intervals. Black estimates are for female respondents and grey estimates are for male respondents.

10.4 Age

Figure A.10.4 Effect of Attributes Conditional on Respondents' Age



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) conditional on respondents' age with 95% confidence intervals. Black estimates are for younger respondents (18-34 years old) and grey estimates are for older respondents (55 years old or over).

10.5 Interest in Human Rights

Figure A.10.5 Effect of Attributes Conditional on Respondents' Interest in Human Rights



Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) conditional on respondents' interest in human rights. Black estimates are for respondents interested in human rights and grey estimates are for respondents disinterested in human rights.

11 Randomization Balance Checks

While the conjoint survey design is fully randomized, it is important to check that the randomization of the conjoint attributes and levels are well balanced across respondent demographics (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). Table A.11.1-A.11.10 presents the results from a series of multinomial logit regression models that regress a range of respondent characteristics on all attribute levels. For the majority of attributes, the randomization of the treatment groups are well balanced across the sample–with the exception of the Target Identity attributes.

Specifically, Table A.11.5-A.11.8 show that some respondent sub-groups were more likely to see certain Target Tactic, Race/Ethnicity, Religion, and Immigration attribute levels than others. However, this is to be expected given the large number of attributes included in this study, the likelihood of some attribute levels appearing together, and statistical chance. For example, the Target Identity attributes have the most randomization constraints out of all attributes in order to exclude implausible and problematic combinations of levels (e.g., a hispanic hindu protester or a journalist immigrant without legal status) as this could affect the believability of certain profiles and bias results (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014).

To ensure that this imbalance does not bias the study's main findings, Figure A.11 displays the main effects of the conjoint treatments, while controlling for these respondent demographic variables. The results show that the main findings from the study still hold and the results are robust to this alternative model specification. I also conduct omnibus tests to evaluate whether the conjoint attributes are jointly insignificant for the respondent sub-groups (F-tests for linear regressions and chi^2 tests for logistic regressions) (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). The omnibus test statistic for Age is 0.62, for Female is 24.49, for High Education is 50.55, and for Liberal is 42.58. Together, these findings indicate that the attributes are jointly balanced in these tests.

Table A.11.1: Perpetrator (Principal) Randomization Balance Check, Multinomial Logit Regression

Variable	Democrat governor	Republican president	Republican governor
Age	-0.001	-0.0003	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.021	0.044	-0.022
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
High Education	-0.041	0.051	0.048
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Liberal	0.045	0.013	-0.013
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Constant	0.025	-0.075	0.038
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)

Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard errors in parentheses

Table A.11.2: Perpetrator (Agent) Attribute Randomization Balance Check, Multinomial Logit Regression

Variable	Private militia group	Military	National guard	Police
Age	0.001	0.001	0.00002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.014	-0.002	0.017	-0.069*
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.039)
High Education	-0.025	0.046	-0.040	-0.010
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.040)
Liberal	-0.018	0.051	-0.039	0.002
	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.042)
Constant	0.008	-0.780***	0.025	-0.761***
	(0.053)	(0.066)	(0.053)	(0.066)

Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard errors in parentheses

Table A.11.3: Violation Type Attribute Randomization Balance Check, Multinomial Logit Regression

Variable	Disappearance	Torture	Extrajudicial killing
Age	0.001	0.001	0.0004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.031	0.008	0.022
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
High Education	0.033	0.015	-0.013
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Liberal	-0.046	-0.0002	-0.042
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Constant	-0.029	-0.061	0.001
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)

Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard errors in parentheses

Table A.11.4: Violation Scope Attribute Randomization Balance Check, Multinomial Logit Regression

Variable	Six people	Twelve people	Twenty people
Age	-0.0002	-0.0001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.034	-0.010	-0.013
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
High Education	-0.010	-0.048	-0.005
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Liberal	-0.016	0.004	-0.015
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Constant	-0.009	0.035	0.065
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)

Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard errors in parentheses

Table A.11.5: Target (Tactic) Attribute Randomization Balance Check, Multinomial Logit Regression

Variable	Criminals	Protesters	Journalists	Civilians
Age	-0.0005	0.0005	0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.040	-0.015	-0.041	0.007
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)
High Education	0.039	-0.004	0.021	0.004
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Liberal	0.016	0.030	0.068*	-0.031
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Constant	0.010	-0.022	-0.069	0.005
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.060)

Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard errors in parentheses

Table A.11.6: Target (Race/Ethnicity) Attribute Randomization Balance Check, Multinomial Logit Regression

Variable	Black	Hispanic	Middle Eastern	White
Age	0.0002	-0.0003	0.0004	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.020	0.021	-0.020	-0.022
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.035)
High Education	0.077**	0.038	0.072**	0.062*
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Liberal	0.083**	0.063*	0.044	0.016
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Constant	-0.081	-0.012	-0.073	0.024
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.059)

Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard errors in parentheses

Table A.11.7: Target (Religion) Attribute Randomization Balance Check, Multinomial Logit Regression

Variable	Christian	Hindu	Jewish	Muslim
Age	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.006	0.005	-0.053	-0.013
	(0.037)	(0.061)	(0.045)	(0.041)
High Education	0.010	0.017	0.036	-0.032
	(0.037)	(0.061)	(0.046)	(0.042)
Liberal	0.015	-0.161**	0.029	0.009
	(0.040)	(0.066)	(0.049)	(0.044)
Constant	1.375***	-0.859***	0.088	0.549***
	(0.062)	(0.101)	(0.076)	(0.068)

Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard errors in parentheses

Table A.11.8: Target (Immigration) Attribute Randomization Balance Check, Multinomial Logit Regression

Variable	Naturalized American citizens	Immigrants with legal status	Immigrants without legal status
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.035	0.008	0.010
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.033)
High Education	-0.012	0.009	-0.101***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Liberal	0.031	-0.035	0.004
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Constant	0.022	0.039	-0.219***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.056)

Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard errors in parentheses

Table A.11.9: Frame Attribute Randomization Balance Check, Multinomial Logit Regression

Variable	Personal	Violent
Age	0.0001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.00001	0.033
	(0.025)	(0.033)
High Education	-0.002	-0.021
	(0.025)	(0.033)
Liberal	0.023	0.007
	(0.027)	(0.035)
Constant	-0.031	-0.956***
	(0.041)	(0.054)

Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard errors in parentheses

Table A.11.10: Elite Cue Attribute Randomization Balance Check, Multinomial Logit Regression

Variable	Amnesty International	Democrat MOC	Republican MOC
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.003	-0.021	0.007
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
High Education	-0.015	-0.025	-0.017
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Liberal	-0.005	0.003	-0.040
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Constant	0.030	0.087*	0.077
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)

Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard errors in parentheses

Figure A.11 Main Effects of Attributes, Controlling for Respondents' Age, Gender, Education and Political Ideology



Average Marginal Component Effects with 95% confidence intervals.

12 Full Tables of Results

Table A.12.1: Main Effects of Attributes

	Dependent variable			
	Model 1 Oppose (Forced Choice)	Model 2 Disapprove (Ratings Based)	Model 3 Participation (Ratings Based)	Model 4 Petition (Choice)
Democrat governor	0.020	0.008	0.010	0.014
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Republican president	−0.003	−0.002	0.001	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Republican governor	−0.001	0.003	0.011	0.037**
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.016)
Private militia group	0.005	−0.001	0.005	−0.002
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Military	−0.034**	−0.013	0.002	−0.008
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
National guard	−0.048***	−0.021***	−0.008*	−0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Police	−0.067***	−0.033***	−0.010	−0.026**
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Disappearance	0.131***	0.044***	0.032***	0.076***
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Torture	0.145***	0.070***	0.030***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Extrajudicial killing	0.197***	0.054***	0.027***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Six people	0.041***	0.004	0.004	0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twelve people	0.076***	0.014***	0.016***	0.028***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twenty people	0.089***	0.013***	0.024***	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Criminals	0.022**	0.029***	0.012**	0.021**
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Protesters	0.114***	0.061***	0.046***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Journalists	0.124***	0.076***	0.058***	0.089***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Civilians	0.119***	0.067***	0.057***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Black	0.002	−0.016*	−0.0002	0.012
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Hispanic	−0.013	−0.006	−0.009	−0.011
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Middle Eastern	−0.003	−0.009	−0.003	−0.004
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
White	−0.007	−0.003	−0.004	−0.019
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Christian	0.022	0.018	0.002	0.013
	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Hindu	−0.003	−0.009	−0.015	−0.014
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Jewish	0.016	0.016**	−0.002	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Muslim	−0.010	0.008	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Naturalized American citiz	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants with legal stat	−0.006	0.004	0.001	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants without legal stat	−0.027***	−0.007	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Personal	0.034***	0.004	0.007*	0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Violent	0.028**	−0.005	0.022***	0.028**
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Amnesty International	0.002	−0.003	0.001	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Democrat MOC	−0.005	−0.001	−0.005	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Republican MOC	−0.017**	−0.007	−0.008*	−0.016**

	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Observations	32,000	32,000	32,000	32,000

Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) using linear regressions. Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. The estimates represent the difference in respondents' choice for each outcome compared to the baseline level for each attribute.

Table A.12.2: Effect of Target (Race/Ethnicity) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Race/Ethnicity (Asian)

	Dependent variable			
	Model 1 Oppose (Forced Choice)	Model 2 Disapprove (Ratings Based)	Model 3 Participation (Ratings Based)	Model 4 Petition (Choice)
Asian Resp*Target Black	−0.068	−0.038	−0.085*	−0.082
	(0.068)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.077)
Asian Resp*Target Hispanic	−0.046	−0.015	0.003	−0.022
	(0.066)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.064)
Asian Resp*Target Middle Eastern	−0.108*	−0.017	−0.044	−0.104**
	(0.057)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.044)
Asian Resp*Target White	−0.142**	−0.010	−0.054	−0.069
	(0.060)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.061)
Democrat governor	0.020	0.008	0.010	0.014
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Republican president	−0.003	−0.002	0.001	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Republican governor	−0.001	0.003	0.011	0.037**
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.016)
Private militia group	0.005	−0.001	0.005	−0.002
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Military	−0.034**	−0.013	0.002	−0.008
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
National guard	−0.048***	−0.021***	−0.008*	−0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Police	−0.067***	−0.033***	−0.010	−0.026**
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Disappearance	0.131***	0.044***	0.032***	0.076***
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Torture	0.145***	0.070***	0.030***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Extrajudicial killing	0.197***	0.054***	0.027***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Six people	0.041***	0.004	0.004	0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twelve people	0.076***	0.014***	0.016***	0.028***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twenty people	0.089***	0.013***	0.024***	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Criminals	0.022**	0.029***	0.012**	0.021**
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Protesters	0.114***	0.061***	0.046***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Journalists	0.124***	0.076***	0.058***	0.089***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Civilians	0.119***	0.067***	0.057***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Black	0.002	−0.016*	−0.0002	0.012
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Hispanic	−0.013	−0.006	−0.009	−0.011
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Middle Eastern	−0.003	−0.009	−0.003	−0.004
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
White	−0.007	−0.003	−0.004	−0.019
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Christian	0.022	0.018	0.002	0.013
	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Hindu	−0.003	−0.009	−0.015	−0.014
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Jewish	0.016	0.016**	−0.002	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Muslim	−0.010	0.008	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Naturalized American citizens	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants with legal status	−0.006	0.004	0.001	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants without legal status	−0.027***	−0.007	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Personal	0.034***	0.004	0.007*	0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)

Violent	0.028**	−0.005	0.022***	0.028**
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Amnesty International	0.002	−0.003	0.001	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Democrat MOC	−0.005	−0.001	−0.005	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Republican MOC	−0.017**	−0.007	−0.008*	−0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Observations	32,000	32,000	32,000	32,000

Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) using linear regressions. Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. The estimates represent the difference in respondents' choice for each outcome compared to the baseline level for each attribute. The baseline level for the Target (Race/Ethnicity) attribute is the respondents' in-group (Asian). Asian Resp is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the respondent is Asian (1,290), and 0 otherwise (30,710).

Table A.12.3: Effect of Target (Race/Ethnicity) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Race/Ethnicity (Black)

	Dependent variable			
	Model 1 Oppose (Forced Choice)	Model 2 Disapprove (Ratings Based)	Model 3 Participation (Ratings Based)	Model 4 Petition (Choice)
Black Resp*Target Asian	−0.061	−0.023	−0.026	−0.097**
	(0.042)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.043)
Black Resp*Target Hispanic	−0.020	−0.040**	−0.014	−0.104***
	(0.033)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.033)
Black Resp*Target Middle Eastern	0.002	−0.020	−0.036	−0.057
	(0.046)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.045)
Black Resp*Target White	−0.021	−0.037	−0.041	−0.162***
	(0.061)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.060)
Democrat governor	0.020	0.008	0.010	0.014
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Republican president	−0.003	−0.002	0.001	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Republican governor	−0.001	0.003	0.011	0.037**
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.016)
Private militia group	0.005	−0.001	0.005	−0.002
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Military	−0.034**	−0.013	0.002	−0.008
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
National guard	−0.048***	−0.021***	−0.008*	−0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Police	−0.067***	−0.033***	−0.010	−0.026**
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Disappearance	0.131***	0.044***	0.032***	0.076***
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Torture	0.145***	0.070***	0.030***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Extrajudicial killing	0.197***	0.054***	0.027***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Six people	0.041***	0.004	0.004	0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twelve people	0.076***	0.014***	0.016***	0.028***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twenty people	0.089***	0.013***	0.024***	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Criminals	0.022**	0.029***	0.012**	0.021**
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Protesters	0.114***	0.061***	0.046***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Journalists	0.124***	0.076***	0.058***	0.089***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Civilians	0.119***	0.067***	0.057***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Asian	−0.004	−0.008	−0.001	−0.003
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Hispanic	0.002	0.008	0.0001	−0.014
	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.016)
Middle Eastern	0.007	0.013	−0.005	−0.026
	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.022)
White	0.028*	0.009	0.005	0.023
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Christian	−0.003	−0.009	−0.015	−0.014
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Hindu	0.016	0.016**	−0.002	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Jewish	−0.010	0.008	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Muslim	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Naturalized American citizens	−0.006	0.004	0.001	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants with legal status	−0.027***	−0.007	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Immigrants without legal status	0.034***	0.004	0.007*	0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Personal	0.028**	−0.005	0.022***	0.028**
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)

Violent	0.002	−0.003	0.001	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Amnesty International	−0.005	−0.001	−0.005	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Democrat MOC	−0.017**	−0.007	−0.008*	−0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Republican MOC	−0.002	0.016*	0.0002	−0.012
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Observations	32,000	32,000	32,000	32,000

Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) using linear regressions. Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. The estimates represent the difference in respondents' choice for each outcome compared to the baseline level for each attribute. The baseline level for the Target (Race/Ethnicity) attribute is the respondents' in-group (Black). Black Resp is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the respondent is Black (4,020), and 0 otherwise (27,980).

Table A.12.4: Effect of Target (Race/Ethnicity) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Race/Ethnicity (Hispanic)

	Dependent variable			
	Model 1 Oppose (Forced Choice)	Model 2 Disapprove (Ratings Based)	Model 3 Participation (Ratings Based)	Model 4 Petition (Choice)
Hispanic Resp*Target Asian	−0.119**	−0.034	−0.031	−0.073
	(0.053)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.052)
Hispanic Resp*Target Black	−0.025	−0.062*	−0.026	−0.021
	(0.064)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.063)
Hispanic Resp*Target Middle Eastern	−0.102	−0.058*	−0.032	−0.103
	(0.065)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.065)
Hispanic Resp*Target White	−0.038	−0.016	−0.021	−0.013
	(0.032)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.032)
Democrat governor	0.020	0.008	0.010	0.014
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Republican president	−0.003	−0.002	0.001	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Republican governor	−0.001	0.003	0.011	0.037**
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.016)
Private militia group	0.005	−0.001	0.005	−0.002
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Military	−0.034**	−0.013	0.002	−0.008
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
National guard	−0.048***	−0.021***	−0.008*	−0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Police	−0.067***	−0.033***	−0.010	−0.026**
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Disappearance	0.131***	0.044***	0.032***	0.076***
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Torture	0.145***	0.070***	0.030***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Extrajudicial killing	0.197***	0.054***	0.027***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Six people	0.041***	0.004	0.004	0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twelve people	0.076***	0.014***	0.016***	0.028***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twenty people	0.089***	0.013***	0.024***	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Criminals	0.022**	0.029***	0.012**	0.021**
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Protesters	0.114***	0.061***	0.046***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Journalists	0.124***	0.076***	0.058***	0.089***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Civilians	0.119***	0.067***	0.057***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Asian	−0.035*	0.005	0.011	−0.002
	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Black	−0.053**	−0.015	−0.0004	−0.017
	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.026)
Middle Eastern	−0.026**	0.002	0.006	−0.016
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
White	0.028*	0.009	0.005	0.023
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Christian	−0.003	−0.009	−0.015	−0.014
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Hindu	0.016	0.016**	−0.002	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Jewish	−0.010	0.008	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Muslim	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Naturalized American citizens	−0.006	0.004	0.001	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants with legal status	−0.027***	−0.007	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Immigrants without legal status	0.034***	0.004	0.007*	0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Personal	0.028**	−0.005	0.022***	0.028**
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)

Violent	0.002	−0.003	0.001	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Amnesty International	−0.005	−0.001	−0.005	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Democrat MOC	−0.017**	−0.007	−0.008*	−0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Republican MOC	−0.032	−0.011	0.010	0.010
	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.026)
Observations	32,000	32,000	32,000	32,000

Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) using linear regressions. Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. The estimates represent the difference in respondents' choice for each outcome compared to the baseline level for each attribute. The baseline level for the Target (Race/Ethnicity) attribute is the respondents' in-group (Hispanic). Hispanic Resp is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the respondent is Hispanic (5,270), and 0 otherwise (26,730).

Table A.12.5: Effect of Target (Race/Ethnicity) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Race/Ethnicity (Middle Eastern)

	Dependent variable			
	Model 1 Oppose (Forced Choice)	Model 2 Disapprove (Ratings Based)	Model 3 Participation (Ratings Based)	Model 4 Petition (Choice)
Middle Eastern Resp*Target Asian	−0.101	0.009	0.028	−0.307**
	(0.171)	(0.084)	(0.096)	(0.145)
Middle Eastern Resp*Target Black	−0.015	0.013	−0.075	−0.063
	(0.124)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.173)
Middle Eastern Resp*Target Hispanic	0.067	−0.118	−0.049	−0.276**
	(0.131)	(0.120)	(0.116)	(0.139)
Middle Eastern Resp*Target White	−0.249	−0.171	0.016	−0.635***
	(0.185)	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.157)
Democrat governor	0.020	0.008	0.010	0.014
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Republican president	−0.003	−0.002	0.001	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Republican governor	−0.001	0.003	0.011	0.037**
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.016)
Private militia group	0.005	−0.001	0.005	−0.002
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Military	−0.034**	−0.013	0.002	−0.008
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
National guard	−0.048***	−0.021***	−0.008*	−0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Police	−0.067***	−0.033***	−0.010	−0.026**
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Disappearance	0.131***	0.044***	0.032***	0.076***
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Torture	0.145***	0.070***	0.030***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Extrajudicial killing	0.197***	0.054***	0.027***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Six people	0.041***	0.004	0.004	0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twelve people	0.076***	0.014***	0.016***	0.028***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twenty people	0.089***	0.013***	0.024***	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Criminals	0.022**	0.029***	0.012**	0.021**
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Protesters	0.114***	0.061***	0.046***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Journalists	0.124***	0.076***	0.058***	0.089***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Civilians	0.119***	0.067***	0.057***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Asian	0.018	0.017**	0.010	0.012
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Black	0.021	0.004	0.011	0.027*
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Hispanic	0.004	0.004	−0.001	−0.005
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
White	0.003	0.012	0.006	−0.010
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Christian	0.028*	0.009	0.005	0.023
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Hindu	−0.003	−0.009	−0.015	−0.014
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Jewish	0.038*	0.028**	0.009	0.029
	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.023)
Muslim	−0.010	0.008	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Naturalized American citizens	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants with legal status	−0.006	0.004	0.001	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants without legal status	−0.027***	−0.007	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Personal	0.034***	0.004	0.007*	0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)

Violent	0.028**	−0.005	0.022***	0.028**
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Amnesty International	0.002	−0.003	0.001	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Democrat MOC	−0.005	−0.001	−0.005	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Republican MOC	−0.017**	−0.007	−0.008*	−0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Observations	32,000	32,000	32,000	32,000

Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) using linear regressions. Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. The estimates represent the difference in respondents' choice for each outcome compared to the baseline level for each attribute. The baseline level for the Target (Race/Ethnicity) attribute is the respondents' in-group (Middle Eastern). Middle Eastern Resp is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the respondent is Middle Eastern (250), and 0 otherwise (31,750).

Table A.12.6: Effect of Target (Race/Ethnicity) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Race/Ethnicity (White)

	Dependent variable			
	Model 1 Oppose (Forced Choice)	Model 2 Disapprove (Ratings Based)	Model 3 Participation (Ratings Based)	Model 4 Petition (Choice)
White Resp*Target Asian	0.003	0.002	−0.003	0.016
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
White Resp*Target Black	−0.021	−0.017	−0.004	0.011
	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.027)
White Resp*Target Hispanic	0.005	−0.004	−0.012	0.011
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
White Resp*Target Middle Eastern	−0.005	−0.013	−0.012	−0.006
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.017)
Democrat governor	0.020	0.008	0.010	0.014
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Republican president	−0.003	−0.002	0.001	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Republican governor	−0.001	0.003	0.011	0.037**
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.016)
Private militia group	0.005	−0.001	0.005	−0.002
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Military	−0.034**	−0.013	0.002	−0.008
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
National guard	−0.048***	−0.021***	−0.008*	−0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Police	−0.067***	−0.033***	−0.010	−0.026**
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Disappearance	0.131***	0.044***	0.032***	0.076***
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Torture	0.145***	0.070***	0.030***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Extrajudicial killing	0.197***	0.054***	0.027***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Six people	0.041***	0.004	0.004	0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twelve people	0.076***	0.014***	0.016***	0.028***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twenty people	0.089***	0.013***	0.024***	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Criminals	0.022**	0.029***	0.012**	0.021**
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Protesters	0.114***	0.061***	0.046***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Journalists	0.124***	0.076***	0.058***	0.089***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Civilians	0.119***	0.067***	0.057***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Asian	0.007	0.003	0.004	0.019
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Black	−0.007	−0.013	0.005	0.026
	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.022)
Hispanic	0.026**	−0.002	−0.006	0.016
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Middle Eastern	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.013
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.012)
Christian	−0.003	−0.009	−0.015	−0.014
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Hindu	−0.007	0.004	−0.013	0.005
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Jewish	−0.010	0.008	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Muslim	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Naturalized American citizens	−0.006	0.004	0.001	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants with legal status	−0.027***	−0.007	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Immigrants without legal status	0.034***	0.004	0.007*	0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Personal	0.028**	−0.005	0.022***	0.028**
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)

Violent	0.002	−0.003	0.001	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Amnesty International	−0.005	−0.001	−0.005	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Democrat MOC	−0.017**	−0.007	−0.008*	−0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Republican MOC	−0.003	−0.012	−0.006	0.010
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Observations	32,000	32,000	32,000	32,000

Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) using linear regressions. Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. The estimates represent the difference in respondents' choice for each outcome compared to the baseline level for each attribute. The baseline level for the Target (Race/Ethnicity) attribute is the respondents' in-group (White). White Resp is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the respondent is White (22,760), and 0 otherwise (9,240).

Table A.12.7: Effect of the Perpetrator (Principal) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Party Identification (Democrat)

	Dependent variable			
	Model 1 Oppose (Forced Choice)	Model 2 Disapprove (Ratings Based)	Model 3 Participation (Ratings Based)	Model 4 Petition (Choice)
Democrat Resp*Democrat governor	0.034	0.027**	0.008	0.030
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.024)
Democrat Resp*Republican president	0.059***	0.024***	0.003	0.027*
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
Democrat Resp*Republican governor	0.062**	0.036**	0.026*	0.079***
	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.025)
Democrat governor	0.020	0.008	0.010	0.014
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Republican president	−0.003	−0.002	0.001	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Republican governor	−0.001	0.003	0.011	0.037**
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.016)
Private militia group	0.005	−0.001	0.005	−0.002
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Military	−0.034**	−0.013	0.002	−0.008
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
National guard	−0.048***	−0.021***	−0.008*	−0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Police	−0.067***	−0.033***	−0.010	−0.026**
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Disappearance	0.131***	0.044***	0.032***	0.076***
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Torture	0.145***	0.070***	0.030***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Extrajudicial killing	0.197***	0.054***	0.027***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Six people	0.041***	0.004	0.004	0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twelve people	0.076***	0.014***	0.016***	0.028***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twenty people	0.089***	0.013***	0.024***	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Criminals	0.022**	0.029***	0.012**	0.021**
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Protesters	0.114***	0.061***	0.046***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Journalists	0.124***	0.076***	0.058***	0.089***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Civilians	0.119***	0.067***	0.057***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Black	0.002	−0.016*	−0.0002	0.012
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Hispanic	−0.013	−0.006	−0.009	−0.011
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)

Middle Eastern	−0.003	−0.009	−0.003	−0.004
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
White	−0.007	−0.003	−0.004	−0.019
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Christian	0.022	0.018	0.002	0.013
	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Hindu	−0.003	−0.009	−0.015	−0.014
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Jewish	0.016	0.016**	−0.002	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Muslim	−0.010	0.008	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Naturalized American citizens	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants with legal status	−0.006	0.004	0.001	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants without legal status	−0.027***	−0.007	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Personal	0.034***	0.004	0.007*	0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Violent	0.028**	−0.005	0.022***	0.028**
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Amnesty International	0.002	−0.003	0.001	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Democrat MOC	−0.005	−0.001	−0.005	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Republican MOC	−0.017**	−0.007	−0.008*	−0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Observations	32,000	32,000	32,000	32,000

Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) using linear regressions. Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. The estimates represent the difference in respondents' choice for each outcome compared to the baseline level for each attribute. The baseline level for the Perpetrator (Principal) attribute is the president of the political party favored by the respondent (Democrat). Democrat Resp is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the respondent is Democrat (12,280), and 0 otherwise (19,720).

Table A.12.8: Effect of the Perpetrator (Principal) Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Party Identification (Republican)

	Dependent variable			
	Model 1 Oppose (Forced Choice)	Model 2 Disapprove (Ratings Based)	Model 3 Participation (Ratings Based)	Model 4 Petition (Choice)
Republican Resp*Republican governor	−0.007	0.011	0.006	−0.028
	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.030)
Republican Resp*Democrat president	0.075***	0.027**	0.002	0.008
	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.019)
Republican Resp*Democrat governor	0.083***	0.041**	0.014	0.002
	(0.032)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.030)
Republican governor	0.001	0.006	0.015	0.031**
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Democrat president	0.022	0.010	0.015*	0.007
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Democrat governor	0.005	−0.001	0.005	−0.002
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Private militia group	−0.036**	−0.011	0.013	−0.011
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
Military	−0.048***	−0.021***	−0.008*	−0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
National guard	−0.067***	−0.033***	−0.010	−0.026**
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Police	0.131***	0.044***	0.032***	0.076***
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Disappearance	0.145***	0.070***	0.030***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Torture	0.197***	0.054***	0.027***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Extrajudicial killing	0.041***	0.004	0.004	0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Six people	0.076***	0.014***	0.016***	0.028***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twelve people	0.089***	0.013***	0.024***	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twenty people	0.022**	0.029***	0.012**	0.021**
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Criminals	0.114***	0.061***	0.046***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Protesters	0.124***	0.076***	0.058***	0.089***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Journalists	0.119***	0.067***	0.057***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Civilians	0.002	−0.016*	−0.0002	0.012
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Black	−0.013	−0.006	−0.009	−0.011
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Hispanic	−0.003	−0.009	−0.003	−0.004
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Middle Eastern	−0.007	−0.003	−0.004	−0.019
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
White	0.022	0.018	0.002	0.013
	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Christian	−0.003	−0.009	−0.015	−0.014
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Hindu	0.016	0.016**	−0.002	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Jewish	−0.010	0.008	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Muslim	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Naturalized American citizens	−0.006	0.004	0.001	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants with legal status	−0.027***	−0.007	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Immigrants without legal status	0.034***	0.004	0.007*	0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Personal	0.028**	−0.005	0.022***	0.028**
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Violent	0.002	−0.003	0.001	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)

Amnesty International	−0.005	−0.001	−0.005	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Democrat MOC	−0.017**	−0.007	−0.008*	−0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Republican MOC	0.003	0.002	−0.001	−0.007
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Observations	32,000	32,000	32,000	32,000

Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) using linear regressions. Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. The estimates represent the difference in respondents' choice for each outcome compared to the baseline level for each attribute. The baseline level for the Perpetrator (Principal) attribute is the president of the political party favored by the respondent (Republican). Republican Resp is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the respondent is Republican (7,080), and 0 otherwise (24,920).

Table A.12.9: Effect of the Elite Cue Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Party Identification (Democrat)

	Dependent variable			
	Model 1 Oppose (Forced Choice)	Model 2 Disapprove (Ratings Based)	Model 3 Participation (Ratings Based)	Model 4 Petition (Choice)
Democrat Resp*Republican MOC	−0.020	−0.003	−0.004	−0.028**
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.013)
Democrat Resp*ACLU	0.013	0.006	0.008	0.003
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.012)
Democrat Resp*Amnesty International	−0.008	0.008	0.011	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.013)
Democrat governor	0.020	0.008	0.010	0.014
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Republican president	−0.003	−0.002	0.001	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Republican governor	−0.001	0.003	0.011	0.037**
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.016)
Private militia group	0.005	−0.001	0.005	−0.002
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Military	−0.034**	−0.013	0.002	−0.008
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
National guard	−0.048***	−0.021***	−0.008*	−0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Police	−0.067***	−0.033***	−0.010	−0.026**
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Disappearance	0.131***	0.044***	0.032***	0.076***
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Torture	0.145***	0.070***	0.030***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Extrajudicial killing	0.197***	0.054***	0.027***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Six people	0.041***	0.004	0.004	0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twelve people	0.076***	0.014***	0.016***	0.028***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twenty people	0.089***	0.013***	0.024***	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Criminals	0.022**	0.029***	0.012**	0.021**
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Protesters	0.114***	0.061***	0.046***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Journalists	0.124***	0.076***	0.058***	0.089***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Civilians	0.119***	0.067***	0.057***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Black	0.002	−0.016*	−0.0002	0.012
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Hispanic	−0.013	−0.006	−0.009	−0.011
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Middle Eastern	−0.003	−0.009	−0.003	−0.004
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
White	−0.007	−0.003	−0.004	−0.019
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Christian	0.022	0.018	0.002	0.013
	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Hindu	−0.003	−0.009	−0.015	−0.014
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Jewish	0.016	0.016**	−0.002	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Muslim	−0.010	0.008	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Naturalized American citizens	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants with legal status	−0.006	0.004	0.001	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants without legal status	−0.027***	−0.007	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Personal	0.034***	0.004	0.007*	0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Violent	0.028**	−0.005	0.022***	0.028**
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)

Republican MOC	−0.012	−0.006	−0.003	−0.009
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
ACLU	0.005	0.001	0.005	0.007
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Amnesty International	0.007	−0.002	0.006	−0.001
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Observations	32,000	32,000	32,000	32,000

Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) using linear regressions. Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. The estimates represent the difference in respondents' choice for each outcome compared to the baseline level for each attribute. The baseline level for the Elite Cue attribute is the MOC of the political party favored by the respondent (Democrat). Democrat Resp is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the respondent is Democrat (12,280), and 0 otherwise (19,720).

Table A.12.10: Effect of the Elite Cue Attribute Conditional on Respondents' Party Identification (Republican)

	Dependent variable			
	Model 1 Oppose (Forced Choice)	Model 2 Disapprove (Ratings Based)	Model 3 Participation (Ratings Based)	Model 4 Petition (Choice)
Republican Resp*Democrat MOC	−0.004	0.008	0.004	−0.011
	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
Republican Resp*ACLU	0.011	0.009	0.005	−0.013
	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
Republican Resp*Amnesty International	0.028*	0.003	0.006	−0.014
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.016)
Democrat governor	0.022	0.010	0.015*	0.007
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Republican president	0.003	0.002	−0.001	−0.007
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Republican governor	0.001	0.006	0.015	0.031**
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Private militia group	0.005	−0.001	0.005	−0.002
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Military	−0.036**	−0.011	0.013	−0.011
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.016)
National guard	−0.048***	−0.021***	−0.008*	−0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Police	−0.067***	−0.033***	−0.010	−0.026**
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Disappearance	0.131***	0.044***	0.032***	0.076***
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Torture	0.145***	0.070***	0.030***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Extrajudicial killing	0.197***	0.054***	0.027***	0.087***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Six people	0.041***	0.004	0.004	0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twelve people	0.076***	0.014***	0.016***	0.028***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Twenty people	0.089***	0.013***	0.024***	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Criminals	0.022**	0.029***	0.012**	0.021**
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Protesters	0.114***	0.061***	0.046***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Journalists	0.124***	0.076***	0.058***	0.089***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Civilians	0.119***	0.067***	0.057***	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Black	0.002	−0.016*	−0.0002	0.012
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Hispanic	−0.013	−0.006	−0.009	−0.011
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Middle Eastern	−0.003	−0.009	−0.003	−0.004
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
White	−0.007	−0.003	−0.004	−0.019
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Christian	0.022	0.018	0.002	0.013
	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Hindu	−0.003	−0.009	−0.015	−0.014
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Jewish	0.016	0.016**	−0.002	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Muslim	−0.010	0.008	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Naturalized American citizens	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants with legal status	−0.006	0.004	0.001	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Immigrants without legal status	−0.027***	−0.007	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Personal	0.034***	0.004	0.007*	0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Violent	0.028**	−0.005	0.022***	0.028**
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)

Democrat MOC	0.012	0.006	0.003	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
ACLU	0.017**	0.007	0.008*	0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Amnesty International	0.019**	0.003	0.009*	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Observations	32,000	32,000	32,000	32,000

Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) using linear regressions. Significance codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with standard in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. The estimates represent the difference in respondents' choice for each outcome compared to the baseline level for each attribute. The baseline level for the Elite Cue attribute is the MOC of the political party favored by the respondent (Republican). Republican Resp is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the respondent is Republican (7,080), and 0 otherwise (24,920).

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