

The Political Costs of Abusing Human Rights: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition¹

Rebecca Cordell

Arizona State University

Rebecca.Cordell@asu.edu

Please do not cite or circulate without permission

Abstract

We now know that over a quarter of all countries in the world cooperated in a secret rendition network that enabled the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites from 2001-2005. While governments in some states have not been punished for participating, others have incurred several political costs, including electoral defeats. What explains the variation in the political costs of participation in the post-9/11 extraordinary rendition program? I argue that left of center governments suffered greater political costs from being caught because of the perception that they are better at protecting civil liberties in the context of national security. I test the effect of party orientation on electoral defeat at the election following the revelation of cooperation in extraordinary rendition using a sample of all democracies where the party in office at the time of cooperation remained the same. The analysis provides empirical support for my theoretical argument.

¹The author thanks Daina Chiba, Eric Dunford, Chelsea Estancona, Christopher J Fariss, Anna Getmansky, Lucrecia Garcia Iommi, Erik A Gartzke, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Nadiya Kostyuk, Fabian Guy Neuner, Alejandro Quiroz Flores, Thorin M Wright, and conference participants at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting 2018, Arizona State University, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting 2017, Network of European Peace Scientists Annual Conference 2017, and University of Essex for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are my own.

Introduction

At the end of 2005 it emerged that several countries (in Europe and elsewhere) had been helping the United States of America (U.S.) to run a post-9/11 global rendition network that enabled the transfer of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) terrorist suspects to secret detention sites across the world (Amnesty International, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2005; Priest, 2005b,a; Ross and Esposito, 2005). In seeking to determine the extent of foreign government involvement, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), Investigative Journalists, intergovernmental institutions and governments launched a series of high profile investigations on the issue of rendition, detention and interrogation (RDI). For example, the Council of Europe and European Parliament established committees to investigate “alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states” (Council of Europe, 2006b; European Parliament, 2006a). From June 2006, the commissions released a series of investigative reports that relied upon detainee testimony, expert witness accounts and suspected extraordinary rendition flight data; and pointed to the participation of more than 60 states (in Europe and elsewhere).² They described how foreign governments had assisted with the arrests, detention and interrogation of CIA terrorist suspects and enabled extraordinary rendition aircrafts to fly in their airspace and land discretely at their airports (Council of Europe, 2006b; European Parliament, 2006a). The reports elicited mainstream media coverage, public debates and condemnation from the international community (Bonini, 2006; Cameron, 2006; Kirk, 2006).³

While some governments have not been punished for participating, others have incurred several political costs including a loss in votes, a decline in public opinion, and the ability to hold office at the election following the revelation of cooperation in rendition (European Court of Human Rights, 2016). International relations and conflict scholars continue to debate the short and long term costs of abusing human rights for the governments that perpetrate them (Moore, 2000; Davenport, 2007a; Pierskalla, 2010;

²Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zambia.

³See here for examples: a) <http://www.repubblica.it/2005/j/sezioni/esteri/ciagate2/rapporto-marty/rapporto-marty.html> b) <http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/council-of-europe-cia-used-prague-airport-for-refuelling-secret-flights> c) <https://euobserver.com/foreign/21855>.

Shadmehr, 2014). However, it is not exactly clear what those costs are and under what conditions governments are more or less likely to experience such costs in practice. The study of this topic is further hindered by data availability given the secret nature of repression (Hafner-Burton, 2014). Unlike many instances of repression, international cooperation in extraordinary rendition has the advantage of being observable (ex-post) as we can analyze detainee testimony and suspected extraordinary rendition flight paths using publicly available data. It also provides us with a unique opportunity to study the effects of engaging in the same repressive activity for states in different domestic political environments across the world. What explains the variation in the political costs of participation in post-9/11 CIA extraordinary RDI operations?

I argue that states with left of center governments suffered greater political costs from being caught because of the perception that they are better at protecting civil liberties in the context of national security (Welch and Schuster, 2005; Moeckli, 2008; Neumayer et al., 2014).⁴ Liberal voters are less likely to consider trading off civil liberties in the name of national security and would be more likely to perceive the revelation that their government was complicit in the violation of human rights as a grievance (McClosky and Brill, 1983; Davis and Silver, 2003). Consequently, left of center parties are more likely to be hurt by a contentious human rights scandal as liberal voters disillusioned by the government's behavior could respond by voting for another party whose preferences they perceive are closer aligned to their own (Downs, 1957; Davis et al., 1970; Jessee, 2009). Alternatively, this event could foster a distrust in politicians and democratic institutions among left of center voters that leads to a decline in political engagement and withdrawal from voting altogether (Downs, 1957; Converse, 1966; Citrin et al., 1975; Fieschi and Heywood, 2004). This theory is consistent with the existing claim that political scandals that reveal greater differences in a party's public and private type threaten their survival in office as it causes voters to question their credibility as a government (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Tomz, 2007).

To test my hypothesis, I interact data on party orientation (Hyde and Marinov, 2012) with a variable that codes whether a country was described as cooperating in the RDI program by the Open Society Foundations (2013) *Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret*

⁴It is certainly evident that left-wing governments are not de facto liberal in practice (Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Marshall, 2016). However, in the context that this article focuses on, it is the perception among voters that left of center governments are more liberal than their right of center counterparts that counts.

Detention and Extraordinary Rendition report. The results from the empirical analysis indicate support for my theoretical argument. Narrative evidence of the events that followed the revelation of international cooperation in extraordinary rendition in 2006 in some of the countries that were accused of participating in the RDI program and had left of center governments, sheds additional light on the causal mechanism. This article makes a substantive contribution to the field of international relations by exploring the factors that make abusing human rights costlier for states.

The Political Costs of Abusing Human Rights

Previous research on repression has developed a rational framework for explaining why we observe repression being implemented by states in some political contexts and less in others. When deciding whether or not to respond to a particular threat with repression or accommodation, the state must first weigh up the costs and benefits of each option. On the one hand, repression can successfully deter collective action and escalation and enhance political survival (Moore, 1998, 2000; Pierskalla, 2010; Gupta et al., 1993; Rasler, 1996). On the other hand, repression can increase people's relative sense of deprivation and make escalation and open conflict more likely (Gurr, 1970; Lichbach, 1987; Rasler, 1996; Pierskalla, 2010). Repression can also entail economic costs at the domestic and international level since effective repression requires material and political resources and repression can be met with sanctions from the international community (e.g. a reduction in aid and trade or foreign military intervention) (Hafner-Burton, 2005; Hathaway, 2007; Vreeland, 2008; Hafner-Burton, 2014).

However, we should not expect the use of repression to generate the same magnitude of costs for all governments that engage in it. For example, Davenport (2007a) and Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2005) argue that the costs of abusing human rights are far greater for democracies as their behavior is constrained by institutions designed to hold government's accountable for their actions and facilitate their removal from office. Countries with liberal democratic institutions provide the opportunity for citizens to respond to moral and legal concerns regarding contentious government behavior (e.g. protests) and threaten the government for violating human rights (e.g. removal via ballot) (Davenport et al., 2008). The cost of using repression in liberal democracies is

greater because of “voice” (a competitive and fair electoral system that incentivizes leaders to behave according to public opinion), “veto” (constraints on executive authority and a dispersion of power) and the legal guarantee of free speech/freedom of expression (that allow journalists and civil society to track, criticize and challenge the behavior of state officials) (Van Belle, 2000; Davenport, 2007b; Davenport et al., 2008). Moreover, keeping citizen’s grievances to a minimum is of central importance in a democracy because the size of the groups in society that choose the leadership (the selectorate) and determine whether the leadership can remain in office (the winning coalition) are large. If a democratic government engages in repression, their supporters can defect to a rivalling party that promises better protection of human rights.

Whereas in a non-democracy, the cost of using repression is less because the institutions that enable “the people” to punish leaders are usually absent and the size of the winning coalition that determines whether the leadership can remain in office is small (Downs and Rocke, 1994; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009). In this context, satisfying the interests of a limited number of peers (elites) is a greater determinant for political survival than meeting citizen’s demands. However, if political or military elites in an autocracy are divided, engaging in repression may be more costly as it could lead some ruling factions to switch their support to groups outside of the regime (O’Donnell et al., 1986). Repression should also be less costly for autocratic governments with high state capacity to repress and maintain sustained threats as the government typically has control over a large portion of the population that prevents political society from developing and deters potential dissidents from challenging the regime (Tarrow, 2011).

While there is agreement that the use of repression can be costly for governments, the extent to which members of the public truly care about the promotion and protection of human rights continues to be debated. For example, a series of global public opinion polls suggest that there is strong international consensus on human rights including support for the United Nations (UN), freedom of expression, media freedom, religious freedom, women’s rights, racial and ethnic equality, social and economic rights, and international rules against torture (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). Similarly, a number of studies that look at the allocation of foreign aid and economic sanctions show that voters do have moral concerns about the human rights behavior of states and fundamentally care about the well-being of others. However, this concern is often

conditional on the national interest of their country not being compromised and the human rights issue having received substantial attention in the media (McFarland and Mathews, 2005; Cingranelli and Filippov, 2010; Nielsen, Nielsen; Putnam and Shapiro, 2017; Heinrich and Kobayashi, 2018; Heinrich et al., 2018). There are also some groups in society that may be more likely to care about human rights than others. For example, previous research has found that people with leftist and internationalist views are more likely to be concerned with human rights (than their rightist and nationalistic counterparts) because of the values that are expressed by these political ideologies (Anderson et al., 2005; McFarland and Mathews, 2005). Siegel (2011) also argues that people are more likely to support a human rights campaign if the group being subjected to repression has sufficient ties to groups outside of their own. We might also expect people's concern for human rights abuses to vary depending on the perceived severity of the human rights violation. For example, in Heinrich and Kobayashi (2018) survey experiment, they asked respondents whether they disapproved more of their government providing aid to a country that imprisons and tortures people or a country that suppresses peaceful protests, independent newspapers, and access to social media - and find that torture elicited the greatest disapproval among respondents. This finding is in line with a BBC World Service (2006) poll of 27,000 people in 25 countries that found that most people rejected torture "even in the case of terrorists who have information that could save innocent lives".

In the context of political survival literature, the revelation that a government has committed human rights abuses can be framed as an exogenous event to domestic voting conditions. Even when the domestic conditions for surviving in office seem positive, an exogenous event can unexpectedly take place that disrupts a stable political environment and threatens the tenure of a politician or government. Examples of these "critical events" include scandals, prime ministerial deaths, contentious policy issues, party fractionalization, intragovernmental disagreements, and crises relating to the economy, war and international relations (Browne et al., 1984, 1986). While the cause of a critical event can often be traced back to the actions of individuals within the government, the timing of their exposure is largely out of the hands of those at the center of the allegations (Browne et al., 1986). These events can be fatal for politicians and governments. However, their timing, magnitude and intensity can have disproportional effects (Browne

et al., 1984). For example, if an event takes place close to an election, we should expect the impact to be more severe than events that take place in the middle of an election cycle as they are more likely to be forgotten over time (Diermeier and Stevensen, 1999). A government's initial response can also counter some of the negative effects of an external event; such as firing the individual(s) associated with the scandal or calling for their resignation (Dewan and Myatt, 2007).

One example that demonstrates the political costs of abusing human rights in practice is the American public's reaction to the release of photographs in 2004 documenting the abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison, Iraq by the U.S. military. A U.S. poll taken immediately after the release of the photographs indicated widespread disapproval regarding the mistreatment of detainees and led to a number of protests at political events. Following the revelation, the overall performance rating of former U.S. President, George W. Bush, fell to the lowest during his presidency (ABC, 2005; Drash, 2009; Carborne, 2012). The American public's strong reaction prompted public apologies from former U.S. President, George W. Bush, and former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, with a series of criminal investigations and an independent commission established to investigate the abuse (CNN, 2018). Another example is the Georgian public's reaction to the release of video footage in 2012 documenting the abuse of prisoners in Prison No. 8., Tbilisi by prison guards. Members of the public responded to the revelation with large protests calling for the resignation of former Prison Minister, Khatuna Kalmakhelidze, and former head of the Justice Ministry's department for overseeing prisons, Bacho Akhalaia (Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 2012b). In response to the Georgian public's strong reaction, the officials responsible for the abuse were arrested and Khatuna Kalmakhelidze resigned as the Minister of Corrections, Probation, and Legal Assistance. An activist of the opposition Georgian Dream movement, Tea Tsulukianil, publicly blamed the government for the abuse and the Georgian Dream movement leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili, vowed to remove the government and asked Georgians to express their anger at the polls (Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 2012a).


Foreign Complicity in Extraordinary Rendition

International cooperation in the post-9/11 RDI operations provides us with an ideal opportunity to study the causes and dynamics of the political costs of abusing human rights. I frame the revelation in 2006 that more than a quarter of all countries in the world participated in this secret rendition network as an exogenous shock to domestic voting conditions.⁵ Government officials were not responsible for exposing this political scandal and could do very little to prevent the information from reaching the electorate (Maurer, 2011). States would have been aware of the domestic and international costs associated with these activities; from perpetuating grievances (that can lead to an increase in terrorism threat) to triggering negative public opinion among the electorate, and gaining a disingenuous reputation that could hinder international relations (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Satori, 2005). Whilst these costs are all worth consideration, for the purposes of this article, I focus on the ultimate cost of being caught for participation in rendition; losing office. Figure 1 demonstrates the disproportionate effect that this revelation had among those democracies that allegedly cooperated where the party in office during the period that extraordinary rendition operations took place (2001-2005) was the same party in office at the election that followed the revelation in 2006.

The details that emerged from numerous reports on the extraordinary rendition and secret detention of CIA terrorist suspects generated a great deal of attention both domestically and internationally for those countries allegedly involved. Together, investigative reports and media spotlight on foreign complicity in torture during the post-9/11 period have “driven public opinion in Europe on the issue of rendition” (Benjamin, 2007). However, not every leader and government that was caught cooperating in rendition has been punished for participating. What explains the variation in the political costs of participation in the post-9/11 RDI program? I argue that states with left of center governments were hurt more by the revelation of foreign complicity in RDI operations because of the perception that they are better at protecting civil liberties in the context

⁵While the revelation of participation in RDI operations may be exogenous, RDI cooperation certainly is not as the U.S. selects which countries to approach for cooperation and in turn countries select into the RDI network by deciding whether or not to participate (as Cordell (2018) argues). However, we should not expect this feature to bias results as (*Left Orientation*) is not a significant predictor of RDI cooperation. In relation to endogeneity concerns regarding the dependent variable in this article (*Electoral Defeat*), *Regime Type* is also not a significant predictor of cooperation in RDI (which is promising given the possibility that democracies are more likely to incur political costs from participating).

Figure 1: Ability of Party to Hold Office Following Revelation of Cooperation in 2006.



Ability of party to hold office, with parties in red countries failing to secure re-election and parties in yellow countries succeeding, and white for countries not identified by the Open Society Foundations (2013) report. Source: Hyde and Marinov (2012)

of national security (Welch and Schuster, 2005; Moeckli, 2008; Neumayer et al., 2014). Previous research has demonstrated strong ideological differences between liberal and conservative voters regarding the importance of protecting civil liberties versus maintaining social order. Liberal voters are less likely to consider trading off civil liberties than conservative voters and accordingly would be more likely to perceive the revelation that their government was complicit in the violation of human rights as a grievance (McClosky and Brill, 1983; Davis and Silver, 2003). Political scandals that reveal greater differences in a party's public and private type threaten their survival in office as it causes voters to question their credibility as a government (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Tomz, 2007). The consequences of a voter discovering that the party they are affiliated with no longer shares the same interests on security and human rights trade-offs are two-fold.

First, this event could generate disillusion among liberal voters and drive them to vote for another party whose preferences they perceive are closer aligned to their own (Downs, 1957; Davis et al., 1970; Jessee, 2009). For example, United Kingdom (UK) Actor, Colin Firth, described how he was voting for the Liberal Democrats at the election that followed the revelation that the Labour Party had engaged in rendition because of their policies on asylum seekers, Iraq, rendition and Guantánamo Bay (Hope, 2010). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) explore the issue of conflicting attitudes on policy decisions between voters and the government in their analysis of threats to political

survival and argue that the domestic backers of parties must be satisfied in order to prevent them from defecting to a challenger.

Second, this event could foster distrust in politicians and democratic institutions among left of center voters and plausibly lead to a decline in political engagement and a withdrawal from voting altogether (Downs, 1957; Converse, 1966; Citrin et al., 1975; Fieschi and Heywood, 2004; Trubowitz and Mellow, 2005). For example, UK Actor, Julie Walters, stated that she was not going to vote for any party in the 2010 election that followed the revelation that the UK cooperated in rendition. This was a direct result of feeling “disillusioned and let down” by the Labour party in general that she perceived consisted of “slippery, evasive, irresponsible liars” (particularly in relation to their dishonest foreign policy behavior) (Todd, 2010). In addition to preventing the party from securing re-election, these steps can also be pursued by voters to send a signal to future leaders regarding their tolerance and preferences on such issues and deter the party from behaving in a similar manner in the future (Downs and Rocke, 1994). This discussion leads to the article’s central hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The political costs of participation in post-9/11 RDI operations were greater for left of center parties relative to parties ideologically to the right.

It also follows from the hypothesis that centrist parties should experience greater political costs for cooperating in rendition relative to right of center parties. Research on centrist voter ideology demonstrates that the median voter prefers a more moderate approach to governance. However, the revelation that a centrist party engaged in the violation of human rights suggests that they are ideologically positioned further to the right than expected (Downs, 1957; Aspinwall, 2002; Green, 2007; Treier and Hillygus, 2009). Moreover, when the actions of a party are discovered to be at odds with the commitments made to the public at the beginning of the contract (previous election) their social respectability can deteriorate - alienating swing voters and causing the median voter to opt for a more viable and reputable alternative (Hölmstrom, 1979; Rasmusen, 2001; Tomz, 2007; Baum and Potter, 2008; Lane, 2013; Colaresi, 2014). However, we should expect the political costs to be worse for parties where the distance between their private and public type is greater (i.e. left of center parties).

Alternatively, one could expect left of center parties to benefit from the discovery

that they cooperated in aggressive counterterrorism action and pick up votes from voters ideologically to the right of them. Left of center governments are traditionally perceived to be more “dovish” on counterterrorism which can be viewed by some voters as a weakness and a prime reason not to vote for them (Nanes, 2017). By demonstrating that they are willing to adopt offensive measures against terrorism, left of center parties could increase their attractiveness to both right of center and swing voters who prefer harsher counterterrorism approaches. The provision of counterterrorism is a type of public good and the revelation that a state cooperated in RDI operations signals to voters that they are competent at responding to terrorist threat (Bueno de Mesquita, 2007). However compelling this alternative explanation may be, I expect the effects from a party’s traditional voter base to be stronger than those generated by swing voters and the opposition party’s traditional voter base. Therefore, left of center parties should overall experience greater political costs for participating in rendition relative to right of center parties.

The decision to focus on the incumbent’s political party as the unit of analysis instead of the political leader is driven by the fact that the type of senior government officials that directly engaged in these counterterrorism practices varied across countries. In many countries it was not just the Chief Executive that was perceived to be culpable. Croco (2011)’s work on culpability and domestic punishment explains how citizens not only blame political leaders for foreign policy failures but also consider members of the same party responsible if they had close proximity to the decision-making process (making it more likely that they were involved too).⁶ While changes to the government could be made by governments to regulate the negative effect of a scandal, the majority of governments denied participating in rendition in order to avoid incurring political costs. Therefore, most individuals allegedly responsible for cooperating were not removed from their positions as this action would imply that they knowingly cooperated (Dewan and Myatt, 2007). These factors, together with a lack of transparency on the government’s knowledge of the RDI program, created a general impression that cooperation in rendition was a wider party issue (and not just the result of one or two corrupt individuals).

The culpability issue is also the reason why the sample used for estimation only includes those democracies where the party in office at the time of the alleged cooperation

⁶See also Cingranelli and Filippov (2010, p.243-244)

(2001-2005) was the same party in office at the election that followed the revelation of cooperation in 2006. It does not follow from the theory outlined in this article that we should expect to see governments incur political costs for abusing human rights if they themselves were not involved. Similarly, previous research on the political costs of repression suggests that we should not expect a revelation like this to generate political costs in non-democratic countries (especially given that the measure of political costs is electoral defeat). As a consequence, only democracies are included in the analysis.

Research Design

In order to evaluate this article's hypothesis, I estimate a probit model that tests the effect of party orientation on electoral defeat. For the independent variable, I interact party orientation with cooperation in post-9/11 RDI operations (as identified by the Open Society Foundations (2013) *Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition* report). The unit of analysis is the incumbent's political party in the year that the election took place following the revelation of cooperation in the RDI program in 2006. The data used for estimation has information on 74 democracies where the party in office at the time of cooperation remained the same.⁷ In an ideal setting, the sample size would be much bigger. However, as an event study that seeks to measure the impact of an exogenous event on domestic voting conditions, the data has been shaped by the empirical realities of cooperation in rendition and previous theoretical work that suggests the environments where we are most likely to see the effects.

Dependent Variable (Electoral Defeat)

The dependent variable captures *Electoral Defeat*. I use Hyde and Marinov (2012) *National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) 4.0* data and extract the variable *NELDA24* that measures whether the incumbent's party lost during the national election that followed the revelation of cooperation in the RDI program in 2006.⁹ Table

⁷I use Gleditsch (2013) *Modified Polity 4 and P4D Data, Version 4.0* to create a sample of all democracies. I subset those countries with *Polity* scores between 6-10 (democracy to full democracy) which results in an N of 80 countries. I then use Beck et al. (2015) *Database of Political Institutions* and extract the *PTYIN* (number of years the party of the chief executive has been in office) variable to create a sub-sample of all democracies where the party in office at the time of the alleged cooperation (2001-2005) is the same in office at the election that followed the revelation of cooperation in 2006. For independent incumbents, I extract the *YRSOFFC* variable (number of years the chief executive has been in office).⁸ This results in a final N of 74.

⁹I only consider leadership elections (i.e. executive) and only count national legislative elections for

Table 1: Distribution of Elections that Followed the Revelation of Cooperation (by Year).

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Elections	21	19	12	14	6	2

1 displays the distribution of elections by year. I construct a dummy variable for this measure. Parties are coded 1 if the party associated with the incumbent lost, and 0 otherwise.¹⁰ This is the case for 50% of the observations (37), but not for the remaining 50% (37).

As an alternative data source for the dependent variable I construct a dummy variable of vote loss. I use Hyde and Marinov (2012) *NELDA 4.0* data and extract the variable *NELDA27* that measures whether the vote count was a gain for the opposition during the national election that followed the revelation of cooperation in the RDI program in 2006. Parties are coded 1 if the vote count was a gain for the opposition, and 0 otherwise.¹¹ This is the case for 68% of the observations (50), but not for the remaining 32% (24). If my theoretical argument is correct, then I would expect opposition parties to gain votes more often in contexts where the government that was caught cooperating in rendition was left of center, relative to parties ideologically to the right.

*Independent Variable (Revelation*Left Orientation)*

To test my hypothesis, I interact data on party orientation (Hyde and Marinov, 2012) with a variable that codes whether a country was described as cooperating in RDI operations by the Open Society Foundations (2013) *Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition* report. I construct a dummy variable that measures whether a country that was suspected of engaging with the U.S. had a left of center party in office or not. Parties are coded 1 if there were details of the country allegedly participating in the report and the party in office was were left of center (e.g. Sweden), and 0 otherwise (e.g. Greece). This is the case for 11% of the observations parliamentary systems. When there are multiple rounds of elections, I only count the result from the final round.

¹⁰There is complete information on this variable for 70 countries (this excludes Ireland, Lithuania, Comoros, East Timor). Therefore, I have used the IFES Election Guide and Wikipedia to fill in the missing data and calculate whether the incumbent's party lost.

¹¹There is complete information on this variable for 73 countries (this excludes Lithuania). Therefore, I have used the IFES Election Guide and Wikipedia to fill in the missing data and calculate whether the vote count was a gain for the opposition.

(8), but not for the remaining 89% (66). In an ideal setting the distribution of values for the independent variable would be more balanced. However, this is the empirical reality of international cooperation on rendition and nevertheless presents us with an interesting puzzle worth pursuing. If anything, it would be more remarkable to find significant support for the main hypothesis given the small number of observations in the sample.

Revelation

For the first component of the interaction term, I construct a dummy variable that measures whether a country was described as cooperating in the RDI program by the Open Society Foundations (2013) *Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition* report.¹² While this report was published several years after the first revelation of international cooperation in torture, this report represents the most “comprehensive catalog” of detainee transfers and foreign government participation in RDI practices (Open Society Foundations, 2013, p. 6). The factual content of the report is derived from carefully reviewed credible public sources and information provided by reputable human rights organizations that were published many years earlier. Due to the secret nature of counterterrorism cooperation, there has been considerable debate over how many countries participated in RDI during the post-9/11 period (Cordell, 2017). Therefore, in order to reduce the likelihood of identifying false positives (i.e. countries that may not have participated in RDI operations), I use the most conservative and reliable estimates. Parties are coded 1 if the country was named in the report (e.g. Portugal), and 0 otherwise (e.g. Mexico). This is the case for 35% of the observations (26), but not for the remaining 65% (48).

Left Orientation

For the second element of the interaction term, I use data from Beck et al. (2015) *Database of Political Institutions* as a measure of party orientation. I extract data from 2006 (the year that numerous reports were released documenting foreign complicity in the RDI program) from the categorical variable *EXECRLC* that codes the party orientation

¹²For the purposes of this analysis, I look at the effects of being caught for cooperation in rendition regardless of the type and intensity of cooperation. Avenues for future research include disaggregating categories of cooperation and frequency of cooperation to see whether the revelation was costlier for those countries perceived to be more culpable.

of a government as left, center or right (Beck et al., 2015). I construct a dummy variable for this measure. Parties are coded 1 if they are left of center (e.g. Canada), and 0 otherwise (e.g. Germany). This is the case for 28% of the observations (21), but not for the remaining 72% (53). These scores specifically relate to a party's economic policy, but are likely to be highly correlated with a more general ideological positioning that applies to other political domains.

Controls

To eliminate the possibility that other factors affecting the likelihood of *Electoral Defeat* may be correlated with the *Revelation*Left Orientation* measure, I control for a number of confounders.

Casualties (log)

I create a *WoT Casualties (log)* control variable to account for whether a country incurred casualties during the WoT. I use Marinov et al. (2015) data on troop contributions and casualties for two central WoT military operations based in Afghanistan from 2001; Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force. I create a continuous variable that takes the natural logarithm of the total number of troop casualties that a country has suffered since the party (or incumbent for independent parties) has been in office. A high value (e.g. the UK) indicates that a country experienced a greater amount of casualties in these WoT campaigns, and a lower value (e.g. Belgium) indicates that they did not. It is anticipated that parties in office in countries experiencing casualties were more likely to lose at the election that followed the revelation that they cooperated in RDI operations because it highlights the human costs of the war effort and points to a larger foreign policy failure (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1992; Zaller, 1992; Bennett and Paletz, 1994; Berinsky, 2009; Marinov et al., 2015). This measure also captures WoT alliance membership (excluding countries that did not incur casualties).

Terrorism (log)

I control for *Terrorism* threat by using the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) *GTD* (START, 2016). Given the in-

ternational nature of the WoT, I exclude domestic terrorist incidents from the data and count the number of transnational terrorist incidents in a given year. I create a continuous variable that takes the natural logarithm of the total number of transnational terrorist incidents from the start of the WoT (2001) since the party (or incumbent for independent parties) has been in office. A higher value (e.g. Spain) indicates that a state has a greater terrorism threat and a lower value (e.g. Netherlands) indicates that a state has a lower terrorism threat. It is expected that states with a higher number of terrorist events were less likely to be punished by voters for cooperation in rendition (and lose at the election that followed) because the public understands that in exceptional circumstances leaders face a pragmatic trade-off between security and human rights; particularly in contexts that have high terrorism threat (Ignatieff, 2005; Colaresi, 2014; Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014; Wike, 2016).

Rule of Law

I control for *Rule of Law* by using Kauffman and Kraay (2015) *Worldwide Governance Indicators Project* data. I extract data on the *Rule of Law* from 2006 (when the revelation of cooperation in the RDI program took place). This measure captures the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts and the likelihood of crime and violence. This variable is continuous, with higher scores (e.g. Australia) indicating a strong rule of law and lower scores indicating a weak rule of law (e.g. Russia). It is predicted that a government in a country with a strong rule of law were more likely to lose at the election that followed the revelation that they cooperated in the RDI program given the expectation that agents of the state will abide by the rules of society. This variable is also highly correlated with freedom of the press, which makes it more likely that citizens will be made aware that their government cooperated in rendition in the first place.

Economic Crisis

I control for *Economic Crisis* by using Hyde and Marinov (2012) *NELDA 4.0* and extract the variable *NELDA18* that measures whether there was said to be an economic crisis before the national election that followed the revelation of cooperation in the RDI

program in 2006. This variable is based on perception, as reported by media sources.¹³ I construct a dummy variable for this measure. Parties are coded 1 if there was said to be an economic crisis in the country (e.g. U.S.), and 0 otherwise (e.g. Brazil). This is the case for 24% of the observations (18), but not for the remaining 76% (56). It is anticipated that a party in office during a time where there was an economic crisis should be more likely to lose at the election following the rendition revelation because of the salience of the economy as an issue among voters (Schultz, 1995; Aidt et al., 2011). This control variable is especially important given that 46% of the countries in the sample had an election that took place after the 2008 global economic crisis.

Time in Office (log)

I control for a party's *Time in Office* using data from Beck et al. (2015) *Database of Political Institutions*. I extract the variable *PRTYIN* that provides the number of years that the party of the chief executive has been in office. For independent incumbents, I extract the variable *YRSOFFC* that provides the number of years that the chief executive has been in office. I create a continuous variable that takes the natural logarithm of the number of consecutive years that a party (or incumbent for independent parties) has been in office.¹⁴ A higher value indicates that the party has been in office for a longer time (e.g. Slovenia) and a lower value indicates that the party has been in office for a shorter time (e.g. Romania). It is anticipated that parties that had been in power for a shorter amount of time were more likely to lose at the election that followed the revelation that they cooperated in RDI operations as they have less time to gain experience in governance and demonstrate their competence to voters (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Chan and Scarritt, 2003).

Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of this article's independent and control variables; including the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values.

¹³This perception measure is preferred to raw GDP growth as it better represents public opinion on economic crisis as voters are more likely to learn about the state of the economy from media sources as opposed to studying the figures directly produced by financial institutions such as the World Bank.

¹⁴There is no information for Montenegro in the data. Therefore, I have used the International Foundation for Electoral Systems Election Guide and Wikipedia to fill in the missing data and calculate the relevant party's duration in office.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables.

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Revelation	74	0.481	0.351	0	1
Left Orientation	74	0.454	0.284	0	1
Revelation*Left Orientation	74	0.313	0.108	0	1
Casualties (log)	74	1.391	0.543	0	7.049
Terrorism (log)	74	1.408	0.902	0	5.7462
Rule of Law	74	0.986	0.261	-1.153	1.987
Economic Crisis	74	0.243	0.342	0	1
Time in Office (log)	74	0.701	1.844	0	3.989

Method

Given that the dependent variable capturing *Electoral Defeat* is binary, I use a probit model with robust standard errors. I also test the robustness of my results by dropping parties from the sample that were caught cooperating in rendition and were left of center to ensure that no single party is driving the results.

Results

The theoretical argument predicts that the political costs of participation in post-9/11 RDI operations were greater for left of center parties. The first model in Table 3 only includes the interaction term and its constituent variables; and displays their effect on *Electoral Defeat* at the election that followed the revelation of foreign cooperation in these contentious counterterrorism operations. The second model includes the two components of the interaction variable (*Revelation* and *Left Orientation*), as well as the control variables. Finally, the third model presents the full model including the interaction term *Revelation*Left Orientation*, its constituent variables (*Revelation* and *Left Orientation*), and the control variables.

The results in Table 3 seem to provide empirical support for the hypothesis. When the marginal effect of the interaction term is computed along with its constituent terms (*Revelation* and *Left Orientation*), the difference of the predicted value of 1 and the predicted value at 0 for the dependent variable (*Electoral Defeat*) is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. The interaction effect of *Revelation*Left Orientation* on *Electoral Defeat* is 43%. As expected, the direction of the relationship between *Revelation*Left Orientation* and *Electoral Defeat* is positive: Left of center governments that participated in the RDI program were more likely to lose office at the election that

Table 3: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat.

Variables	Model 1 Interaction Term and Constituent Variables	Model 2 Constituent Variables and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model
Revelation	-0.393 (0.366)	-0.049 (0.367)	-0.483 (0.435)
Left Orientation	-0.990** (0.440)	-0.285 (0.365)	-1.062** (0.495)
Revelation*Left Orientation	1.448** (0.697)	-	1.907** (0.783)
Casualties (log)	-	0.100 (0.151)	0.052 (0.153)
Terrorism (log)	-	-0.167 (0.137)	-0.174 (0.145)
Rule of Law	-	-0.046 (0.189)	0.014 (0.194)
Economic Crisis	-	0.779** (0.387)	0.980** (0.408)
Time in Office (log)	-	0.576** (0.258)	0.539** (0.254)
Constant	0.253 (0.214)	-1.076* (0.516)	-0.856* (0.511)
N	74	74	74
LR chi ²	6.114	16.14	22.424
Prob>chi ²	0.106	0.024	0.004
Pseudo R ²	0.060	0.219	0.278
Log Likelihood	-48.236	-43.223	-40.081
AIC	104.47	102.45	98.162

Significant Codes $p \leq 0.01$ '***', $p \leq 0.05$ '**', $p \leq 0.1$ '*' with Standard Errors in parentheses.

followed the revelations in 2006.


Model 2 demonstrates that simply being caught for participating in this contentious counterterrorism program did not have a detrimental effect on party survival. However, the direction of the relationship between *Revelation* and *Electoral Defeat* changes dramatically when the party caught was left of center. The extent to which a party behaves consistently in public and in private plays an important part in this narrative. Left of center governments are expected to be better at protecting civil liberties in the context of national security than their right of center counterparts. Thus, it brought their credibility as a government into question when it was revealed that they engaged in a secret counterterrorism program that violated the rights of CIA detainees. This revelation could have caused liberal voters to vote for another party whose preferences they perceive are closer aligned to their own or could have led to a decline in voter turnout in support of the party. This deterioration in a party's social respectability could also have alienated swing voters and caused the median voter to opt for a more viable and

reputable alternative.

The full model (model 3) that includes the interaction term (*Revelation*Left Orientation*), its constituent terms (*Revelation* and *Left Orientation*) and the control variables demonstrates the greatest model fit. The effect of *Revelation*Left Orientation* has a positive (and significant) effect on *Electoral Defeat* at the 95% confidence level. However, the two components of the interaction variable (*Revelation* and *Left Orientation*) have an opposite effect on *Electoral Defeat* that is negative and significant at the 95% confidence level for *Left Orientation* and negative (but not significant) for *Revelation*. First, this finding demonstrates that the political costs of being caught for cooperation in rendition was not equal across all countries. Second, the results show that the period following the revelation of cooperation in rendition in 2006 was not a particularly bad time (in general) for left of center governments included in the sample. However, this changes dramatically when the government that was caught cooperating in rendition was left of center. As expected, *Economic Crisis* has a significant and positive effect on *Electoral Defeat* at the 95% confidence level; indicating that parties were more likely to lose at the election following the revelation of cooperation in rendition if they were portrayed in the media as having an economic crisis. Finally, the *Time in Office (log)* variable has a significant and positive effect at the 95% confidence level; indicating that a fatigue may have developed within countries where the party of the chief executive (or chief executive for independent parties) has been in office for a long time.

Figure 2 shows the different predicted probabilities of *Revelation*Left Orientation* on *Electoral Defeat* at the election that followed the revelation of cooperation in the RDI program with 95% confidence intervals for the unique combinations of the interaction variable's constituent terms. The predicted probabilities are computed by adding the corresponding values of the constituent variables (*Revelation* and *Left Orientation*) to the interaction term while holding all control variables at their means. The x-axis displays the range of possible values for *Revelation*Left Orientation*: *Revelation* = 1 and *Left Orientation* = 1; *Revelation* = 1 and *Left Orientation* = 0; *Revelation* = 0 and *Left Orientation* = 1; *Revelation* = 0 and *Left Orientation* = 0. The y-axis displays the probability of *Electoral Defeat*, ranging from 0 (remained in office) to 1 (was replaced by another party). From left to right, the first two points display the predicted probabilities of those parties in the sample that were caught cooperating in rendition and the final

Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals (Model 3).



Predicted probabilities of electoral defeat based on the unique combinations of the revelation variable and the party orientation variable. The error bars represent the lower and upper bounds of the estimation with 95% confidence intervals

two points display the predicted probabilities of those parties in the sample that were not. The error bars represent the lower and upper bounds of the estimation with 95% confidence intervals.

As expected, the group of countries most likely to be removed from office in the sample were those governments that were caught cooperating in rendition and had left of center governments (with a predicted probability of *Electoral Defeat* at 65%). Whereas, the predicted probability of *Electoral Defeat* for a country that was caught cooperating in rendition but was not left of center was 21 percentage points less likely to be removed from office than for those governments that were left wing at 44%. The group of parties least likely to be removed from office in the sample were left of center and were not caught participating in rendition (with a predicted probability of *Electoral Defeat* at 31%). This finding is important as left of center governments were 34 percentage points more likely to experience electoral defeat if they were caught cooperating in rendition than if they did not. These empirical findings seem to provide support for the main hypothesis that left of center governments were more likely to incur political costs for cooperating in the RDI program relative to right of center parties. The difference be-

tween the predicted probabilities of *Electoral Defeat* for left of center governments that were caught cooperating in rendition and those that appeared to have stayed committed to protecting human rights in the context of national security (and did not cooperate in rendition) are striking – particularly because the latter group were the most likely type to stay in office at the election that followed the revelation in 2006. While the 95% confidence intervals overlap for each of the different values of the *Revelation*Left Orientation* variable, the difference in means are statistically significant and provide further support for the article’s argument.

I test the robustness of my results by dropping parties from the sample that were caught cooperating in rendition and were left of center to ensure that no single party is driving the results. Table 4 displays the results from the full model including the interaction term, constituent variables and control variables using samples that exclude each of these countries one at a time (Canada, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, UK) – and the results still hold. However, because there is such a low number of cases with a value of 1 on the interaction variable (i.e. the country caught cooperating in rendition had a left of center government), there are three instances where the statistical significance of the interaction term effect changes. For example, in Model 6 and Model 8 where Macedonia and South Africa are excluded from the sample (countries that did not experience electoral defeat) the statistical significance of the interaction term effect increases from the 95% confidence level to the 99% in the regression table. Whereas, in Model 7 where Portugal is excluded from the sample (a country that experienced electoral defeat) the statistical significance of the interaction term effect decreases from the 95% confidence level to the 90% in the regression table. However, in all cases the direction of the relationship between *Revelation*Left Orientation* on *Electoral Defeat* and the size of the effect of the interaction term is the same (and in some cases even doubles in size).

I further test the robustness of my empirical results by running Model 1-3 with *Vote Loss* in replacement of *Electoral Defeat* and the results still hold (see Appendix 1). When the marginal effect of the interaction term is computed along with its constituent terms (*Revelation* and *Left Orientation*), the difference of the predicted value of 1 and the predicted value at 0 for the dependent variable (*Vote Loss*) is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The interaction effect of *Revelation*Left Orientation* on *Vote*

Table 4: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat. Full Model Including the Interaction Term, Constituent Variables and Control Variables.

Variables	Model 4 Excluding Canada	Model 5 Excluding Czech Republic	Model 6 Excluding Macedonia	Model 7 Excluding Portugal	Model 8 Excluding South Africa	Model 9 Excluding Spain	Model 10 Excluding Sweden	Model 11 Excluding UK
Revelation	-0.471 (0.434)	-0.494 (0.435)	-0.429 (0.436)	-0.471 (0.435)	-0.405 (0.439)	-0.509 (0.466)	-0.482 (0.434)	-0.409 (0.440)
Left Orientation	-1.058** (0.494)	-1.058** (0.494)	-1.036** (0.494)	-1.063** (0.501)	-1.058** (0.500)	-1.059** (0.493)	-1.046** (0.494)	-1.068** (0.497)
Revelation * Left Orientation	1.825** (0.796)	1.821** (0.803)	2.151*** (0.824)	1.480* (0.809)	2.360*** (0.845)	2.047** (0.806)	1.777** (0.809)	1.748** (0.793)
Casualties (log)	0.032 (0.157)	0.058 (0.154)	0.027 (0.155)	0.076 (0.155)	0.033 (0.157)	0.052 (0.155)	0.072 (0.157)	-0.013 (0.163)
Terrorism (log)	-0.161 (0.147)	-0.169 (0.146)	-0.164 (0.145)	-0.138 (0.146)	-0.216 (0.150)	-0.138 (0.149)	-0.177 (0.145)	-0.211 (0.151)
Rule of Law	0.012 (0.193)	0.013 (0.193)	-0.027 (0.197)	-0.038 (0.198)	-0.017 (0.197)	0.016 (0.193)	-0.009 (0.197)	0.030 (0.195)
Economic Crisis	0.992** (0.408)	0.980** (0.407)	0.997** (0.409)	0.906** (0.408)	0.986** (0.412)	0.976** (0.407)	0.977** (0.408)	1.041** (0.416)
Time in Office (log)	0.523** (0.255)	0.525** (0.256)	0.535** (0.255)	0.726** (0.302)	0.607** (0.265)	0.520** (0.254)	0.530** (0.255)	0.494* (0.254)
Constant	-0.834 (0.512)	-0.835 (0.512)	-0.860* (0.567)	-1.211** (0.594)	-0.958* (0.572)	-0.841* (0.510)	-0.843* (0.511)	-0.754 (0.515)
N	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73
LR chi ²	21.499	21.439	22.925	24.13	24.921	22.033	21.665	22.514
Prob > chi ²	0.006	0.006	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.005	0.006	0.004
Pseudo R ²	0.212	0.212	0.227	0.238	0.246	0.217	0.214	0.222
Log Likelihood	-39.843	-39.873	-39.131	-38.528	-38.132	-39.576	-39.760	-39.336
AIC	97.687	97.746	96.261	95.055	94.265	97.153	97.52	96.672

Significant Codes p ≤ 0.01 ***, p ≤ 0.05 **, p ≤ 0.1 * with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Loss is 26%. As expected, the direction of the relationship between *Revelation*Left Orientation* and *Vote Loss* is positive: Left of center governments that participated in the RDI program were more likely to lose votes at the election that followed the revelations in 2006. However, using *Vote Loss* as an alternative version of political costs produces less significant results in support of the main hypothesis. This is likely because the original measure from Hyde and Marinov (2012) captures the gain in vote count for the opposition from the previous election as opposed to the loss in vote count for the incumbent's party (or chief executive for independent parties). While a gain in vote count for the opposition can be treated as a political cost for the ruling government, it is not a direct reflection and also disregards a gain in vote count for parties that may not be the main opposition party that could have picked up votes lost from the incumbent's party (or chief executive for independent parties). However, the results do show that opposition parties were more likely to gain votes at the election following the revelation of cooperation in the RDI program when the party in government was left of center.

Exploring the Mechanisms: Canada, Sweden, UK and Portugal

When we take a look at the events that followed the revelation of international cooperation in extraordinary rendition in 2006 in some of the countries that were accused of participating in the RDI program and had left of center governments, we find further support for the article's main hypothesis. For example, Canada's government at the time of cooperation in RDI and the revelation in 2006 that they cooperated in RDI was the left of center party, the Liberal Party of Canada. In their manifesto in 2000, they outlined their commitment to human rights by stating "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects the rights of all Canadians. A new Liberal government will uphold these rights and vigorously defend them." (Liberal Party of Canada, 2000, p.28). However, it was revealed that during the WoT Canada provided information leading to the capture of a Canadian national, Maher Arar, who was extraordinarily rendered to Syria and tortured. Canada also allowed use of its airspace and airports for flights associated with extraordinary renditions (Open Society Foundations, 2013). These revelations were met with widespread criticism from the public, NGOs and politicians - with a BBC

World Service (2006) poll in 2006 revealing that 74% of Canadians rejected torture. This response prompted a judicial inquiry into Canada's complicity in Maher Arar's torture, three official apologies from the Canadian government, and a \$10 million settlement (Austen, 2007). At the 2006 election that followed the revelation of cooperation in the RDI program, The Liberal Party of Canada lost 11 seats in the House of Commons and 502,805 votes at the election - with the right of center opposition (Conservative Party of Canada) and alternative left of center party (New Democratic Party) both gaining votes (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2006a). The argument outlined in this article does not claim that the revelation of participation in RDI was the sole reason for this electoral outcome. However, it does suggest that some supporters of The Liberal Party of Canada who disapproved strongly of the government's behavior could have decided to vote for the alternative left of center party, the New Democratic Party, expecting that they would do a better job at promoting and protecting human rights. On the other hand, left of center voters may have decided not to vote for any party in the election because of a distrust in politicians and democratic institutions in general.

Similarly, Sweden's government at the time of cooperation in RDI and the revelation in 2006 that they cooperated in RDI was the left of center party, the Social Democratic Party. Under the Social Democratic Party, Sweden has been heralded as setting the "gold standard" for human rights (at a domestic and international level) - with their 2006 election manifesto expressing a commitment to upholding civil liberties, specifically abuse, torture and human trafficking (O'Mahony, 2006; Social Democratic Party, 2006; Brysk, 2009, p.42). However, it was revealed that Sweden captured two individuals, Ahmed Agiza and Muhammed al-Zery, and transferred them to CIA custody who extraordinarily rendered them to Egypt where they were tortured. Sweden also permitted use of its airspace and airports for flights associated with extraordinary renditions (Open Society Foundations, 2013). The discovery that Sweden had been involved in RDI and torture received substantial attention in Swedish media with a coalition of Swedish human rights group publicly denouncing Sweden's role and filing complaints at the UN Committee against Torture and the UN Human Rights Council (The Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2004). The year before the Swedish national election, Sweden's parliamentary ombudsman conducted an investigation into Sweden's activities and concluded that it was responsible for the inhumane and unlawful treat-

ment of Ahmed Agiza and Muhammed al-Zery (who were later compensated in three million Swedish kronor) (Open Society Foundations, 2013). In the 2006 election, after 12 consecutive years in office the Social Democratic Party were replaced by the center-right party, the Moderate Party, who were able to form a majority coalition with the Center Party, Liberal People's Party and the Christian Democrats. While the Social Democratic Party still won the most votes in the election of any party, they were unable to gain the number of votes and seats required to form a majority government (losing a total of 170,935 votes and 14 seats) (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2006b). As expected, the alternative left of center party, the Green Party, experienced a gain in votes from the previous election. Accordingly, left of center voters who were disappointed to learn that the Social Democratic Party were complicit in human rights abuses could have been motivated to switch their votes to the Green Party or withdraw from voting at the election altogether.

Likewise, in the UK the left of center party, the Labour Party, were found directly responsible for violating the rights of three detainees and indirectly responsible for allowing flights involving the unlawful transfer of many more individuals to rest, refuel and regroup at British airports (Council of Europe, 2006a; European Parliament, 2006b). In response to growing domestic pressure and calls for the UK to investigate its alleged collusion in post-9/11 RDI operations, the UK parliament established two major inquiries headed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and The All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition. The committees analyzed detainee testimony, government and security service telegrams, extraordinary rendition flight paths and interviewed several UK government officials including Ministers, Members of Parliament and Ambassadors (Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2006; Gough et al., 2011). Beyond these dedicated forums, there have been over 200 spoken references on "rendition" in the UK House of Commons and House of Lords and three exclusive debates since it was discovered that the UK was complicit in these secret counterterrorism operations (UK Parliament, 2017a,b). These revelations both provided ammunition to opposition parties in the UK (e.g. the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats party) and caused rifts within the Labour party and other government departments during the election period that followed the release of the reports (2006-2010) (Carey, 2008; Hague, 2009;

Clegg, 2010; Hopkins and Norton-Taylor, 2016).¹⁵ During this time, public opinion polls on the British public revealed that the majority of people rejected torture and supported the “unequivocal rule against torture, even in the case of terrorists who have information that could save innocent lives” (BBC World Service, 2006). In the 2010 national election, the Labour Party lost to the right of center party, the Conservative Party, who was able to form a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. The Labour Party had a deficit of 963,231 votes and 98 seats compared to the previous election, with two alternative left of center parties, The Liberal Democrats and The Green Party, both gaining votes (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2010). This provides further support for the argument outlined in this article. Namely, that the revelation that the Labour government was involved in extraordinary rendition and torture could have led left of center voters to either support an alternative party at the election that they perceived had preferences on civil liberties that were closer aligned to their own or not vote at all.

Finally, a similar trend can also be observed in Portugal who had a left of center party, the Socialist Party, in government at the time of cooperation in RDI and the revelation in 2006. In their 2005 election manifesto, they outlined a commitment to strengthening the human rights regime (Socialist Party, 2005). However, it was revealed that Portugal allowed the use of its airports and airspace for flights involved in CIA extraordinary renditions with airport’s providing layovers for flights involving the unlawful transfer of detainees (Open Society Foundations, 2013). The revelation that aircrafts associated with RDI and torture had landed in Portuguese territory alarmed members of the public and the issue was well covered in the media. In response, the Portuguese General Prosecutor’s Office launched a criminal investigation into suspected extraordinary rendition aircrafts that had landed in Portugal after heavy campaigning from European Member of Parliament, Ana Gomes Open Society Foundations (2013). In the 2006 presidential election, the presidential candidate for the Socialist Party, Mário Soares, received only 14.3 of the national vote share (1,626,098 less votes than the Socialist Party candidate at the previous election, former President of Portugal, Jorge Sampaio). The Socialist

¹⁵See here for examples: a) <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2008/02/diego-garcia-british-foreign> b) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1161081/WILLIAM-HAGUE-We-let-judge-probe-torture-case.html> c) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7099169/The-US-is-our-ally-but-we-arent-its-servant.html> d) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/may/31/revealed-britain-rendition-policy-rift-between-spy-agencies-mi6-mi5>.

Party incumbent, Jorge Sampaio, was replaced by the presidential candidate for the right of center party, the Social Democratic Party, Aníbal Cavaco Silva. As expected, the alternative left of center candidate, Manuel Alegre (independent), gained more votes at the election than the Socialist Party. While the consequences of participating in less severe activities in the RDI program (i.e. just enabling flights to land, refuel or regroup) are more likely to be within the lower bounds of the political costs of abusing human rights, public opinion polls on extraordinary rendition have shown that the majority of European's oppose the use of their airspace to transport a terrorism suspect to a country that has a reputation for using torture (World Public Opinion, 2006). Thus, it is still plausible that left of center voters with a concern for human rights may have decided to vote for the alternative left of center candidate, Manuel Alegre, in the election with the expectation that he would be better at preventing Portuguese involvement in human rights abuses of any kind. Alternatively, this revelation could have led left of center voters to decide not to vote for any candidate in the election given a distrust in politicians and democratic institutions in general.

Conclusion

What explains the variation in the political costs of participation in the post-9/11 RDI program? I have argued that states with left of center governments suffered greater political costs from being caught because of the perception that they are better at protecting civil liberties in the context of national security. Liberal voters are less likely to consider trading off civil liberties in the name of national security and would be more likely to perceive the revelation that their government was complicit in the violation of human rights as a grievance. Consequently, left of center parties are more likely to be hurt by a contentious human rights scandal as liberal voters disillusioned by the government's behavior could either decide to vote for another party whose preferences they perceive are closer aligned to their own or withdraw their support altogether. This theory is consistent with the existing claim that political scandals that reveal greater differences in a party's public and private type threaten their survival in office as it causes voters to question their credibility as a government. To test this hypothesis, I used data on party orientation to explore the political costs of being caught cooperating

in the RDI program (where political costs are defined as experiencing electoral defeat).

The results from the quantitative analysis provide empirical support for my theoretical argument. This event study provides the field of international relations with a substantive and transparent insight into the factors that make cooperation in abusing human rights costlier for states. Given the secret nature of repression, many of the research design choices in this article have been conservative in order to reduce the likelihood of identifying false positives (i.e. coding countries that may not have participated in RDI operations as participating). For example, the first component of the interaction term, *Revelation*, is constructed according to whether a country was described as cooperating in the RDI program by the Open Society Foundations (2013) *Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition* report in order for country cooperation to be measured using the same comprehensive high profile source. Thus, we can be more confident that those countries cooperated and that members of the public were aware of these allegations.

An additional feature of the research design that warrants further discussion includes a potential selection issue that could bias the results in this article. In the current format, the sample size is conceptually divided into a treatment group (countries that cooperated in RDI and were caught) and a control group (countries that did not cooperate and thus were not caught). However, the clandestine nature of counterterrorism cooperation means that we cannot be certain that a third group of countries does not exist (that cooperated in RDI but were not caught). While this concern is theoretically possible, there has been no evidence in the last two decades to suggest that this special group of countries exists in reality. Moreover, given the incentives to shift the blame to another country, it would be surprising if countries that did cooperate (and were caught) neglected the opportunity to reveal the identity of those countries they knew cooperated (but were not caught) once the information on foreign complicity in RDI was out. Similarly, it would be unusual if detainees, former intelligence officials and country ambassadors had neglected the opportunity to name and shame all of the countries that they knew participated during interviews by European intergovernmental investigations, government and parliamentary inquiries, NGOs and Investigative Journalists (European Parliament, 2006b; Council of Europe, 2008; All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, 2009; United Nations, 2010; Reprieve and Access

Info, 2011). If anything, this possibility presents a bias in the results that makes it less likely to find support for the main hypothesis, given the small the number of countries that were caught and were left wing, in comparison to those that were not. While these empirical constraints mean that there is no way of modelling this third group given the current research design, a future extension of this article could be to test the main hypothesis under experimental conditions to see whether left of center voters are more likely to withdraw support for a political party based on information that they were involved in the violation of human rights.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Probit Regression, Vote Loss.

Variables	Model 1 Interaction Term and Constituent Variables	Model 2 Constituent Variables and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model
Revelation	-0.063 (0.389)	0.379 (0.380)	-0.005 (0.435)
Left Orientation	-0.946** (0.421)	-0.502 (0.359)	-0.970** (0.447)
Revelation*Left Orientation	1.031 (0.713)	-	1.373* (0.770)
Casualties (log)	-	-0.049 (0.153)	-0.092 (0.154)
Terrorism (log)	-	-0.109 (0.132)	-0.118 (0.135)
Rule of Law	-	0.026 (0.194)	0.066 (0.196)
Economic Crisis	-	0.412 (0.409)	0.558 (0.423)
Time in Office (log)	-	0.345 (0.243)	0.322 (0.248)
Constant	0.652*** (0.229)	-0.124 (0.476)	0.044 (0.492)
N	74	74	74
LR chi ²	5.759	9.172	12.435
Prob>chi ²	0.124	0.241	0.132
Pseudo R ²	0.062	0.098	0.133
Log Likelihood	-43.747	-42.040	-40.409
AIC	95.494	100.08	98.818

Significant Codes $p \leq 0.01$ '***', $p \leq 0.05$ '**', $p \leq 0.1$ '*' with Standard Errors in parentheses.

References

- ABC (2005). Abu ghraib protest interrupts rice speech. Available at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2005-05-28/abu-ghraib-protest-interrupts-rice-speech/1580470>.
- Aidt, T. S., F. José Veiga, and L. Gonçalves Veiga (2011). Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model. *Public Choice* 148(1/2), 21–44.
- All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition (2009). Extraordinary rendition: Closing the gap. Available at <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/nov/uk-apg-extraordinary-rendition-closing-the-gap.pdf>.
- Amnesty International (2005). Eu rendition, revelation of 800 secret cia flights in european airspace. Available at <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/eu-rendition-revelation-800-secret-cia-flights-european-airspace>.
- Anderson, C. J., A. Paskeviciute, and M. E. Sandovici (2005). In the eye of the beholder? the foundations of subjective human rights conditions in east-central europe. *Comparative Political Studies* 38(7), 771–798.
- Aspinwall, M. (2002). Preferring europe: Ideology and national preferences on european integration. *European Politics* 3(1), 81–111.
- Austen, I. (2007). Canada reaches settlement with torture victim. *New York Times*. Available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/26/world/americas/26cnd-canada.html>.
- Baum, M. A. and P. B. K. Potter (2008). The relationships between mass media, public opinion, and foreign policy: Toward a theoretical synthesis. *The Annual Review of Political Science* 11, 39–65.
- BBC World Service (2006). World citizens reject torture, bbc global poll reveals. *World Public Opinion*. Available at <http://worldpublicopinion.net/world-citizens-reject-torture-bbc-global-poll-reveals/>.
- Beck, T., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh (2015). New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions. *World Bank Economic Review* 15(1), 165–176.
- Benjamin, D. (2007). Rendition to torture: The case of maher ara. *Brookings*. Available at <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/rendition-to-torture-the-case-of-maher-arar/>.
- Bennett, W. L. and D. L. Paletz (1994). *Taken by storm: The media, public opinion and u.s. foreign policy in the gulf war*. University of Chicago Press.
- Berinsky, A. J. (2009). *In time of war*. University of Chicago Press.
- Bonini, C. (2006). Il capo degli 007 americani in italia dietro il sequestro di abu omar. *La Repubblica.it*. Available at <http://www.repubblica.it/2005/j/sezioni/esteri/ciagate2/rapporto-marty/rapporto-marty.html>.
- Browne, E. C., J. P. Frendreis, and D. W. Gleiber (1984). An “events” approach to the problem of cabinet stability. *Comparative Political Studies* 17(2), 167–197.
- Browne, E. C., J. P. Frendreis, and D. W. Gleiber (1986). The process of cabinet dissolution: An exponential model of duration and stability in western democracies. *American Journal of Political Science* 30(3), 628–650.
- Brysk, A. (2009). *Global good samaritans: Human rights as foreign policy*. Oxford University Press.
- Bueno De Mesquita, B., G. W. Downs, A. Smith, and F. M. Cherif (2005). Thinking inside the box: A closer look at democracy and human rights. *International Studies Quarterly* 49(3), 439–457.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., R. M. Siverson, and G. Woller (1992). War and the fate of regimes: A comparative analysis. *The American Political Science Review* 86(3), 638–

- 646.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. and A. Smith (2009). Political survival and endogenous institutional change. *Comparative Political Studies* 42(2), 167–197.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., A. Smith, R. M. Siverson, and J. D. Morrow (2003). *The logic of political survival*. MIT Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, E. (2005). The quality of terror. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3), 515–530.
- Bueno de Mesquita, E. (2007). Politics and the suboptimal provision of counterterrorism. *International Organisation* 61(1), 9–36.
- Cameron, R. (2006). Council of europe cia used prague airport for refueling "secret flights". *Radio Praha*. Available at <http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/council-of-europe-cia-used-prague-airport-for-refuelling-secret-flights>.
- Carborne, N. (2012). Donald rumsfeld vs. abu ghraib protesters. *Time*. Available at <http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/12/21/when-protesters-interrupt-speeches-disrupted-by-hecklers/slide/donald-rumsfeld-vs-abu-ghraib-protesters/>.
- Carey, S. (2008). The truth about rendition. *New Statesmen*.. Available at <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2008/02/diego-garcia-british-foreign>.
- Chan, S. and J. Scarritt (2003). *Coping with globalization: Cross-national patterns in domestic governance and policy performance*. Routledge.
- Cingranelli, D. and M. Filippov (2010). Electoral rules and incentives to protect human rights. *The Journal of Politics* 72(1), 243–257.
- Citrin, J., H. McClosky, S. Merrill Shanks, and P. M. Sniderman (1975). Personal and political sources of political alienation. *British Journal of Political Science* 5(1), 1–131.
- Clegg, N. (2010). The us is our ally, but we aren't its servant. *The Telegraph*. Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7099169/The-US-is-our-ally-but-we-arent-its-servant.html>.
- CNN (2018). Iraq prison abuse scandal fast facts. Available at <https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse-scandal-fast-facts/index.html>.
- Colaresi, M. P. (2014). *Democracy declassified: The security dilemma in national security*. Oxford University Press.
- Converse, P. E. (1966). The concept of the normal vote. In *Elections of the political order*. Edited by A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, and D. E. Stokes.
- Cordell, R. (2017). Measuring extraordinary rendition and international cooperation. *International Area Studies Review* 20(2), 179–197.
- Cordell, R. (2018). Security-civil liberties trade-offs: International cooperation in extraordinary rendition. *International Interactions*. Forthcoming. Available at <http://www.rebeccacordell.com/research.html>.
- Council of Europe (2006a). Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees involving council of europe member states. Available at <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=11527&lang=en>.
- Council of Europe (2006b). Council of europe investigation into illegal transfers and secret detentions in europe: A chronology. Available at <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/FeaturesManager-View-EN.asp?ID=362>.
- Council of Europe (2008). *Cia above the law? Secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees in europe*. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe Publishing.
- Council on Foreign Relations (2009). World opinion on human rights. Available at <https://www.cfr.org/background/world-opinion-human-rights>.
- Croco, S. E. (2011). The decider's dilemma: Leader culpability, war outcomes, and domestic punishment. *American Political Science Review* 105(3), 457–477.

- Davenport, C. (2007a). State repression and political order. *Annual Review of Political Science* 10, 1–23.
- Davenport, C. (2007b). *State repression and the domestic democratic peace*. Cambridge University Press.
- Davenport, C., D. Armstrong, and W. H. Moore (2008). Waterboarding and democracy: Do democratic institutions inhibit torture? available at: .
- Davis, D. and B. D. Silver (2003). Civil liberties vs. security: Public opinion in the context of the terrorist attacks on america. *American Journal of Political Science* 48(1), 28–46.
- Davis, O. A., M. Hinich, and P. C. Ordeshook (1970). An expository development of a mathematical model of the electoral process. *American Political Science Review* 64(2), 426–48.
- Dewan, T. and D. P. Myatt (2007). Scandal, protection, and recovery in the cabinet. *American Political Science Review* 101(1), 63–77.
- Diermeier, D. and R. T. Stevensen (1999). Cabinet survival and competing risks. *American Journal of Political Science* 43(4), 1051–1068.
- Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. Harper Collins.
- Downs, G. W. and D. M. Rocke (1994). Conflict, agency, and gambling for resurrection: The principal-agent problem goes to war. *American Journal of Political Science* 38(2), 362–380.
- Drash, W. (2009). Abu ghraib photos were ‘big shock,’ undermined u.s. ideals. *CNN*. Available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/05/18/detainee.abuse.lookback/index.html?iref=nextin>.
- European Court of Human Rights (2016). Secret detention sites. Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Secret_detention_ENG.PDF.
- European Parliament (2006a). Report on the alleged use of european countries by the cia for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners. Available at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2006/2200\(INI\)#documentGateway](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2006/2200(INI)#documentGateway).
- European Parliament (2006b). Working document no 7 on ‘extraordinary renditions’. Available at <http://www.statewatch.org/cia/documents/working-doc-no-7-nov-06.pdf>.
- Fieschi, C. and P. Heywood (2004). Trust, cynicism and populist anti-politics. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9(3), 289–309.
- Getmansky, A. and T. Zeitzoff (2014). Terrorism and voting: The effect of rocket threat on voting in israeli elections. *American Political Science Review* 108(3), 588–604.
- Gleditsch, K. S. (2013). Modified polity p4 and p4d data, version 4.0. Available at <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/Polity.html>.
- Gough, R., S. McCracken, and A. Tyrie (2011). *Account rendered: Extraordinary rendition and britain’s role*. Biteback.
- Green, J. (2007). When voters and parties agree: Valence issues and party competition. *Political Studies* 55, 629–655.
- Guisinger, A. and A. Smith (2002). Honest threats: The interaction of reputation and political institutions in international crises. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(2), 175–200.
- Gupta, D. K., H. Singh, and T. Sprague (1993). Government coercion of dissidents: Deterrence or provocation? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, 301–339.
- Gurr, T. R. (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton University Press.
- Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2005). Trading human rights: How preferential trade agreements influence government repression. *International Organization* 59(3), 593–629.
- Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2014). A social science of human rights. *Journal of Peace Re-*

- search* 51(2), 173–286.
- Hague, W. (2009). William Hague: We must let a judge probe torture case. *Mail Online*. Available at <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1161081/WILLIAM-HAGUE-We-let-judge-probe-torture-case.html>.
- Hathaway, O. A. (2007). Why do countries commit to human rights treaties? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(4), 588–621.
- Heinrich, T. and Y. Kobayashi (2018). How do people evaluate foreign aid to ‘nasty’ regimes? *British Journal of Political Science*.
- Heinrich, T., Y. Kobayashi, and L. Long (2018). Voters get what they want (when they pay attention): Human rights, policy benefits, and foreign aid. *International Studies Quarterly* 62, 195–207.
- Hope, C. (2010). General election 2010: The celebrities who are backing the major parties in the campaign. *The Telegraph*. Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/election-2010/7638880/General-Election-2010-the-celebrities-who-are-backing-the-major-parties-in-the-campaign.html>.
- Hopkins, N. and R. Norton-Taylor (2016). Blair government’s rendition policy led to rift between uk spy agencies. *The Guardian*. Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/may/31/revealed-britain-rendition-policy-rift-between-spy-agencies-mi6-mi5>.
- Human Rights Watch (2005). Human rights watch statement on u.s. secret detention facilities in europe. Available at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/11/06/human-rights-watch-statement-us-secret-detention-facilities-europe>.
- Hyde, S. D. and N. Marinov (2012). Which elections can be lost? *Political Analysis* 20(2), 191–210.
- Hölmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. *The Bell Journal of Economics* 10(1), 74–91.
- Ignatieff, M. (2005). *The lesser evil: Political ethics in an age of terror*. Princeton University Press.
- International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2006a). Canada: Canadian house of commons 2006-01-23. Available at <http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/39/>.
- International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2006b). Sweden: Swedish parliament 2006-09-17. Available at <http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/206/>.
- International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2010). United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland: British house of commons 2010-05-06. Available at <http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/225/>.
- Jessee, S. A. (2009). Spatial voting in the 2004 presidential election. *American Political Science Review* 103(1), 59–81.
- Joint Committee on Human Rights (2006). Nineteenth report. uk parliament. Available at <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrightts/185/18502.htm>.
- Kauffman, D. and A. Kraay (2015). The worldwide governance indicators project. *World Bank*. Available at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>.
- Kirk, L. (2006). Ireland considering inspections of us military flights. *Euobserver*. Available at <https://euobserver.com/foreign/21855>.
- Lane, J.-E. (2013). The principal-agent approach to politics: Policy implementation and public policy-making. *Open Journal of Political Science* 2(2), 85–89.
- Liberal Party of Canada (2000). Opportunity for all: The liberal plan for the future of canada. *Akaash Maharaj*. Available at <https://www.maharaj.org/pdf/2000redbook.pdf>.

- Lichbach, M. I. (1987). Deterrence or escalation? the puzzle of aggregate studies of repression and dissent. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31(2), 266–297.
- Marinov, N., W. G. Nomikos, and J. Robbins (2015). Does electoral proximity affect security policy? *The Journal of Politics* 77(3), 762–773.
- Marshall, S. (2016). Obama has deported more people than any other president. *ABC News*. Available at <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obamas-deportation-policy-numbers/story?id=41715661>.
- Maurer, T. (2011). Wikileaks 2010: A glimpse of the future? *Explorations in Cyber International Relations Discussion Paper Series*. Available at <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-dp-2011-10-wikileaks-final.pdf>.
- McClosky, H. and A. Brill (1983). *Dimensions of tolerance: What americans believe about civil liberties*. Russell Sage.
- McFarland, S. and M. Mathews (2005). Do americans care about human rights? *Journal of Human Rights* 4(3), 305–319.
- Mitchell, N. J. and J. M. McCormick (1988). Economic and political explanations of human rights violations. *World Politics* 40(4), 476–498.
- Moeckli, D. (2008). *Human rights and non-discrimination in the 'war on terror'*. Oxford University Press.
- Moore, W. H. (1998). The repression of dissent: Substitution, context, and timing. *American Journal of Political Science* 42(3), 851–873.
- Moore, W. H. (2000). The repression of dissent: A substitution model of government coercion. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(1), 107–127.
- Nanes, M. J. (2017). Political violence cycles: Electoral incentives and the provision of counterterrorism. *Comparative Political Studies* 50(2), 171–199.
- Neumayer, E., T. Plümper, and M. Epifanio (2014). The “peer-effect” in counterterrorist policies. *International Organization* 68(1), 211–234.
- Nielsen, R. A. Rewarding human rights? selective aid sanctions against repressive states. *International Studies Quarterly* 57(4), 791–803.
- O'Donnell, G., P. C. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead (1986). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*. John Hopkins University Press.
- O'Mahony, P. (2006). Sweden 'world's most democratic country'. *The Local SE*. Available at <https://www.thelocal.se/20061122/5578>.
- Open Society Foundations (2013). Globalizing torture: Cia secret detention and extraordinary rendition. Available at <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/globalizing-torture-cia-secret-detention-and-extraordinary-rendition>.
- Pierskalla, J. H. (2010). Protest, deterrence, and escalation: The strategic calculus of government repression. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(1), 117–145.
- Priest, D. (2005a). Cia holds terror suspects in secret prisons. *The Washington Post*. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html>.
- Priest, D. (2005b). Help from france key in covert operations. *The Washington Post*. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/02/AR2005070201361.html>.
- Putnam, T. L. and J. N. Shapiro (2017). International law and voter preferences: the case of foreign human rights violations. *Human Rights Review*.
- Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (2012a). Georgian prisons minister steps down in wake of abuse videos. Available at <https://www.rferl.org/a/georgian-prisons-minister-resigns-abuse-claims/24712932.html>.
- Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (2012b). Scandal highlights poor conditions inside georgia's prisons. Available at <https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-prison-abuse->

- video-tbilisi-scandal/24713136.html.
- Rasler, K. (1996). Concessions, repression, and political protest in the iranian revolution. *American Sociological Review* 61, 132–152.
- Rasmusen, E. (2001). *Games and information: An introduction to game theory*. Blackwell Publishers.
- Reprieve and Access Info (2011). Rendition on record: Using the right of access to information to unveil the paths of illegal prisoner transfer flights. Available at <http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/documents/RDI/111219-Reprieve-Rendition-on-Record.pdf>.
- Ross, B. and R. Esposito (2005). Exclusive: Sources tell abc news top al qaeda figures held in secret cia prisons. *ABC News*. Available at <http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1375123>.
- Satori, A. E. (2005). *Deterrence by diplomacy*. Princeton University Press.
- Schultz, K. A. (1995). The politics of the political business cycle. *British Journal of Political Science* 25(1), 79–99.
- Shadmehr, M. (2014). Mobilization, repression, and revolution: Grievances and opportunities in contentious politics. *The Journal of Politics* 76(3), 621–635.
- Siegel, D. A. (2011). When does repression work? collective action in social networks. *The Journal of Politics* 73(4), 993–1010.
- Social Democratic Party (2006). Social democratic labour party manifesto 2006. *Manifesto Project*. Available at https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_corpus_doc/.
- Socialist Party (2005). Socialist party manifesto 2005. *Manifesto Project*. Available at https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_corpus_doc/.
- START (2016). Global terrorism database [gtd92to11dist.xlsx]. Available at <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>.
- Tarrow, S. G. (2011). *Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- The Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (2004). Torture by proxy: International and domestic law applicable to "extraordinary renditions". *New York University School of Law*. Available at <https://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/TortureByProxy.pdf>.
- Todd, B. (2010). Politics is full of slippery evasive liars: After years of backing labour, julie walters has had enough. *The Daily Mail*. Available at <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1246056/Politics-slipper-evasive-liars-After-years-backing-Labour-Julie-Walters-enough.html>.
- Tomz, M. (2007). Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach. *International Organization* 61(4), 821–840.
- Treier, S. and D. S. Hillygus (2009). The nature of political ideology in the contemporary electorate. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 73(4), 679–703.
- Trubowitz, P. and N. Mellow (2005). Going bipartisan: Politics by other means. *Political Science Quarterly* 120(3), 433–453.
- UK Parliament (2017a). Hansard search: Rendition. Available at <https://hansard.parliament.uk/search?searchTerm=rendition>.
- UK Parliament (2017b). Hansard search: Torture. Available at <https://hansard.parliament.uk/search?searchTerm=torture>.
- United Nations (2010). Joint study on global practices in relation to secret detention. Available at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-HRC-13-42.pdf>.
- Van Belle, D. A. (2000). *Press freedom and global politics*. Praeger.

- Vreeland, J. R. (2008). Political institutions and human rights: Why dictatorships enter into the united nations convention against torture. *International Organization* 62(1), 65–101.
- Welch, M. and L. Schuster (2005). Detention of asylum seekers in the us, uk, france, germany, and italy: A critical view of the globalizing culture of control. *Criminal Justice* 5(4), 331–355.
- Wike, R. (2016). Global opinion varies widely on use of torture against suspected terrorist. *Pew Research Center*. Available at <http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/02/09/global-opinion-use-of-torture/>.
- World Public Opinion (2006). Publics in europe and india see u.s. as violating international law at guantánamo. Available at <http://worldpublicopinion.net/publics-in-europe-and-india-see-u-s-as-violating-international-law-at-guantanamo/>.
- Zaller, J. R. (1992). *The nature and origins of mass opinion*. Cambridge University Press.