

Security-Civil Liberties Trade-offs: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition¹

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Abstract

Following the launch of the WoT, the US established a global rendition network that saw the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites across the world. Conventional accounts of foreign complicity show that 54 diverse countries were involved, including many established democracies. What determined more than a quarter of the world's countries to participate in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period? Given the sensitive nature of cooperation required, I argue that the US screened countries according to their preferences on security-civil liberties trade-offs. Countries with similar preferences to the US on human rights were cheaper to buy off and would have required less persuasion to cooperate. This theory is consistent with the existing claim that cooperation is more likely between countries with similar preferences as both actors are better off when the partnership increases. I test this hypothesis on global data using UNGA voting data as a proxy for common interest and develop a spatial variable that models a country's logistical utility during the transfer of a detainee based on their distance to a central rendition transit corridor between the US and Afghanistan. The analysis provides robust empirical support for my theoretical argument.

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Introduction

Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States of America (US) launched a secret rendition network that enabled the transfer of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) terrorist suspects to secret detention sites around the world (All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, 2009; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014). Rendition, Detention and Interrogation (RDI) practices would not have been possible without international cooperation.² Outsourcing arrests, detention and interrogations to a third country was essential as it meant that the process took place out of public view; unconstrained by the due legal process on US territory (Mayer, 2005; Satterthwaite, 2006). Moreover, due to the limited range of the private civilian aircrafts used by the CIA to conceal detainee transfers, the US required a number of countries to allow flights to land discretely at their airports (Open Society Foundations, 2013). Unlike other forms of secret counterterrorism cooperation, the practice of extraordinary rendition has the advantage of being observable (ex-post), as we can analyze detainee testimony and suspected extraordinary rendition flight paths using publicly available data. However, very little is known as to why states became involved in this deeply sensitive area of international politics. What determined more than a quarter of the world's countries (including many established democracies) to participate in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period? This puzzle is magnified by the political and socioeconomic diversity of the states alleged to have collaborated in this clandestine security alliance – ranging from Sweden and Canada to Iran and Zimbabwe.

I argue that the US screened countries according to their human rights preferences, given the sensitive nature of cooperation required. The most desirable RDI partners should view security-civil liberties trade-offs in a similar light to the US. Countries with similar preferences to the US on human rights were cheaper to buy off and should have required less persuasion to cooperate. In order to obtain support from the international community during the War on Terror (WoT) and maintain counterterrorism cooperation, the US needed to ensure that their RDI program remained secret. Global public

²The following countries reportedly cooperated: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, UK, Uzbekistan, Yemen and Zimbabwe (Open Society Foundations, 2013).

opinion of the US declined during the establishment of the WoT, particularly during times when reports of human rights abuses were exposed; threatening its support from allies (Hafner-Burton and Shapiro, 2010; Pew Research Center, 2007). Therefore, it was crucial that the US avoided approaching countries that could decline cooperation and risk leaking contentious counterterrorism plans. Cooperation in RDI operations offered participants a mutually beneficial partnership that was expected to strengthen every member's national security (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Jervis, 1978). Countries with closely aligned preferences and a vested interest in the outcomes of counterterrorism cooperation would make more reliable partners as they are less likely to disclose classified information that is detrimental to the group.

To test my hypothesis, I use United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting data as a proxy for similar human rights preferences (Voeten, 2013). Results from the analysis indicate support for my theoretical argument. These results are robust to a series of different model specifications shown in the results section and appendices. This article provides a first account of the causes and dynamics of international cooperation in RDI practices during the post-9/11 period from a quantitative perspective.³ This analysis makes a substantive contribution to the field of international relations by explaining patterns of cooperation under conditions of secrecy and bridges the gap between theory from international security literature and empirical research on rendition.


International cooperation During the Post-9/11 Period

Like many other aspects of the WoT, the RDI program would not have been possible without international cooperation (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2002). All forms of cooperation were bilateral, between the US and a country that could provide a particular service. While some states hosted CIA secret detention sites, others carried out the arrest, capture, detention and interrogation of detainees on behalf of the CIA, shared intelligence during detainee interrogations, and provided staging posts for rendition flights to rest, refuel and regroup at their airports (United Nations, 2010). Appendix 1 lists those states that engaged in each of these activities according to Open Society Foundations (2013).

This clandestine security coalition becomes particularly intriguing when we take a

³See also Colaresi and DiBlasi (2017); Cordell (2017); Raphael et al. (2015).

Figure 1: International Cooperation in Rendition, Secret Detention and Interrogation (Alliances).



Collaboration in rendition, secret detention and interrogation operations visualised according to the Open Society Foundations (2013), with light blue representing non-U.S. allies, dark blue indicating U.S. allies, and white for countries not identified as being involved.

closer look at the diverse group of states alleged to have collaborated with the US (from Australia and Ireland to Syria and Libya) and consider how core international relations theories fail to fully explain this form of cooperation. For example, one might expect to observe cooperation between allies since defense pact members are obliged to come to the aid of their alliance partners in times of need (Long et al., 2000; Marinov et al., 2015).⁴ Allies are more trustworthy and reliable as these states know that they will be dealing with each other repeatedly in the future; reducing the incentives to exploit a situation and weaken the alliance (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Fearon, 1998; Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995). States are more likely to exchange favors with friends and take great risks in order to maintain their international and domestic positions and reputations (Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004; Levy, 1997). However, this arguments fails to fully account for international cooperation in RDI operations as only 28% of countries that participated had formal alliances with the US. For example, longstanding US allies such as France and Mexico did not participate but non-allies such as Iran and Zimbabwe did (see Figure 1).

Similarly, previous research suggests that democracies are less likely to violate human rights because of the domestic costs that would result if detected (Conrad, 2014;

⁴However, alliances are not always fully reliable and are often conditional on country characteristics, treaty content and the compatibility of state interests (Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004; Leeds, 2003; Long et al., 2000; Smith, 1995).

Davenport, 2007; Vreeland, 2008). Countries with liberal democratic institutions should be less likely to engage in repression as their behavior is constrained by domestic and international legal commitments (Kelley, 2007; Rejali, 2009). However, this also fails to explain international cooperation in RDI, since as many as 50% of participating states were more democratic, including established democracies such as Denmark and Sweden. An alternative explanation for the large presence of democracies in the sample of countries known to have cooperated in the RDI program concerns the tension that democracies experience between upholding civil liberties and transparency in the context of national security and being able to execute national security operations in secret. While engaging in the violation of human rights may be costlier for democracies than non-democracies, democracies are better at keeping secrets as a result which could make them the most desirable RDI partners to the US (Colaresi, 2014; Colaresi and DiBlasi, 2017).

On the other hand, past studies would predict cooperation from states with high levels of terrorism threat because of shared grievances with the US and the opportunity to defeat a common enemy and foil potential attacks on their territory (Bueno de Mesquita, 2007; Kroenig, 2009; Lai and Reiter, 2000; Sandler, 2005). A state's decision to engage in harsh counterterrorism approaches also depends upon the policies of other countries experiencing similar levels of threat from terrorism to avoid becoming the softest target in a peer group (Neumayer et al., 2014). However, 40% of the countries that participated in RDI operations actually faced low levels of terrorism threat, with participating states such as Finland and Portugal not experiencing a single terrorism attack in the ten years that preceded 9/11.

Conversely, perhaps we should expect to observe cooperation from states that are more dependent on the US since hegemonic actors can better use sanctions effectively to secure desired policy outcomes when the balance of power is unequal (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dreher et al., 2008). As a result, we should expect countries with financial linkages to the US to be more likely to collaborate in clandestine security matters since refusing to cooperate could place valuable economic transactions in jeopardy (Hufbauer et al., 1990; Nooruddin and Payton, 2010). Along the same lines, we might expect countries with smaller populations to band wagon and ally with a great power like the US in order to increase their defense capability and reduce their relative vulnerability (Jervis,

1978; Rothstein, 1968). However, these explanations also fail to explain variation in international cooperation in RDI. For example, between 55%-62% of the countries that cooperated had low levels of US trade and aid, and 64% had a large population size above the global median.

Past research on the importance of domestic politics suggests that we might expect to observe more cooperation from right wing governments, as this type of party is more likely to implement policies that strongly prioritize national security over civil liberties (Imbeau et al., 2001; Moeckli, 2008; Neumayer et al., 2014; Welch and Schuster, 2005). Country leaders play a major role in determining the political and economic policies of the country; with party ideology informing the general approach that is taken as well as the outcome (Dreher and Jensen, 2012; Jones and Olken, 2005). However, we find quite the opposite, as 87% of the countries that participated in RDI operations had left-of-center governments (including countries such as Canada and the UK).

Given these largely null findings, what determined more than a quarter of the world's countries to participate in this deeply sensitive area of international politics? I argue that the secret nature of the RDI program imposed an entirely different dynamic on alliance formation that core international relations theory is ill-equipped to explain. Participation in this clandestine security network carried far greater public costs than other forms of cooperation due to the human rights abuses involved in these operations. This is particularly true for many established democracies with a strong domestic rule of law that are expected to honor their commitments to international law de facto (Kelley, 2007). In addition to causing negative public opinion that could foreseeably threaten a leader's popularity and survival, several governments complicit in RDI operations have had to compensate victims of torture and fund investigations into their alleged illegal activity after it was revealed that they cooperated.

For the US, the domestic and international costs associated with a leak ranged from hindering counterterrorism progress and threatening national security, to triggering negative public opinion among the electorate, and gaining a deceitful reputation that could hinder international relations (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Satori, 2002; Wike, 2016). There are several examples where revelations that threatened exposing details of the program shaped state behavior and the structure of the program itself.⁵ As a result, it

⁵For example, see: Rise and fall of CIA's overseas prisons traced in Senate report on interrogations.

is likely that the US would have had to be far more selective concerning the countries that it approached in order to prevent public opposition from states. Given the unpopular global opinion ratings of the US during the WoT (particularly during times when human rights abuses were exposed) it would be surprising if countries that had refused to cooperate neglected the opportunity to capitalize on public outcry (Hafner-Burton and Shapiro, 2010; Pew Research Center, 2007; Weaver, 2014).⁶

Identifying State Preferences

In order to maintain secrecy and reduce the risk of counterterrorism operations being exposed, it would have been crucial that the US only approached countries likely to agree to cooperate in the first place. This selection mechanism can be conceptualized as a screening process that identified those countries most likely to perceive the payoffs of cooperation as positive and eliminated those states most likely to perceive the payoffs of cooperation as negative (Asal and Beardsley, 2007; Glaser, 1997; Jervis, 1978). Several studies have emphasized the importance of perception in decision making within the field of international security as an actor's decision can be heavily influenced by the way they think about their problems (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Jervis, 1976) The most desirable RDI partners should be those that view security-civil liberties trade-offs in a similar light to the US. Axelrod and Keohane (1985) argue that we are more likely to observe cooperation between countries that have mutual interest as the likelihood of both actors being satisfied with the outcome from negotiations increases. In international politics, states recognize and develop transnational in-groups by identifying similar states with shared norms and political culture in order to overcome collective action problems. Cooperation has a higher rate of success when states have similar aims as actors become less worried about eliciting reciprocal cooperation from others and find rewards in cooperating to help others for their own sake (Lai and Reiter, 2000; Wendt, 1994).

This would have been particularly beneficial during bilateral negotiations as it reduces the need for expensive rewards to be offered in receipt of cooperation as countries would have required less persuasion to join the alliance. For example, countries with similar security interests that view the imminent threat posed by Al Qaida in a sim-

⁶This type of behavior in international relations is frequently observed in the UN Commission on Human Rights where governments publicly name and shame others for abusing their citizens (Lebovic and Voeten, 2006).

ilar manner may be more willing to agree or comply with aggressive counterterrorism approaches in order to achieve the aims of the network. Whereas states who emphasize the importance of upholding civil liberties over national security at all times would require larger bribes as they would be more likely to object to the nature of the operations. Countries with closely aligned preferences and a vested interest in the outcomes of counterterrorism cooperation make more reliable partners as they are less likely to disclose classified information that is detrimental to the group (Kydd, 2005). This is an exceptionally important consideration given the sensitive nature of RDI cooperation and a desire to maintain secrecy for as long as possible.

While preferences are difficult to observe directly, they can be analyzed at the level where they manifest; behavior. The UNGA provides a unique opportunity to explore the foreign policy positions of every nation in the world within the same institutional environment (Bailey et al., 2015; Gartzke, 2006; Signorino and Ritter, 1999).⁷ The UNGA is comprised of all 193 members of the UN who meet in regular annual sessions to vote on a range of important international security and peace issues. States at the UNGA are able to observe one another's voting behavior and derive conclusions about the underlying preferences of their peers (Bailey et al., 2015). Equally, it also provides an international platform for states to express their preferences on each topic that a resolution addresses and deliberately signal their type to peers (Becker et al., 2014; Hillman and Potrafke, 2015).⁸

It is largely agreed that the foreign policy position of states (in general) transcends domestic party orientation as UNGA votes remain fairly constant before and after leadership changes. Moreover, domestic political institutions mediate the level of change in foreign policy as they constrain a leader's decision-making process and rarely change across time (Dreher and Jensen, 2012; Mattes et al., 2015; Moravcsik, 1997). This is particularly beneficial for analyzing international cooperation in RDI operations as the type of senior government officials representing the state and directly engaging in these counterterrorism practices varied across countries (from intelligence and security personnel to politicians). Moreover, empirically speaking, many governments changed leadership

⁷Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that state preferences are shaped by those groups in society who ensure a government's survival in office.

⁸While several studies have demonstrated that UNGA voting with the US is consequential, strategic voting is noticeably less prevalent compared to other forums such as the UN security council (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Thacker, 1999; Wang, 1999).

between 2001-2005 (when RDI operations were most active) and cooperation continued.

However, it is unlikely that all votes matter in this context as there is great variation in the types of resolutions that states vote on at the UNGA. The category of votes that are most important in relation to cooperation in the RDI program are human rights. I conceptualize voting patterns on this set of resolutions as a proxy for state preferences on human rights.⁹ While there are many ways that states can gather information on each other's preference type and reach conclusions about how they expect certain countries to behave, UNGA voting data provides a reliable proxy for comparing state preferences on human rights related matters as the institutional environment where the behavior is observed is equal and stable across the sample (unlike domestic conditions where human rights behavior can also be observed).

There may be many states who agree with the US on security issues but who fundamentally disagree with the civil liberties trade-off that must be made in return. Voting patterns on human rights resolutions can provide us with some indication of a country's willingness to bend human rights for the sake of national security. For example, in 1999 the UK, Poland and Romania (known RDI partners) demonstrated identical voting behavior to the US by abstaining on a Human Rights and Terrorism resolution that included provisions on upholding human rights in the context of counterterrorism (indicating a more similar preference to the US on security-civil liberties trade-offs). However, in comparison, in 2000 the Netherlands and Norway (countries that did not cooperate in the RDI program) voted in support of a resolution on the topic of upholding the Geneva Conventions, whereas the US voted against it (indicating less similar preference to the U.S on security-civil liberties trade-offs). On the other hand, countries can have both dissimilar preferences to the US on human and prefer trading off civil liberties in the name of national security in instances where the US votes in support of a human rights resolution. For example, Egypt and Jordan (known RDI partners) have less similar voting patterns to the US on human rights resolutions in comparison to the UK, Poland and Romania and yet it is well known that they practice repression in the context of counterterrorism. However, we should expect UNGA voting data to be most useful for distinguishing between countries with less variation in human rights similarity

⁹While preferences on other issue areas such as trade or economic development may possibly be correlated with preferences on human rights, we would not expect these factors to have a major direct impact on US decision making in this context.

to the US (where their position on security-civil liberties tradeoffs is less clear). This leads us to the article's central hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Countries with similar human rights preferences to the US were more likely to cooperate in RDI operations.

Research Design

In order to evaluate this article's hypothesis, I estimate a probit model that tests the effect of US human rights dissimilarity on cooperation in the RDI program. The independent variable is termed "Human Rights Dissimilarity" as it is computed by subtracting a state ideal's point from the US's ideal point. Therefore, a low value indicates greater similarity to the US and a high value indicates less similarity. Accordingly, if a negative sign appears next to the Human Rights Dissimilarity coefficient in the regression Table, then this indicates greater similarity and if there is not a negative sign then this indicates less similarity. The unit of analysis is the country in 2000 and the data used for estimation has information on 169 states. Limiting the data to 2000 prevents post-9/11 events in the final quarter of 2001 from contaminating the analysis. This is important as the first known rendition took place in December 2001 and the selection process would have started prior to this in order for the operations to be planned. Moreover, it is also possible that the independent variable, Human Rights Dissimilarity, and the dependent variable, Cooperation, may be spurious. For example, the US's need to induce concessions from a given country might explain both voting behavior at the UNGA on human rights and whether a country cooperates in RDI operations. By focusing on pre-9/11 data, the possibility that the US is using UN votes to secure RDI cooperation (and vice versa) is eliminated.

Dependent Variable (Cooperation)

The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a state cooperated with the US in RDI operations at any point after September 11 2001, and 0 otherwise. This is the case for 31% of the observations (53) but not for the remaining 69% (116). Cooperation is identified by the Open Society Foundations (2013) Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition report, which provides the most "comprehensive

catalog” of detainee transfers and foreign government participation in RDI practices. The factual content of the report is derived from carefully reviewed credible public sources and information provided by reputable human rights organizations (Open Society Foundations, 2013, 6).

Independent Variable (Human Rights Dissimilarity)

To test this article’s hypothesis, I use Voeten (2013) UNGA Voting Data as a proxy for a country’s human rights dissimilarity to the US. I extract voting data on human rights resolutions from 1991-2000 to calculate a country’s mean estimate of human rights dissimilarity during the ten years preceding the WoT. This wider time frame provides far greater variation of human rights dissimilarity than the small number of resolutions voted on in 2000, with voting data on 139 resolutions taken into account (see Appendix 2 for a full list of the resolution subjects during this time period). The raw data on UNGA voting records provides an observation for each country per resolution; indicating whether a state voted yes, no or abstained. I use a spatial model to estimate state ideal points on human rights on a single dimension from 1991 to 2000. I adopt the same normalized identification procedure as Bailey et al. (2015) by imposing a mean of zero with a standard deviation of 1 to each ideal point. I create a roll call of votes for each year, based on whether a country voted yes, no or abstained on a particular resolution.¹⁰ The Bayesian item theory response model is then fitted using a Markov chain Monte Carlo method. This procedure places countries on a single spectrum where their vote on a given resolution is a function of their ideal point and random error. In order to compute a country’s dissimilarity in human rights preferences to the US, I subtract their mean ideal point from 1991-2000 from the US’s mean ideal point for this time period. The index is continuous and has a scale from 0.09 to 2.19. States with lower values (greater similarity) such as Israel have more similar human rights preferences to the US and states with higher values (greater dissimilarity) such as China have less similar human rights preferences to the US. There is complete information for the Human Rights Dissimilarity variable for 167 out of 169 countries. The median value is 1.36 (for example, Senegal), the minimum value is 0.09 (Israel), the maximum value is 2.19 (India) and the standard deviation across the sample is 0.44. The top ten states with the closest human

¹⁰States that were not present at the meeting or are not a member of the UNGA are coded NA.

rights similarity to the US within the sample of countries known to have cooperated in RDI operations include the Czech Republic, Somalia, Australia, Spain, Ireland, Austria, Macedonia, Georgia, Lithuania, and Greece. Given that state preferences could change over time, I have run a series of t-tests to confirm that human rights dissimilarity to the US from 1991-2000 does not deviate significantly from human rights dissimilarity to the US for the year 2000.

Controls

To eliminate the possibility that other factors affecting the likelihood of cooperation in RDI operations may be correlated with the preference measure, I control for a number of confounders. I include variables representing each of the core international relations theories discussed at the beginning of this article in the model, in addition to a measure on overall preference dissimilarity and distance to the central rendition transit corridor.

*Overall Preference Dissimilarity*¹¹

In order to ensure that the independent variable is not capturing general preference dissimilarity on issues other than human rights, I include a measure for overall preference dissimilarity. I use Bailey et al. (2015) Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from UN Voting Data and extract the Ideal point variable which provides the mean estimate of a country ideal point in a given year using a dynamic ordinal spatial model. In order to control for overall preference dissimilarity during the same time period that the independent variable covers, I calculate the mean ideal point for each country from 1991-2000 and subtract it from the US' mean ideal point for this time period. The index is continuous and has a scale from 0.52 to 4.52. States with lower values (greater similarity) such as the UK have more similar preferences to the US and states with higher values (less similarity) such as North Korea have less similar preferences to the US. This alternative explanation suggests that countries with greater overall preference dissimilarity were less likely to cooperate in the RDI program as countries with closely aligned preferences make more reliable cooperation partners as they are less likely to

¹¹This control variable is termed "Overall Preference Dissimilarity" as a low value indicates greater similarity to the US and a high value indicates greater dissimilarity. This is because a state's relative similarity/dissimilarity is computed by subtracting their mean ideal point from the US' mean ideal point. Accordingly, if a negative sign appears next to the Overall Preference Dissimilarity coefficient in any of the regression tables, then this indicates greater similarity and if there is not a negative sign then this indicates greater dissimilarity.

disclose classified information that is detrimental to the group.


Central Rendition Transit Corridor (log)

Extraordinary rendition operations during the post-9/11 period used private civilian aircrafts to conceal detainee transfers. Rendition circuits typically began and completed their journey in the US (where the home bases of aircrafts were located) and included a stop at Washington Dulles International Airport as it provided a convenient location to pick up and drop off rendition teams (Shane, 2005). Due to the limited range of the private civilian aircrafts used by the CIA, extraordinary rendition operations included a series of stops where aircrafts could rest, refuel and regroup during a long journey from the US to secret detention sites located in Eastern Europe, North Africa and Asia (Open Society Foundations, 2013). It is possible to analyze all of the flights within a circuit by using public flight data to track extraordinary rendition flight paths; including those that facilitate the refueling of an aircraft before and after the transfer of a CIA terrorist suspect to a secret detention site (Cordell, 2017; Raphael et al., 2015). Accordingly, we might be more likely to observe cooperation from countries with an airport closer to a central rendition transit corridor based on their geographical position and logistical utility during the transfer of a detainee.

I create a Central Rendition Transit Corridor spatial control variable by calculating the distance of every airport in the world from the shortest flight path between the US and the WoT battle ground in Afghanistan. The shortest distance between two points on the surface of the earth is known as a great circle. I use Geographic Information System data to model the shortest flight path from Washington Dulles International Airport to Kabul International Airport (a central location for Operation Enduring Freedom from the end of 2001). I calculate the minimum distance between a state and the flight path using latitude and longitude coordinates from Our Airports (2016) data (including only medium and large airports that would enable larger aircrafts used by the CIA to land).¹² This dataset is the largest publicly available dataset in the field of Aviation; containing geographical information on 50,235 airports (Our Airports, 2016). I construct a continuous variable and take the natural logarithm. A high value (for

¹²While many other variables inform the optimum flight path the current measure provides a simple baseline model that is still able to capture the theoretical notion of the most convenient extraordinary rendition flight path (Warntz, 1961).

Figure 2: Visual Representation of the Central Rendition Transit Corridor (log) Variable.



The red line represents the shortest flight path from Washington Dulles International Airport, U.S. to Kabul International Airport, Afghanistan, and the blue points represent the airport within each country closest to the flight path. Source: Our Airports (2016).

example, Fiji) represents a greater distance from the central rendition transit corridor between the US and Afghanistan (less logistical utility) and a low value (for example, Canada) represents a shorter distance from the central rendition transit corridor between the US and Afghanistan (greater logistical utility). Figure 2 gives a visual representation of the central rendition transit corridor control variable. The blue points on the map depict the airport within each country closest to the central rendition transit corridor, and the red line represents the shortest flight path from Washington Dulles International Airport, US to Kabul International Airport, Afghanistan.

Alliance

I create an Alliance control variable to account for whether or not a state is a US ally by using Leeds et al. (2002) Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions data. I construct a dummy variable and code states 1 if they have a formal military alliance with the US in 2000 (for example, Australia), and 0 otherwise (for example, Switzerland) (Leeds et al., 2002). Following Mattes and Vonnahme (2010), I exclude non-aggression and neutrality pacts from my analysis as the motivations and obligations behind these agreements are entirely different and do not require states to actively cooperate during military threat or conflict. International relations literature suggests that we should expect to observe cooperation between allies since defense pact members are obliged to come to the aid of their alliance partners in times of need and are more trustworthy and reliable as they

know that they will be dealing with each other repeatedly in the future (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Fearon, 1998; Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995; Long et al., 2000; Marinov et al., 2015).

Regime Type

I control for Regime Type by using Coppedge et al. (2016) Varieties of Democracy data. I extract the electoral democracy index; polyarchy and retrieve country scores from 2000. This continuous variable includes a country's respect for freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected executive and suffrage. A higher value (for example, Luxembourg) indicates that a state has greater presence of electoral democracy and a lower value (for example, Saudi Arabia) indicates that a state has a lower presence of electoral democracy. Previous literature tells us that we should not expect democracies to participate in the RDI program because of the domestic costs that would result if detected (Conrad, 2014; Davenport, 2007; Kelley, 2007; Rejali, 2009; Vreeland, 2008).

Terrorism (log)

I control for Terrorism threat by using Enders et al. (2011) Domestic Versus Transnational Terrorism: Data, Decomposition, and Dynamics data. This data separates the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) into transnational and domestic terrorist incidents and calibrates transnational terrorist data from GTD and ITERATE to overcome the inaccuracies in counting of events. Given the international nature of the WoT, I exclude domestic terrorist incidents from the data and count the number of transnational terrorist incidents in a given year. I construct a continuous variable and take the natural logarithm of the total number of transnational terrorist incidents in the ten years preceding the start of the WoT (1991-2000). A higher value (for example, France) indicates that a state has a greater terrorism threat and a lower value (for example, Iceland) indicates that a state has a lower terrorism threat. Past studies would predict cooperation from states with high levels of terrorism threat because of shared grievances with the US and the opportunity to defeat a common enemy and foil potential attacks on their territory (Bueno de Mesquita, 2007; Kroenig, 2009; Lai and Reiter, 2000; Sandler, 2005).

Dependence on the US (Trade%GDP (log), Aid%GDP (log), Population (log))

I control for dependence on the US by using the IMF (2016) Direction of Trade Statistics and the USAID (2016) Foreign Aid Explorer dataset. I construct two continuous variables using data from 2000 that calculate the amount of trade as a percentage of GDP and the amount of aid as a percentage of GDP using Gleditsch (2002) Expanded GDP and Trade Data. For the Trade variable, I add a state's imports and exports together (IMF, 2016). For the Aid variable, I add the military and economic obligations (money agreed to be spent) together (USAID, 2016). In both instances, I take the natural logarithm of the total. A higher value indicates that a state depends more on the US (for example, Mexico and Jordan) and a lower value indicates less dependence (for example, Cuba and Iran). To further control for the balance of power with the US, I construct a continuous variable that takes the natural logarithm of a country's Population size in 2000 using Gleditsch (2002) Expanded GDP and Trade Data. A higher value indicates that the balance of power between a state and the US is more equal (for example, China) and a lower value indicates that the balance of power between a state and the US is less equal (for example, Belize). Previous literature informs us that we should expect countries that are more dependent on the US (for financial or security reasons) to be more likely to cooperate in order to avoid sanctions and ensure that their support continues (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dreher et al., 2008; Hufbauer et al., 1990; Nooruddin and Payton, 2010).

Party Orientation

I control for Party Orientation by using the Beck et al. (2015) World Bank Database of Political Institutions. I extract data for 2000 from the categorical variable EXERCRLC that codes the party orientation of a government as left, center or right (Beck et al., 2015). I construct a dummy variable for this measure. States are coded 1 if they are right-wing (for example, Denmark), and 0 otherwise (for example, Norway). These scores specifically relate to a party's economic policy but are likely to be highly correlated with a more general ideological positioning that applies to other political domains. Past research on the importance of domestic politics suggests that we might expect to observe more cooperation from right wing governments, as such parties are more likely to implement policies that strongly prioritize national security over civil liberties (Imbeau et al., 2001; Moeckli, 2008; Neumayer et al., 2014; Welch and Schuster, 2005).

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables.

| Variable | N | Mean | S.D. | Min | Max |
|--|-----|------|------|------|-------|
| Human Rights Dissimilarity | 167 | 1.26 | 0.44 | 0.09 | 2.19 |
| Overall Preference Dissimilarity | 167 | 2.94 | 0.84 | 0.52 | 4.52 |
| Central Rendition Transit Corridor (log) | 169 | 7.79 | 1.22 | 3.09 | 9.41 |
| Alliance | 169 | 0.3 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| Regime Type | 158 | 0.53 | 0.28 | 0.03 | 0.94 |
| Terrorism (log) | 168 | 1.99 | 1.46 | 0 | 6.4 |
| Trade%GDP (log) | 169 | 8.22 | 2.9 | 0 | 13.77 |
| Aid%GDP (log) | 169 | 5.31 | 3.13 | 0 | 11.13 |
| Population (log) | 169 | 9 | 1.64 | 5.55 | 14.04 |
| Party Orientation | 169 | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0 | 1 |

Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of this article’s independent and control variables; including the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values.

Method

Given that the dependent variable capturing dyadic cooperation with the US in RDI is binary, I use a probit model with robust standard errors. I also test the robustness of the results by estimating the average treatment effect of US human rights dissimilarity on RDI cooperation using a matched sample with balanced values on the control variables included in Model 2. This reduces the sample from 169 to 126. The distribution of the dependent variable in this subsample includes 42 countries coded as 1 (that did cooperate), and 0 otherwise (that did not cooperate).

Results

The theoretical argument predicts that states with similar human rights preferences were more likely to cooperate with the US in RDI. The first model in Table 2 presents the baseline effect of human rights dissimilarity on dyadic cooperation with the US. The second model presents the full model including the control variables. Table 3 tests the average treatment effect of the hypothesis on a subset of states that are matched on all the control variables. The results from Table 2 and Table 3 provide empirical support for the hypothesis.

As expected, countries with greater human rights dissimilarity to the US were less likely to cooperate in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period (that is, countries

Table 2: Probit Regression, Cooperation in Rendition, Secret Detention and Interrogation.

| Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| | Baseline Model | Full Model |
| | Human Rights | Human Rights |
| | Dissimilarity | Dissimilarity |
| Human Rights Dissimilarity | -0.77*** (0.24) | -0.95** (0.47) |
| Overall Preference Dissimilarity | - | -0.08 (0.26) |
| Central Rendition Transit Corridor | - | -0.14 (0.10) |
| Alliance | - | -0.47 (0.34) |
| Regime Type | - | -0.53 (0.71) |
| Terrorism (log) | - | 0.04 (0.10) |
| Trade%GDP (log) | - | -0.02 (0.05) |
| Aid%GDP (log) | - | -0.08** (0.04) |
| Population (log) | - | 0.13 (0.10) |
| Party Orientation | - | -0.42 (0.33) |
| Constant | 0.47 (0.30) | 1.82 (1.19) |
| N | 167 | 155 |
| LR chi ² | 11.28 | 32.08 |
| Prob>chi ² | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.06 | 0.21 |
| Log Likelihood | -98.71 | -82.85 |
| AIC | 201.4 | 187.7 |

Significant Codes $p \leq 0.01$ '***', $p \leq 0.05$ '**', $p \leq 0.1$ '*', with Standard Errors in parentheses.

with greater human rights similarity were more likely to participate).

This negative relationship holds in every model and is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level (or more) throughout. We observe less cooperation from states with opposing human rights preferences to the US as the US only approached those countries that it expected to agree to cooperate (states with similar preferences on security-civil liberties trade-offs). The perceived likelihood of cooperation plays an important part in this story as keeping RDI operations secret was paramount. Human rights preferences can easily be observed by peers at the UNGA; enabling states to both signal their type and identify countries that are more likely to view security dilemmas in a similar way. The full model (model 2) that includes all the control variables and tests the effect of Human Rights Dissimilarity demonstrates the greatest model fit. The effect of Human

Rights Dissimilarity to the US has a significant and negative effect on cooperation in RDI at the 95% confidence level.


Beyond the hypothesis, the model produces some surprising results that are worthy of discussion. For example, the Aid%GDP (log) has a negative and significant effect at the 95% confidence level indicating that states with less dependence on the US were more likely to cooperate. This is likely because of the large number of established democracies that cooperated in RDI that do not require aid from the US and have a higher GDP. The findings for the Overall Preference Dissimilarity variable indicate that countries that cooperated in RDI operations had greater general preference similarity to the US (as opposed to less similarity) but that this relationship was not causal. This adds further support to the main hypothesis that similarity in preferences on human rights is what matters in the context of explaining cooperation in the RDI program, regardless of whether states has overall preference similarity. The results for the Central Rendition Transit Corridor variable indicate that countries that cooperated in RDI operations were located closer to the central rendition transit corridor between the US and Afghanistan but that feature is not predictive of cooperation. This is likely because the benefits of securing cooperation from states with a more desirable location (that is, shorter flight time) is overshadowed by the need to obtain cooperation from countries that are more likely to cooperate in secret (especially given recent advances in aviation trip planning). The outcome for the Regime Type variable indicates that there were more democratic countries that cooperated in RDI activities but that this relationship was not causal. First, this could be due to the large number of established democracies cooperating in this contentious counterterrorism network that are better at keeping secrets than non-democracies because of the costs associated with being caught (Colaresi, 2014; Colaresi and DiBlasi, 2017). Second, this could be because the dependent variable is binary and does not distinguish between cooperation type. This finding warrants further investigation and points to an interesting tension between upholding civil liberties in the context of national security that future research should pursue. Alternatively, it may be the case that democracies were more likely to be caught cooperating in the RDI program than non-democracies because of a greater presence of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and freedom of the press. The result for the Terrorism (log) variable indicates that RDI partner countries had greater levels of transnational terrorism threat

but that this pattern does not predict cooperation. This finding adds further support to the hypothesis that national security concerns were not the sole driver of cooperation in the RDI program; a country's willingness to engage in contentious counterterrorism cooperation depended on their commitment to upholding civil liberties too.

However, the findings for the Alliance variable indicate that countries with less formal alliances cooperated in RDI operations but that this relationship was not causal. This null finding may be because this measure and the dependent variable are both binary but empirically neither alliances nor cooperation were homogenous. The results for the Trade%GDP variable and Population variable indicate that states that cooperated in the RDI program were less dependent on the US (for economic and security reasons) but that this feature is not predictive of cooperation. This finding is similar to that of the Aid%GDP variable and adds further support to the hypothesis, demonstrating that the decision to cooperate in RDI operations did not seem to be strategic (so as to avoid sanctions and continue US support). The outcome for the Party Orientation variable indicates that countries that cooperated in RDI were more likely to be left of center but that this feature does not predict cooperation. This result challenges literature on the polarization of party preferences on security-civil liberties trade-offs but could also be due to more liberal and centrist parties being in office in 2000. These interesting findings support my claim that the secret nature of RDI operations imposed an entirely different dynamic on alliance formation that required the US to be far more selective beyond its usual cooperation partners.

Figure 3 shows the predicted probability of Human Rights Dissimilarity on cooperation in RDI during the post-9/11 period according to model 2. The predicted probabilities are computed by holding all control variables at their means. The x axis displays the range of values for Human Rights Dissimilarity to the US rescaled between 0 and 1 (that is, from very similar to very dissimilar). The y axis displays the probability of dyadic cooperation with the US, ranging from 1 (cooperated) to 0 (did not cooperate). The observed values of human rights dissimilarity (black points) hug the minimum and maximum range of the plot along the horizontal axis (with darker points indicating more observations and lighter points indicating less observations). The blue solid line represents the predicted probabilities and the dashed black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals (Model 2).



The results show that the probability of dyadic cooperation decreases as human rights dissimilarity increases. When the independent variable is held at its mean (for example, Mauritania and Algeria), the probability of cooperation in RDI is 31%. When the independent variable is held at the 95th percentile (for example, the Austria and Ireland), the probability of cooperation in RDI increases to 54%. These empirical findings support the hypothesis that we are more likely to observe secret security cooperation in RDI from states with similar human rights preferences to the US.

In order to test the robustness of my empirical results and evaluate the model fit, I estimate the average treatment effect for human rights dissimilarity with the US on cooperation in RDI. I assign countries within the full sample that have above average human rights similarity to the US to the treatment group (103 countries) and those countries with below average human rights similarity to the US to the control group (66 countries). I use propensity score matching to pair countries in the treatment group to countries in the control group with the closest values on all of the control variables used in Model 2. This pre-processing strategy creates a matched sample of 126 countries balanced on each of the covariates (see Appendix 3 for a list of countries assigned to the treatment and control group). Table 3 displays the average treatment effect of Human Rights Dissimilarity on Cooperation using the matched sample – and the results still hold. Unlike the Aid%GDP variable, Human Rights Dissimilarity continues to have a negative and significant effect (at the 95% confidence interval).

Table 3: Estimating Model Accuracy with Probit Regression, Cooperation in RDI – Using Matched Sample.

| Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|------------------------------------|---|---|
| | Baseline Model Human Rights Dissimilarity | Full Model Human Rights Dissimilarity |
| Human Rights Dissimilarity | -1.05*** (0.29) | -0.98** (0.49) |
| Overall Preference Dissimilarity | - | -0.15 (0.29) |
| Central Rendition Transit Corridor | - | -0.12 (0.11) |
| Alliance | - | -0.38 (0.36) |
| Regime Type | - | -0.54 (0.80) |
| Terrorism (log) | - | 0.02 (0.11) |
| Trade%GDP (log) | - | -0.02 (0.05) |
| Aid%GDP (log) | - | -0.05 (0.05) |
| Population (log) | - | 0.16 (0.12) |
| Party Orientation | - | -0.34 (0.34) |
| Constant | 0.73** (0.34) | 1.51 (1.42) |
| N | 126 | 126 |
| LR chi ² | 14.58 | 27.83 |
| Prob>chi ² | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.09 | 0.17 |
| Log Likelihood | -72.91 | -66.28 |
| AIC | 149.8 | 154.6 |

Significant Codes $p \leq 0.01$ '***', $p \leq 0.05$ '**', $p \leq 0.1$ '*', with Standard Errors in parentheses.

I further test the robustness of my empirical results by running Model 1 and Model 2 with Economic Development Dissimilarity in replacement of Human Rights Dissimilarity to ensure that the independent variable is capturing preferences on human rights specifically (see Appendix 4).

I compute ideal point for states on Economic Development resolutions only from 1991-2000 in the same way that ideal points were created for Human Rights Dissimilarity whereby a low value represents greater preference similarity to the US and a higher value represents greater dissimilarity. The effect of Economic Development Dissimilarity is not significant (at the 95% confidence level) in either models and shows an opposite trend to the Human Dissimilarity Variable in Model 2 as states with greater preference dissimilarity cooperated in RDI. These results provide further support for the

hypothesis.

Conclusion

What determined more than a quarter of the world's countries to participate in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period? Unlike other forms of clandestine counterterrorism cooperation, the practice of extraordinary rendition has the advantage of being observable (ex-post), as we can analyze detainee testimony and suspected extraordinary rendition flight paths using publicly available data. Given the sensitive nature of cooperation required, I have argued that the US screened countries according to their preferences on security-civil liberties trade-offs. Countries with similar preferences to the US on human rights were cheaper to buy off and would have required less persuasion to cooperate as they are more likely to view security-civil liberties trade-offs in a similar light. In order to obtain support from the international community during the WoT and maintain counterterrorism cooperation, the US needed to ensure that their RDI program remained secret. Therefore, it was crucial that the US avoided approaching countries that it expected would decline cooperation and risk leaking their contentious counterterrorism plans. To test this hypothesis, I used UNGA voting data as a proxy to explore similarity in state preferences on human rights. Results from my quantitative analysis provide robust empirical support my theoretical argument.

One puzzling feature of international cooperation in the RDI program is the large number of established democracies that assisted the US in the violation of human rights. Previous research on this topic suggests that we should not expect this this group of countries to engage in repression because of domestic and international legal constraints on their behavior. However, the results appear to show that this did not work. This presents an interesting tension between upholding civil liberties in the context of national security that warrants further research. While engaging in the violation of human rights may be costlier for democracies than non-democracies, this incentive may make democracies better at keeping secrets which would make them desirable RDI partners to the US (Colaresi, 2014; Colaresi and DiBlasi, 2017). While the empirical results in this article do not provide direct empirical support for this theory, future research on this topic may seek to disaggregate cooperation in RDI operations into frequency of co-

operation and cooperation type using information on known renditions (Cordell, 2017; Raphael et al., 2015).

However, the clandestine nature of counterterrorism cooperation makes it difficult to estimate exactly when and to what extent countries participated in RDI operations. Binary data on cooperation in the RDI program is more reliable and less likely to contain false positives as it pools categories and intensity of cooperation into one measure that provides an overall picture of cooperation (albeit with less variation on the dependent variable). The Open Society Foundations (2013) report used to measure binary cooperation in the RDI program in this article provides the most conservative estimates of cooperation in rendition; using carefully reviewed credible public sources and information provided by reputable human rights organizations. However, any data that attempts to measure secret cooperation risks excluding aspects of the process that have not yet come to light (including the possibility that other countries participated). This in part might explain why such a large number of democracies appear in the group of countries known to cooperate in rendition as these countries tend to have a greater presence of NGOs and freedom of the press than non-democracies. However, it has been over a decade since the RDI program was terminated and our knowledge about the operations have improved considerably over time following numerous investigations by European intergovernmental committees, government and parliamentary inquiries, NGOs and investigative journalists. Moreover, it is the unexpected number of democracies that cooperated in the RDI program that makes the article's research question even more important to pursue.

In sum, this article provides a first account of the causes and dynamics of international cooperation in RDI practices during the post-9/11 period from a quantitative perspective. More generally, it contributes to a wider discussion in the field of international relations that seeks to understand which countries are more likely to cooperate with one another on secret counterterrorism operations and why. A major finding from the analysis is that core international relations theory fails to fully explain this form of cooperation. This is likely because secret nature of RDI operations imposed an entirely different dynamic on alliance formation that required the US to be far more selective beyond its usual cooperation partners. The results have important policy implications as the findings indicate that democracies are just as likely to engage in repression when

the activities are expected to remain hidden. This research can also be useful both for NGOs and investigative researchers interested in using the findings for advocacy purposes and forecasting which countries are more likely to cooperate with one another on sensitive issues in national security.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Categories of participation in the RDI program.

| Country | Host CIA Prison | Arrest Detention Interrogation | Intelligence Sharing | Airports |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|----------|
| Afghanistan | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Albania | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Algeria | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Angola | No | No | No | No |
| Argentina | No | No | No | No |
| Armenia | No | No | No | No |
| Australia | No | Yes | No | No |
| Austria | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Azerbaijan | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Bahamas | No | No | No | No |
| Bahrain | No | No | No | No |
| Bangladesh | No | No | No | No |
| Barbados | No | No | No | No |
| Belarus | No | No | No | No |
| Belgium | No | No | No | Yes |
| Belize | No | No | No | No |
| Benin | No | No | No | No |
| Bhutan | No | No | No | No |
| Bolivia | No | No | No | No |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Botswana | No | No | No | No |
| Brazil | No | No | No | No |
| Brunei | No | No | No | No |
| Bulgaria | No | No | No | No |
| Burkina Faso | No | No | No | No |
| Burundi | No | No | No | No |
| Cambodia | No | No | No | No |
| Cameroon | No | No | No | No |
| Canada | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Cape Verde | No | No | No | No |
| Central African Republic | No | No | No | No |
| Chad | No | No | No | No |
| Chile | No | No | No | No |
| China | No | No | No | No |
| Colombia | No | No | No | No |
| Comoros | No | No | No | No |
| Congo | No | No | No | No |
| Costa Rica | No | No | No | No |
| Croatia | No | No | No | Yes |
| Cuba | No | No | No | No |
| Cyprus | No | No | No | Yes |
| Czech Republic | No | No | No | Yes |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | No | No | No | No |
| Denmark | No | No | No | Yes |
| Djibouti | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Dominican Republic | No | No | No | No |
| Ecuador | No | No | No | No |
| Egypt | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| El Salvador | No | No | No | No |
| Equatorial Guinea | No | No | No | No |
| Eritrea | No | No | No | No |

| | | | | |
|---------------|-----|-----|----|-----|
| Estonia | No | No | No | No |
| Ethiopia | No | Yes | No | No |
| Fiji | No | No | No | No |
| Finland | No | No | No | Yes |
| France | No | No | No | No |
| Gabon | No | No | No | No |
| Gambia | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Georgia | No | Yes | No | No |
| Germany | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Ghana | No | No | No | No |
| Greece | No | No | No | Yes |
| Guatemala | No | No | No | No |
| Guinea | No | No | No | No |
| Guinea-Bissau | No | No | No | No |
| Guyana | No | No | No | No |
| Haiti | No | No | No | No |
| Honduras | No | No | No | No |
| Hungary | No | No | No | No |
| Iceland | No | No | No | Yes |
| India | No | No | No | No |
| Indonesia | No | Yes | No | No |
| Iran | No | Yes | No | No |
| Iraq | No | No | No | No |
| Ireland | No | No | No | Yes |
| Israel | No | No | No | No |
| Italy | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Ivory Coast | No | No | No | No |
| Jamaica | No | No | No | No |
| Japan | No | No | No | No |
| Jordan | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Kazakhstan | No | No | No | No |
| Kenya | No | Yes | No | No |
| Kuwait | No | No | No | No |
| Kyrgyzstan | No | No | No | No |
| Laos | No | No | No | No |
| Latvia | No | No | No | No |
| Lebanon | No | No | No | No |
| Lesotho | No | No | No | No |
| Liberia | No | No | No | No |
| Libya | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Lithuania | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Luxembourg | No | No | No | No |
| Macedonia | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Madagascar | No | No | No | No |
| Malawi | No | Yes | No | No |
| Malaysia | No | Yes | No | No |
| Maldives | No | No | No | No |
| Mali | No | No | No | No |
| Malta | No | No | No | No |
| Mauritania | No | Yes | No | No |
| Mauritius | No | No | No | No |
| Mexico | No | No | No | No |
| Moldova | No | No | No | No |
| Mongolia | No | No | No | No |
| Morocco | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Mozambique | No | No | No | No |
| Myanmar | No | No | No | No |
| Namibia | No | No | No | No |

| | | | | |
|----------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Nepal | No | No | No | No |
| Netherlands | No | No | No | No |
| New Zealand | No | No | No | No |
| Nicaragua | No | No | No | No |
| Niger | No | No | No | No |
| Nigeria | No | No | No | No |
| North Korea | No | No | No | No |
| Norway | No | No | No | No |
| Oman | No | No | No | No |
| Pakistan | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Panama | No | No | No | No |
| Papua New Guinea | No | No | No | No |
| Paraguay | No | No | No | No |
| Peru | No | No | No | No |
| Philippines | No | No | No | No |
| Poland | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Portugal | No | No | No | Yes |
| Qatar | No | No | No | No |
| Romania | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Russia | No | No | No | No |
| Rwanda | No | No | No | No |
| Saudi Arabia | No | Yes | No | No |
| Senegal | No | No | No | No |
| Sierra Leone | No | No | No | No |
| Singapore | No | No | No | No |
| Slovakia | No | No | No | No |
| Slovenia | No | No | No | No |
| Solomon Islands | No | No | No | No |
| Somalia | No | Yes | No | No |
| South Africa | No | Yes | No | No |
| South Korea | No | No | No | No |
| Spain | No | No | No | Yes |
| Sri Lanka | No | No | No | Yes |
| Sudan | No | No | No | No |
| Suriname | No | No | No | No |
| Swaziland | No | No | No | No |
| Sweden | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Switzerland | No | No | No | No |
| Syria | No | Yes | No | No |
| Taiwan | No | No | No | No |
| Tajikistan | No | No | No | No |
| Tanzania | No | No | No | No |
| Thailand | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Togo | No | No | No | No |
| Trinidad and Tobago | No | No | No | No |
| Tunisia | No | No | No | No |
| Turkey | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Turkmenistan | No | No | No | No |
| Uganda | No | No | No | No |
| Ukraine | No | No | No | No |
| United Arab Emirates | No | Yes | No | No |
| United Kingdom | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Uruguay | No | No | No | No |
| Uzbekistan | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Venezuela | No | No | No | No |
| Vietnam | No | No | No | No |
| Yemen | No | Yes | No | No |
| Yugoslavia | No | No | No | No |

| | | | | |
|----------|----|-----|----|----|
| Zambia | No | No | No | No |
| Zimbabwe | No | Yes | No | No |

Source: Open Society Foundations (2013).

Appendix 2: List of UNGA human rights resolutions from 1991-2000.

| UN Human Rights Resolution Subject | Number of Resolutions |
|---|-----------------------|
| Apartheid, Committee | 1 |
| Apartheid, Convention | 3 |
| Apartheid, Sports | 1 |
| Coercive Measures | 1 |
| Crimes Against Women | 1 |
| Democratic Order | 1 |
| Freedom Of Travel | 7 |
| Human Rights, Bosnia, Croatia, Yugoslavia | 6 |
| Human Rights, Charter Principles | 1 |
| Human Rights, Coercive Measures | 4 |
| Human Rights, Cuba | 6 |
| Human Rights, Democratic Congo | 2 |
| Human Rights, Globalization | 2 |
| Human Rights, International Cooperation | 2 |
| Human Rights, Iran | 9 |
| Human Rights, Iraq | 10 |
| Human Rights, Kosovo | 6 |
| Human Rights, Nigeria | 3 |
| Human Rights, Occupied Kuwait | 1 |
| Human Rights, Occupied Territories | 4 |
| Human Rights, Sudan | 7 |
| Human Rights, Terrorism | 2 |
| Human Rights, U.N. System | 4 |
| Indiscriminatory Weapons | 1 |
| Israel, Geneva Convention | 10 |
| Mercenaries | 9 |
| Migrant Workers | 1 |
| Palestine, Intifadah | 1 |
| Palestine, Rights Committee | 8 |
| Palestine, Rights, Committee | 5 |
| Palestine, Rights, Secretariat | 7 |
| Right To Development | 3 |
| Self-Determination | 4 |
| Sudan | 1 |
| U.N. African Crime Institute | 3 |
| World Conference On Women | 1 |
| Zionism And Racism, Elimination | 1 |
| Total resolutions: 139. | |

Appendix 3: Matched Sample used to estimate treatment effect of Human Rights Similarity on Cooperation in the RDI program.

| Treatment Group | Control Group |
|--|---|
| Greater than Average Human Rights Similarity | Less than Average Human Rights Similarity |
| Albania | Algeria |
| Australia | Angola |
| Austria | Argentina |
| Barbados | Armenia |
| Belgium | Azerbaijan |
| Bolivia | Belarus |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | Benin |
| Brazil | Bhutan |
| Bulgaria | Botswana |
| Canada | Burundi |
| Chile | Cambodia |
| Costa Rica | Cameroon |
| Croatia | Central African Republic |
| Cyprus | Colombia |
| Czech Republic | Comoros |
| Denmark | Congo |
| Dominican Republic | Djibouti |
| Ecuador | Fiji |
| El Salvador | Gabon |
| Estonia | Guatemala |
| Finland | Guinea-Bissau |
| France | Guyana |
| Gambia | Ivory Coast |
| Georgia | Jamaica |
| Germany | Jordan |
| Greece | Kenya |
| Haiti | Kyrgyzstan |
| Honduras | Lebanon |
| Hungary | Lesotho |
| Iceland | Liberia |
| Iraq | Madagascar |
| Ireland | Malawi |
| Israel | Maldives |
| Italy | Mali |
| Japan | Mauritania |
| Kazakhstan | Mexico |
| Latvia | Namibia |
| Lithuania | Nepal |
| Macedonia | Niger |
| Mauritius | Nigeria |
| Moldova | Pakistan |
| Mongolia | Panama |
| Netherlands | Papua New Guinea |
| New Zealand | Peru |
| Nicaragua | Philippines |
| Norway | Qatar |
| Paraguay | Russia |
| Poland | Rwanda |
| Portugal | Saudi Arabia |
| Romania | Senegal |
| Slovakia | Sierra Leone |

| | |
|---------------------|--------------|
| Slovenia | South Africa |
| Solomon Islands | Sri Lanka |
| Somalia | Suriname |
| South Korea | Swaziland |
| Spain | Tajikistan |
| Sweden | Thailand |
| Trinidad and Tobago | Togo |
| Turkey | Turkmenistan |
| Ukraine | Uruguay |
| United Kingdom | Venezuela |
| Uzbekistan | Yemen |
| Yugoslavia | Zambia |

Countries are matched on all of the control variables included in Model 2; Overall Preference Similarity, Central Rendition Transit Corridor, Alliance, Regime Type, Terrorism (log), Trade%GDP (log), Aid%GDP (log), Population (log), Party Orientation.

Appendix 4: Probit Regression, Cooperation in RDI – Using Economic Development Dissimilarity in replacement of Human Rights Dissimilarity.

| Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|------------------------------------|---|---|
| | Baseline Model Economic Development Dissimilarity | Full Model Economic Development Dissimilarity |
| Economic Development Dissimilarity | -0.41 (0.38) | 0.11 (0.46) |
| Overall Preference Dissimilarity | - | -0.43** (0.21) |
| Central Rendition Transit Corridor | - | -0.10 (0.10) |
| Alliance | - | -0.56* (0.34) |
| Regime Type | - | -0.22 (0.67) |
| Terrorism (log) | - | 0.09 (0.10) |
| Trade%GDP (log) | - | -0.01 (0.05) |
| Aid%GDP (log) | - | -0.10** (0.04) |
| Population (log) | - | 0.08 (0.10) |
| Party Orientation | - | -0.43 (0.32) |
| Constant | 0.64 (1.02) | 1.37 (1.61) |
| N | 167 | 155 |
| LR chi ² | 1.29 | 27.59 |
| Prob>chi ² | 0.26 | 0.00 |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.01 | 0.19 |
| Log Likelihood | -103.71 | -85.09 |
| AIC | 211.4 | 192.2 |

Significant Codes $p \leq 0.01$ '***', $p \leq 0.05$ '**', $p \leq 0.1$ '*', with Standard Errors in parentheses.

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